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1.1. Background 
Public policy design currently receives a special attention from policymakers and 
social stakeholders alike, in light of developments brought about by the economic 
and financial turmoil that started in 2008. In the EU, the crisis is seen as the 
sharpest economic contraction since its establishment (DG ECFIN, 2009), though 
degrees of countries’ vulnerability are highly varied. For example, among the 
earliest and hardest hit countries are the new EU member states, with the Baltic 
states1 being among those the most affected (Gardó & Martin, 2010).  
Finding adequate public policy responses able to counteract crisis influences is a 
major challenge. Many different approaches are being proposed, often including 
interventions of international financial institutions but also responses achieved 
solely via national policy measures. In any case, policy packages chosen to combat 
budget deficits are highly varied across the countries, both in terms of overall 
budgetary size and changes in specific policy aims or parameters. Their 
distributional impacts are often not well known and undergo intense public 
discussion. That is not surprising; after all, the way a number of public policies are 
designed has an influence on each of our chances for a better living. 
A question on how to reduce/reallocate public expenditure given the new 
economic and social challenges is thus one of the biggest governments’ concerns. 
Furthermore, if public spending cuts are to be made, the least “painful way” would 
be by eliminating (identified) inefficiencies and by aiming at the most effective and 
sustainable use of available resources. Identifying them is a challenge on its own. 
Furthermore, central to such policy optimization is the knowledge of distributional 
consequences. A number of questions are associated with it: which population 
groups should be targeted; what type of people (would) benefit or lose because of 
certain policy designs and redesigns; how to change the policy structure as to 
achieve the most effective use of the available resources, etc. To gain such insights, 
adequate distributional policy analyses should be made, often, though, against the 
odds of time.  
Aside the pressures of the economic crisis, many other – stimulating rather than 
restricting -  factors are responsible for the ever-rising interests in linking policy 
making to the research evidence on whether and how policies work (e.g. 
Sanderson, 2002). Based on Amann (2000), “expansion and availability of the 
relevant social science knowledge, the demand for greater public-accountability or 
the enthusiasm on the part of government for systematic and well-focused 
                                                          
1 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
P a g e  | 4 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF PUBLIC POLICIES 
 
evidence” are behind the surging interest in developing  evidence-based-policies. 
Improvements in data availability and quality are of high importance too.  
As Fischer, Miller, & Sidney (2007) note, “although policy advice-giving is as old as 
government itself, the increasing complexity of modern society dramatically 
intensifies the decision makers’ need for information”. Diversified and complex 
information sources must be analysed in order to extract such relevant 
information. Additionally, timely policy evaluations are particularly challenging, 
not the least because of up-to-date data shortages and availability of ready-to-use 
analytical policy tools. For example, many recent structural reforms are based not 
on the current, but on the previously accumulated research knowledge of actual 
and potential distributional policy impacts.  
Aside plentiful limitations, one could also note that policy analysis adequate data 
is becoming ever-more available, partially due to new technologies and new 
capacities to collect and analyse data originating from diverse sources. Actually, in 
the last 20 to 30 years, availability of high quality micro level data - which is central 
for distributional policy impacts’ analysis - has increased dramatically. In parallel, 
data and policy analysis techniques became more comprehensive too. Altogether, 
this enables making richer and more accurate statements on diverse public policy 
issues. Numerous challenges though still remain.  
1.2. PhD thesis objective 
Broadly, this PhD thesis aims at supporting policy advice in the effective and 
efficient attainment of policy goals. Specifically, it aims at providing new empirical 
evidence on the distributional impacts for one monetary and one in-kind public 
policy, namely state cash support to families and public healthcare. These policies 
are analysed given the national and international perspectives and present ex-post, 
ex-ante and hypothetical policy analysis insights. Furthermore, the thesis goes 
beyond a pure empirical analysis type and explores the relevant methods for a 
comprehensive empirical micro-data analysis underlying the policy advice needs. 
We aim to show what factors are important for a systematic analysis of the 
distributional impact of public policies. Furthermore, we aim to show what methods 
could be employed for gaining comprehensive empirical evidence on such policies’ 
distributional impacts.  
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1.3. PhD thesis structure 
The two selected public policies form the two policy themes and thus the two 
major parts of this dissertation (see Figure 1-1). They also influence selection of 
methodological and data discussion topics.  
Figure 1-1. Thesis structure 
Source: own presentation 
Both cash and in-kind programs are equally important public expenditures tools. 
In some countries, the non-cash benefits exceed public spending on cash benefits 
(e.g. Marical, D'Ercole, Vaalavuo, & Verbist, 2006). The in-kind policy we analyse, 
healthcare provision, represents one of the biggest shares of public expenditures – 
often more than 5% of the country’s GDP (Salanauskaite & Verbist, 2010). Cash 
support to families with children, as the cash program we study, also makes a 
bulky share of public expenses - from about 1% to more than 2% of the country’s 
GDP, based on the information collected in the OECD Family Database (OECD, 
2011). Here, cash support to families covers both benefits and tax breaks (i.e. tax 
credits), though information on the latter item is highly scattered across the 
countries.  
As public policies are reflections of national politics and national socio-economic 
settings, geographical coverage is an important aspect of any empirical policy 
analysis. In this dissertation, healthcare utilisation analysis is conducted based on 
the Luxembourg case study.  Family cash policies are explored within the context 
of the new EU member states (NMS), and particularly Lithuania. Both country and 
region specific selections are related to highly under-explored, though, particularly 
interesting policy and socio-economic settings.  
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Distributional policy analysis relies on the availability of the adequate micro-data. 
Therefore, each of the two dissertation themes also makes a specific contribution to 
the underlying micro-data use. In the first theme, the new empirical evidence is 
primarily obtained via the use of a newly developed social security database. In the 
second theme, survey-based micro-data is enriched using a tax-benefit 
microsimulation model. We present both themes – their motivation, specific 
research objectives, policy and scientific relevance - in more detail below.  
Theme I - Disparities in healthcare use: accounting for employment influences 
The first theme explores distributional impacts of Luxembourg’s national 
healthcare system, i.e. utilisation of healthcare services in relation to diverse 
employment characteristics. This policy question is still under-explored within the 
wider literature in general and Luxembourg in particular. Luxembourg is 
particularly interesting to explore as a case study, given its broad national 
healthcare coverage and one of the most ethnically diverse and mobile 
employment markets in the world.  
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we develop a conceptual framework explaining how 
both individual and contextual level employment characteristics influence the 
individual’s use of healthcare services. Individual characteristics are among the 
most often recognised healthcare use determinants. Various contextual factors, 
aside the features of the healthcare system per se receive a much lower attention, 
though are increasingly recognised as an important source of variation in 
healthcare use. Employment, as an array of both individual and contextual factors, 
lacks a comprehensive acknowledgment too. In this conceptual study, we pool 
multidisciplinary insights, namely the social risk management theory and the 
existing conceptual frameworks of healthcare use, to suggest a more 
comprehensive accounting for these diverse determinants’ types. The proposed 
structure of determinants is then immediately applied to depict how an array of 
employment characteristics influences healthcare utilisation. A better 
understanding of employment, as a determinant of healthcare use, could enable 
more adequate policy responses in reducing unequal healthcare consumption.  
In Chapter 3, we present empirical evidence on how employment characteristics 
influence healthcare utilisation. For this, we explore actual healthcare utilisation in 
Luxembourg, an ex post policy analysis type, and rely on the (retrospective, year 
2006) administrative social security records. This dataset is also enriched with 
selected external information: Luxembourg tax-benefit microsimulation model’s 
information on household disposable income and diverse macro-level information 
on healthcare policy settings and socio-economic environment. In comparison to 
the survey data on healthcare utilisation, the obtained dataset permits a much 
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more comprehensive accounting for diverse determinants of healthcare utilisation 
– in line with the framework proposed in Chapter 2. In particular, we are able to 
take a deeper look into employment related influences. Furthermore, we can 
highlight the role of nationality – as it turns out a crucial factor. Luxembourg is 
thus an interesting case study, as it is one of the most ethnically diverse labour 
markets in the world. It should also be noted, that the utilised dataset is specifically 
structured for this particular empirical study and offers a new, unique and 
unexploited information source for conducting healthcare use analysis.   
Theme II - Distributional impacts of family cash support measures: a 
microsimulation approach 
The second theme of this thesis addresses distributional issues of national cash-
based tax and benefit policies. Specifically, it aims at providing knowledge on how 
effective are family support measures in Lithuania in terms of their ability to 
combat (child) poverty. As policy effectiveness is often better judged in 
comparison to certain thresholds, we first focus solely on the Lithuanian case and 
then analyse its family support system in comparison to the systems of the four 
other new EU member states. Given complexity and inter-linkages of diverse tax 
and benefit policies, as well as numerous limitations of available survey data – we 
employ the microsimulation method to obtain information on the potential 
distribution of diverse family support measures. The tax-benefit microsimulation 
models are highly suitable for complex national policy analyses; however, they 
need to be specifically developed given a certain country’s policy settings. 
Therefore, in this theme, we not only conduct empirical analysis, but also provide a 
wider discussion on the tax-benefit microsimulation models and their availability 
for distributional policy analysis within a wider European transition region.  
Actually, analyses of distributional impacts of public policies are still particularly 
rare in Lithuania. Various reasons can be cited. Among them, restrictions of 
distributional policy analyses in the “soviet” times  due to fear of breaking the 
“equality” myth (Davies, 2009). The distributional analysis and its relevant 
analytical instruments have become more “popular” since then, but still to a lesser 
degree than in numerous other (more developed) countries.  
Additionally, given the lack of microsimulation tools to analyse the major 
Lithuanian family policy reform of 2004, we develop our own partial static 
microsimulation model LitFAMOD. A number of this model’s features were later 
integrated into EUROMOD – the EU-wide tax-benefit microsimulation model. The 
latter model enables Lithuanian tax-benefits’ system analysis of 2008 policies and 
in a cross-country perspective. Both models are primarily based on the 
representative EU-SILC survey data for Lithuania.  
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In Chapter 4, we determine how widespread tax-benefit microsimulation models 
(MSM) are in the European transition countries. This group of transition countries 
is composed of 10 new EU member states plus 13 other countries of South-Eastern 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. This review note 
documents the existing microsimulation tools in these countries and discusses the 
major development initiatives, model types, as well as obstacles behind the 
(sluggish) construction and use of MSM for distributional policy analyses. As some 
of these reasons are necessarily country specific, Lithuania – the country with the 
highest recorded MSM incidence – is used as an illustrative case study. 
Chapter 5 explores to what extent the Lithuanian family benefit system is able to 
combat poverty among families with children – one of the major system aims. 
Family benefits were reformed extensively since 1990’s, with the major reform 
implemented in 2004. The latter reform entails a shift from means-tested benefits to 
a more universal system. Due to budget constraints, implementation of the full 
reform design has been postponed till 2008. No distributional impact analysis of 
this reform, either of its initial or final designs, has yet been implemented. 
Furthermore, given that many families with children live on incomes close to the 
at-risk-of poverty threshold, we also analyse how entitlements to family 
allowances interact with the social assistance system. We evaluate if gains from the 
newly designed family benefits’ system are not foregone due to respective losses in 
social assistance benefits.  
Microsimulation also permits analysis of hypothetical policy reforms and designs – 
a policy issue tackled within Chapter 6 of this thesis. Here, we further explore the 
Lithuanian family benefit system. To evaluate the effectiveness of its design, we 
employ an international comparison. First, we note that the at-risk-of-poverty rates 
of both large and single parent families are extremely high in Lithuania (more than 
45%) despite the state continuously recognising these household types as major 
poverty reduction targets. This contrasts with most other EU countries, where at 
least one of these household types has a better income position. Second, we also 
note that family policies in a few other new member states of the EU, namely 
Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Estonia, are much more effective in 
combating child poverty. This point to potential gains if the Lithuanian system 
were re-designed along the policy parameters of these countries. Using 
microsimulation, we “swap” these countries policies into Lithuanian micro-
settings and vice versus. Such an exercise provides policy relevant evidence on 
how a policy would perform, given different country’s socio-economic and 
demographic settings.   
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2.1. Introduction 
In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights2 stated that “everyone has the 
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and 
of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services…” By now many countries have acknowledged significance of 
(equal) healthcare access. Nevertheless, accessibility remains an issue both in the 
countries with universal health insurance or national healthcare systems and in the 
countries with other types of health care systems.  
Impediments to healthcare use occur due to many factors. Individual 
characteristics and the constrained health policy design are among the most often 
quoted causes (e.g. Gulliford et al., 2002; Hurst & Jee-Hughes, 2001; Mooney, Hall, 
Donaldson, & Gerard, 1991; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2000a; Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 2000b). Changes within many of these factors are difficult to achieve: 
individuals might have certain health needs; adjustments in health care policy 
design are often restricted and lagged due to intricate political processes; there is a 
lack of adequate policy tools or knowledge on the sources of the access 
impediments. Thereby, a growing interest recently falls on the modifiable factors of 
healthcare use (i.e. the factors which could be more easily altered by certain public 
actions, such as income situation, job prospects, access to health insurance, etc.). As 
Andersen (1995) explains, “to be useful for promoting access, a variable must also 
be considered mutable, or point to policy changes that might bring about 
behavioural change”.  
Employment related merits and constraints represent an important ray of the 
modifiable factors, with literature pointing to various links between employment 
(type) and healthcare use. On the other hand, under-exploration of employment 
related influences on healthcare use is also stressed. Furthermore, studies tend to 
analyse single or selected influences, rather than structurally reviewing 
overall/varied employment effects. Precise pathways, through which influences 
occur, are rarely documented too. As Gleason & Kneipp (2004) note, few studies 
yet evaluate “the extent to which employment may interfere specifically with 
accessing illness care or preventive care”. Also, diverse contextual as compared to 
individual determinants receive a considerably lower attention (Kirby & Kaneda, 
2006; Phillips, Morrison, Andersen, & Aday, 1998). Following Andersen (1995) and 
Lipscomb, Loomis, McDonald, Argue, & Wing (2006), this reflects the overall 
failure in yet defining the role and scope of institutional factors on healthcare 
                                                          
2 Article, 25, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed in 1948. 
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utilization.  
Complexities in conceptualization, access to adequate empirical data are partially 
responsible for the up to date negligence of employment related influences. Lack of 
conceptual frameworks, which could be used for the empirical evaluation of 
(diverse) employment related healthcare influences, is a restrictive factor too.  
This chapter aims at contributing to two under-explored questions. First, we 
explore existing evidence and then structurally present diverse employments 
influences on healthcare use. For this, we develop a conceptual framework of 
employment related influences in healthcare use. No general conceptual model of this 
type yet exists, though important contributions are made by a few studies, 
especially Andersen (1968), Gleason & Kneipp (2004) and Lipscomb, Loomis, 
McDonald, Argue, & Wing (2006). Second, we explore the role of various contextual 
(employment) factors, as the healthcare use determinants. As the role of these 
determinants is still under-explored in the healthcare literature, we exploit the 
social risk management theory (de Neubourg, 2002; Holzmann & Jørgensen, 2001) 
– a theory proposed and applied by the social protection studies, but not yet 
applied within the field of healthcare research. This conceptual approach 
acknowledges the interrelated role of various institutions in managing individual 
risks, such as becoming ill (Sigg & Behrendt, 2002). A comparable recognition is yet 
lacking in the health or healthcare use studies.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides the overview of the 
conceptual frameworks of healthcare use. The focus is on the frameworks 
suggesting a comprehensive structure of the diverse lists of healthcare use 
determinants. The following section explores the role of institutional determinants 
in healthcare use. The social risk management perspective is applied here. Links to 
employment influences are made if relevant. Section 2.4 sketches through the types 
of individual determinants. Here, the most widely acknowledged determinants are 
discussed. The next section discusses the specific pathways through which a vector 
of employment characteristics influences healthcare utilisation. The conceptual 
model of employment influences on healthcare use is presented. The final section 
presents conclusions.  
2.2. Contextual factors and conceptual models of healthcare 
use 
What are the contextual factors? In a number of different social science fields this 
group of determinants covers a wide range of macro descriptions of environment 
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in which individuals reside and behave (Johnson, Phillips Shively, & Stein, 2002). 
Often, terms “contextual”, “macro”, “aggregate”, “institutional”, “external” are 
used interchangeably. No strict definition of contextual variables exists within the 
field of healthcare analysis too, however usually the list of potential factors is 
defined more narrowly compared to the other disciplines. Furthermore, factors 
linked to the healthcare system dominate the list of recognised contextual factors. 
We explain this observation in more detail. Furthermore, we suggest on how to 
more comprehensively account for the contextual factors, using the theory of social 
risk management.  
The behavioural model(s) of healthcare use 
A number of conceptual frameworks have been suggested for discussion of 
healthcare use and its determinants. Usually they focus on explanation of certain 
aspects. For example, in Grossman’s (1972) economic model of health demand, 
health is seen as a capital stock; a purchase of healthcare - as an investment in 
health. Here, the demand for healthcare is shown to increase with wages. The 
model’s focus is on the selected number of determinants, such as age, income, 
education. Healthcare is treated as the most important input in the health 
investment function. Other influences are mentioned arbitrarily and are not 
modelled due to difficulties of empirical measurement. Many other economic 
models, are extensions (Muurinen, 1982) and/or criticisms (e.g. Cropper, 1977) of 
the Grossman’s model and have been developed afterwards. They do not explore 
the structuring of various determinants’ lists too.  
Conceptual models, which do focus on structuring and acknowledging roles of the 
diverse lists of healthcare determinants, also exist. Among them, one of the earliest 
and the most influential conceptual frameworks of healthcare use is Andersen’s 
(1968) “behavioural model of families’ use of health services” (hereinafter referred to as 
the behavioural model of healthcare use)3.  
A number of this model’s extensions have been suggested, with the direct 
advancements provided in Aday & Andersen’s (1974) framework on access to 
medical care, Andersen’s (1995) “revisited” version of the model or Phillips et al. 
(1998) study on “understanding the context of healthcare utilisation”. An 
adaptation of these frameworks is also Gleason and Kneipp’s (2004) model, which 
provides our study important support on employment related constraints in the 
use of (primary) healthcare. Other significant frameworks exist, with a notable 
contribution for health rather than healthcare analysis made by Lipscomb et al. 
                                                          
3 As noted by Andersen (1995), the model was not the first initiative of a kind, but it has integrated a 
number of ideas on “how’s” and “why’s” of healthcare use.  
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(2006). The findings of this and many other studies are used throughout this study. 
The Andersen’s model and its relevant versions/extensions provide the key 
conceptual frame in both discussing the role of contextual determinants and 
depicting the specific pathways though which employment has an effect on 
individual healthcare utilisation.  
The behavioural model of healthcare use discusses the role of three major groups of 
individual determinants: predisposing, enabling and need factors. The contextual 
(without using the title) influences are also discussed, but with a lower degree of 
attention4. In response to criticism and suggestions, this original classification of 
major determinants’ lists within the model has been revised  (Phillips et al., 1998). 
Among the most important adjustments is Aday & Andersen’s (1974) 
distinguishing of “the health care delivery system”, which refers to two 
components: resources (labour and capital) and organization. In Andersen’s (1995) 
study, the definition of environment appears. Environment consists of the 
healthcare system and external environmental factors. In the further extension of 
the model, namely Phillips et al. (1998) study, an even more comprehensive 
classification is used. Here, in addition to environment, provider-related factors are 
distinguished. Healthcare delivery system characteristics, external environmental 
and community-level enabling variables are listed as environmental factors. 
Provider-related factors refer to provider characteristics and patient factors that 
could be influenced by providers. The focus of this classification nevertheless falls 
short on giving a wider/more precise role to the factors outside the healthcare field. 
In particular, the role of institutional arrangements is mainly linked to the 
healthcare system.  
Studies following this classification did not make any further structural changes. 
Little progress has also been made in a comprehensive use of both individual and 
environmental factors within the empirical studies. Approximately half of existing 
research includes some environmental or provider-related variables, as Phillips et 
al. (1998) point out; however, their overall influence is rarely acknowledged and 
captured. The latter study also warns that such unsystematic inclusion or exclusion 
of contextual variables in addition to individual determinants of healthcare use 
could “lead to biased and misleading results and to large amounts of unexplained 
variance that hamper the understanding of utilization behaviour”.   
                                                          
4 At the time of the initial model’s proposal, as noted by Andersen & Newman (1973), few studies 
analysed the relationship between general societal forces, the health service system and the population use 
of healthcare services. 
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Healthcare determinants and theory of social risk management  
Multidisciplinary perspective could bring advantages in restructuring and 
acknowledging (missing/institutional) categories of contextual variables in the 
healthcare analysis field. The theory of social risk management5 offers precisely 
this capacity: it allows recognising and classifying societal institutional settings 
from the perspective of managing diverse individual risks. Here, the list of risks 
covers such basic needs, as access to housing and utilities, food, social participation 
or our focus variable – health. This theory has been used for the explanation of 
diverse household and individual behaviours and risks. For example, migration as 
a household livelihood strategy (Hagen-Zanker, Siegel, & de Neubourg, 2009) or 
analysis of labour market transitions (Schmid, 2006) have been conceptualised 
using the theory. The application concerning health related risks has not yet been 
done.  
The main idea of the social risk management, as defined by Holzmann & Jørgensen 
(2001), is that all individuals are exposed to numerous risks, such as illness (i.e. a 
natural risk) or unemployment (i.e. man-made risk). Consequently they need an 
access to various institutions to manage the simultaneous or separate occurrence of 
these risks. In response, societies have developed various institutions, which help 
by preventing, mitigating or coping with these risks. Five major society 
institutions, also called Welfare Pentagon, are recognised as the key players: 
family, markets, social networks, membership institutions and public authorities 
(de Neubourg, 2002). According to the theory, actual use of the Welfare Pentagon 
depends on the strength and development of a certain institution within a 
particular society. In practice people deal with their risks by addressing a few 
institutions rather than using a single institution at a time. Following Sigg & 
Behrendt (2002), the theory overcomes the “artificial analytical separation” of 
social protection from the other policy fields and acknowledges important policy 
inter-links. 
As such, the social risk management theory offers complementarities to the 
behavioural model of healthcare use: it provides a more structured way of 
discussing institutional contextual factors. By this, explicit separation of the 
institutional contextual influences is made, while important role of the other 
groups of determinants - remaining contextual (external)6 and individual level 
factors – is still explicitly recognised. The Welfare Pentagon, just like the 
                                                          
5 Emerged around 2000, simultaneously proposed by Holzmann & Jørgensen (2001) and de Neubourg  
(2002) in the field of social protection studies.  
 6 For example, the share of ethnic minorities within the region or pollution and crime level, would 
mainly reflect external environmental factors, as defined by Phillips et al. (1998).  
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aforementioned healthcare use models, recognises various interlinks between the 
different groups and levels of determinants. 
The re-classification of contextual level determinants in line with the social risk 
management theory is stylized within Figure 2-1. Five major institutional factors’ 
groups, namely family, markets, social networks, membership institutions and 
public authorities, are marked P1-5. They incorporate such Phillips et al. (1998) 
described contextual variables’ groups as health services’ system, provider-related 
or community level factors, though with a different annotation. As such, healthcare 
system and non-healthcare institutional settings are assigned more equal weights 
as determinants of healthcare use.   
Figure 2-1. Contextual influences of individual healthcare utilization 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: P1-P5 = Institutional factors 
Source: own adaptation of Welfare Pentagon framework 
 
Welfare Pentagon, as depicted in Figure 2-1 , represents multi-layered influences 
between the individual and contextual factors. An individual reaches for the 
Welfare Pentagon and is influenced by certain external factors in making 
healthcare use choices. External factors shape the way how Welfare Pentagon is 
formed and functions (i.e. poverty situation in the region might imply a higher 
presence of NGO’s, charity organisations or state organisations, aiming at 
improving socio-economic settings). At the same time, institutions also interact and 
influence external factors. Additionally, Pentagon institutions affect each other, 
producing combined effects. For example, public institutions affect the way 
markets organize healthcare provision or the way through which labour markets 
function (so that people could be remunerated for their work and obtain healthcare 
services or healthcare insurance). This presentation of Pentagon inter-links 
corresponds to Phillips et al. (1998) observation that contextual factors often 
interact with other factors, which directly or indirectly influence healthcare 
utilization. 
A note should also be made on the meaning of an individual being the primary 
unit of the analysis. This corresponds to Andersen’s (1995) suggestion to shift the 
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behavioural model of the healthcare use from the household to an individual unit 
analysis level. This is done to account both for heterogeneity of family members in 
seeking healthcare services and because of complexities in developing family 
summary measures, such as “family health status”. Aside the healthcare studies, 
comparable arguments are made. For example, Hagen-Zanker, Siegel & de 
Neubourg (2009) point out that households, as well as their members, have 
different initial endowments, definitions of needs, and degrees of risk aversion. 
Hence, their access to Welfare Pentagon is diverse because some people lack 
required assets (social or material) to ensure beneficial relation with a 
corresponding institution. As a result, the use of each five Welfare Pentagon 
institutions is different for each household and for each household member. A 
comparable argument could also be extended to the household members reacting 
to or using the settings of the external factors.  
2.3. Institutional healthcare determinants  
The role of each Welfare Pentagon’s institution is reviewed in this section. It 
should be noted, that this study does not attempt to analyse or provide new 
evidence regarding the discussed determinants. Instead, it focuses on structuring 
the existing knowledge using the perspective of the theory of social risk 
management. Furthermore, our attention falls on highlighting the role of 
employment related institutional influences.  
Family  
Family is a specific type of a social network, described by the intensity of the 
relationship of its members: birth or marriage, cohabitation, kinship or promises of 
commitment. According to Lewis et al. (1976), many of the stresses and strains that 
affect people’s lives, and many of the supports that they depend on, are found 
within the family structures. Belonging to a family is an important criterion for 
many administrative arrangements too, including healthcare access.  
For example, entitlement to health insurance, which facilitates access to healthcare, 
is often based on the family and family willingness to provide for it – especially if a 
person cannot acquire it through the labour market. Depending on the available 
health insurance products, this could mean coverage for a dependent child, spouse 
or partner, a parent or relative of the 1st, 2nd or 3rd degree of the insured person. 
On the other hand, access to health insurance could also be restricted due to family 
history. For example, a study by Lapham, Kozma, & Weiss (1996) showed that 
more than 20% of the uninsured people in the US believe they were refused health 
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insurance because of the insurance company’s  knowledge of genetic disorders in 
the family.  
Families also have a strong influence in directly shaping the individual use of 
healthcare services (e.g. Gravlee, Dressler, & Bernard, 2005; Krieger, Williams, & 
Moss, 1997). First, they can act as providers. For example, they can provide 
healthcare services when giving birth at home, nursing a person, giving the first 
aid, etc. Second, family social and material assets play a role. This concerns  
attitudes towards seeking healthcare services, lack of knowledge on the healthcare 
system structure, language barriers, availability of economic resources, family care 
giving traditions, etc. (Infeld, Gordon, & Harper, 1995). Third, stresses and strains 
experienced within the family affect person’s behaviour. For example, Fairbrother 
et al. (2005) shows that family social turbulence, economic hardship or parental ill 
health reduce parents' confidence and ability to obtain healthcare for their children 
or other family members.  
Markets 
Different types of markets exist: product and service markets, capital markets, 
labour markets, etc. They have different roles in either providing healthcare or 
shaping healthcare demand.  
Healthcare services or healthcare insurance are offered due to functioning product 
and service markets (e.g. Maynard, 1991). Capital markets are used to obtain 
funds, needed for the development of healthcare services and institutions (e.g. 
Gershberg, Grossman, & Goldman, 1999). Labour markets provide individuals 
with employment and income generation capacity, which is necessary for 
purchasing healthcare services or having healthcare access via health insurance 
plans. In addition, labour markets ensure that health professionals have jobs and 
can perform their duties. We focus on describing the role of labour markets in 
more details due to its direct link with our variable of interest – employment. 
Participation in the labour market does not necessarily ensure access to health 
insurance, even if this pathway is a leading route for gaining affordable access to 
healthcare services. For example, research shows that even if health insurance is 
provided by an employer at a subsidized price (i.e. as in the US), the actual take-up 
decision is highly related to the final costs borne by an employee (e.g. Cutler, 2002). 
This corresponds to the argument of the social risk management theory stating that 
the actual use of any institution depends on the role that institution plays in a 
particular society.  
Formal employment compared to informal employment usually allows easier 
healthcare access (e.g. by health insurance). However, falling employment and, 
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thus shrinking tax revenue, is often seen as a barrier to develop employment-based 
national healthcare coverage in many developing and transition countries (Bennett, 
Creese, & Monasch, 1998). On the other hand, health insurance for people working 
informally is less available due to difficulties of capturing and adequately taxing 
their work income. Based on Bennett et al. (1998), community financing 
programmes and different types of pre-payment and credit schemes are 
increasingly used to offer health insurance for those working in the informal 
labour markets.  
Employment within a certain occupational sector also affects accessibility to health 
services. For instance, Bashshur et al. (1994) observes that the shift in the US labour 
market from manufacturing to service sector resulted in a decline in health 
insurance provision and thus access to healthcare.  
Inflexible and long working hours could directly affect a person’s capacity in 
managing access to healthcare. For instance, research in the US shows that visiting 
a doctor could be less feasible due to difficulties in obtaining employer’s 
permission of leave during morning hours – the most often offered time for 
appointments (i.e. Cristancho et al, 2008).  
Unemployment is found to have contradicting influences on healthcare use. On the 
one hand, it enables healthcare seeking due to lesser time constraints. On the other 
hand, it could impede access to healthcare, especially if the labour market related 
social insurance status is lost. Many other links between unemployment and 
healthcare utilisation exist. For example, lack of employment is linked to unmet 
healthcare needs, especially among those who have psychological concerns (Ahs & 
Westerling, 2006).  
Public institutions 
A number of public institutions are linked to facilitating and/or directly providing 
access to healthcare. For example, healthcare access could be ensured because of 
state credited health insurance contributions for the inactivity time (i.e. maternity 
leave). Many heterogeneous designs of subsidized health insurance schemes (i.e. 
for elderly, children or people receiving social assistance) also exist. Research 
indicates that some of these vulnerable populations might be even better protected 
than employees due to state provisions. For instance, Hayward et al. (1988) find 
that working-age adults in the 1990’s had less access to medical care than the 
elderly due to favourable arrangements provided by the US social insurance 
programme Medicare.  
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Public institutions have the utmost effect not only on the demand, but also on the 
supply side of the healthcare system. For example, educational institutions provide 
medical education and thus form the quantity and knowledge capacity of the 
medical personnel. Moreover, much healthcare demand is dependent on the 
authoritative advice of the doctor. Actually, as the existing research suggests, 
available medical resources could become a perfect predictor for the magnitude of 
services consumed (Lewis et al., 1976). Public institutions also influence supply of 
conventional versus alternative, public versus private healthcare services. 
According to Aday & Andersen (1974), public institutions, especially those 
operating in the healthcare field, decide on financing, education, manpower and 
organization of the healthcare system. This consequently results in numerous 
system characteristics: volume and distribution of labour and capital, organization 
of the entry, etc. In general, public institutions influencing design of the healthcare 
system are interlinked in so many numerous ways that any policy change within 
the scope of their activities has a broad implication on an individual’s healthcare 
seeking behaviour.  
Membership institutions 
Membership institutions are institutions based on solidarity and formal rules. They 
include organizations, such as healthcare insurance companies, sickness funds, or 
labour unions. The role of health insurance for people working in the formal and 
informal labour markets has already been mentioned. Many other influences and 
types of institutions are also important.  
For example, membership institutions, as health and wellbeing centres, affect 
healthcare seeking behaviour through membership related information. They 
could raise awareness on legislative issues, access to care or on societal and ethical 
perspectives of, for example, equitable healthcare access (e.g. Kauffman 
Foundation Convention Center, International Society for Equity in Health, etc.). 
What's more, membership institutions are very often established to actively 
converse with the healthcare system. In such a case, they have ability to influence 
the development of professional standards, review and raise public understanding 
on health and health access issues, or provide support and authoritative 
information to their members (e.g. American Diabetes Association, the Dutch 
Association of Occupational Health, etc.).  
Social networks 
Social networks are viewed as social structures, which consist of both individuals 
and organizations. They are formed because of common values, friendship, kinship 
or mutual activities. Social networks, just like membership institutions, are based 
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on the principle of solidarity, but do not have a formal structure or regulations 
attached to their existence.  
Social networks are often thought of having a diminishing or a more segmented 
role in the developed countries. This is mainly due to people’s ability to manage 
their risks through the relatively more developed Welfare Pentagon institutions, 
such as markets or public organizations. The greater transience of community life 
has caused many of the traditional, informal sources of help to break down in the 
developed industrialized countries: when an illness strikes, the resources of family 
or long-term friends are less available for assistance (e.g. Lewis et al., 1976).  
Nevertheless, the influence of social networks cannot be underestimated in both 
developed and developing countries. It’s here that health related behaviour or 
knowledge is learnt and acquired. For example, recent research in psychology field 
acknowledges that work relations, as a part of the non-kin social networks, are 
highly under-explored with respect to their influence on health and healthcare 
access (e.g. Neyer & Lehnart, 2006). Work relations could influence healthcare use 
via knowledge, shortfall of time, lack or increased support to seek healthcare, etc.  
Furthermore, both work or non-work related social networks can provide many 
positive effects, such as social support, self-esteem, identity and perceptions of 
control or access to other social-networks (i.e. Cattell, 2001). For example, research 
indicates that the often reported inequity favouring the rich in specialists’ care 
utilization is likely related to strong social networks and higher social status, rather 
than any specific delivery system’s characteristics or income situation itself 
(Chandola, Ferrie, Sacker, & Marmot, 2007). Community factors are also found to 
play an important role in improving access to healthcare (e.g. Hendryx, Ahern, 
Lovrich, & McCurdy, 2002).  
2.4. Individual healthcare determinants  
The above presented Welfare Pentagon model takes into account that individual 
differences exist in terms of how and whether or not to seek healthcare services. 
This theory does not focus though on explaining the role of individual level 
determinants in managing the risks of becoming ill. For this, we rely on the 
insights offered by the “behavioural model of healthcare uses”. Aside shortly 
reviewing the role of each determinants’ group, we also aim at highlighting 
multidisciplinary insights on the diverse roles of employment related individual 
healthcare determinants. Where relevant, we touch upon interactions between 
different individual factors, as well as individual and contextual factors. 
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Predisposing factors 
Among the individual determinants of healthcare access, predisposing factors refer 
to immutable and mutable factors. They are defined not as direct causes of 
utilization, but rather as determinants of the propensity to use such services. 
Immutable predisposing factors, such as age, gender or genetic inheritance, 
determine predisposition of certain health conditions. Mutable factors include 
characteristics, such as religion, values, smoking habits, level of physical activity, 
nutritional habits, sleeping rhythm, or even type of personality (Aday & Andersen, 
1974; ISO, 2002; Krieger, 1999; Krieger et al., 1997).  
For example, hostile individuals are reported to create more interpersonal conflicts 
in their lives and to have lower levels of social support. Consequently this affects 
their ability to utilize social (i.e. workplace, family, etc.) networks for a better (e.g. 
timely, appropriate, affordable) healthcare access (e.g. Wiebe & Forenberry, 2006). 
Some of the other predisposing factors, such as smoking or level of physical 
activity, might also be linked to personality type, since one personality type 
individuals might choose to cope with the stress by smoking and others by 
exercising. As Wiebe & Forenberry (2006) explain, personality also works in 
conjunction with the enabling determinants of health (i.e. socioeconomic status) 
and influence the expression of disease vulnerability.  
Enabling factors  
Enabling factors are usually factors defined on the individual level. However, they 
could also refer to community means that influence the individual’s propensity to 
use services (Lewis et al., 1976).  
The enabling individual factors are closely related to socioeconomic and socio-
cultural characteristics of the population. They refer to such variables as income, 
education, literacy, occupational status and occupational stability, unemployment, 
ethnicity, racial stratification, migration status or social class (e.g. Eschbach, Yong-
Fang, & Goodwin, 2006; Krieger et al., 1997; Wagstaff, van Doorslaer, & Watanabe, 
2003; Winkleby, Jatulis, Frank, & Fortmann, 1992). The enabling or restricting 
nature of these variables is quite well documented for a number of socio-economic 
variables, especially income, education or gender. Many of the employment related 
influences receive comparatively lower attention.  
For example, numerous findings point to the inequitable utilization of healthcare 
services, and especially secondary care services, related to person’s income status 
(e.g. van Doorslaer & Koolman, 2004; van Doorslaer, Koolman, & Jones, 2004; van 
Doorslaer et al., 2000). On the other hand, many studies also indicate that income 
related inequality in healthcare use might not be captured well enough. This is 
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caused by lack of data on out of pocket payments, lack of information on regional 
disparities, lack of supply side information or lack of information about the health 
status (e.g. Billings et al., 1993; Gornick et al., 1996; van Doorslaer, Masseria, & 
Koolman, 2006).  
Persons with higher educational level are found to use more preventive services 
and are more likely to take advantage of the new medical programs. Lewis (1994) 
also reports that people from higher social classes are more likely to better describe 
their problems and to seek specialized assistance. In contrast, people with lower 
social status are more likely to enter healthcare system late in their illness and are 
more likely to provide vague and undefined symptoms. 
Gender, as a social category, is also found to have an influence on healthcare 
seeking behaviour. Some studies report that women tend to use more healthcare 
services than men, even if adjustment for need is taken into account. The 
explanation of greater utilization encloses such factors, as worse perception of 
health status or lower embarrassment in expressing pain or asking for help (e.g. 
Lewis et al., 1976; Redondo-Sendino, Guallar-Castillon, Banegas, & Rodriguez-
Artalejo, 2006). Women are also traditionally considered to use more of the 
healthcare services during office hours due to more flexible job arrangements. 
They also use more preventive healthcare services, while men are observed to use 
more of emergency help services.  
Need factors  
Need factors is the third group of the individual determinants of the healthcare 
access. They refer to illness level and could be defined as perceived by individual 
or evaluated by the medical personnel. Need-factors have a direct impact on the 
type, purpose, location or timing of healthcare use.  
Lots of studies use self-assessed health status (SAH) as one of main health needs’  
indicators, as it usually includes overall evaluation (i.e. poor vs. excellent) of the 
health status (e.g. van Doorslaer & Koolman, 2004; van Doorslaer, Masseria, 
Labour and Social Affairs Committee, & Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and, 2004). SAH is considered to be a central key to the management of illness 
because it provides reflection of shifts in actual health status (Williams, 2006). On 
the other hand, research indicates (e.g. van Doorslaer et al., 2000) that a crude 
measurement, like SAH, might lead to a lack of precision in estimates. An 
alternative would be a health status evaluation conducted by the medical 
professionals.  
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A number of other health need related factors, such as age or gender, are also 
routinely analysed (van Doorslaer, Koolman et al., 2004). Other commonly used 
need factors include biomass index, chronic diseases, functional status, cognitive 
deficit or health related quality of life. Some diseases indicate a specific health 
need, which could be captured from a person’s behaviour to use specific service: 
asthma, arthritis, diabetes mellitus, Parkinson’s disease, cancer (at any site), etc.   
Many links between the enabling/predisposing factors and health needs are 
documented. Some studies use enabling factors as predictors of the health needs. 
The rationale behind such a decision is observation that many health needs vary by 
culture, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, geographic location, etc. Predisposing 
factors, such as tobacco and alcohol consumption, are also used to indicate the 
need for healthcare (Redondo-Sendino et al., 2006).  
2.5.  Employment as a determinant of healthcare use: a 
conceptual model 
Underlying frameworks 
The proposed model is an extension of the two major frameworks tracing the 
complex employment influences on healthcare and health. The first framework is 
Gleason & Kneipp’s (2004) model on employment constraints in healthcare 
utilization. As mentioned before, the latter framework is an adaptation of the 
behavioural model of healthcare use and aims at evaluating “the extent to which 
employment may interfere specifically with accessing illness care or preventive 
care”. The second framework is Lipscomb’s et al. (2006) conceptual model of work 
and health disparities (in the United States). This model traces pathways, though 
which work, as a broad concept, contributes to creating health inequalities. Aside 
building on the structures of these two frameworks, our model also accounts for 
institutional influences, as suggested by the theory of social risk management and 
explained in the Section 2.2 of this study.  
A few major alterations and extensions of these three frameworks are suggested by 
this study. Gleason & Kneipp’s (2004) model focuses on three major employment 
constraints: availability of paid sick leave as an employment benefit, job flexibility, 
and availability of after-hours primary healthcare services. Lipscomb’s et al. (2006) 
conceptual model provides a much broader understanding of work related 
influences. It also depicts causal pathways linking work and health outcomes 
(healthcare use is not addressed). Theory of social risk management proposes a 
structural way of accounting for diverse institutional influences in managing 
individual health risks. Our proposed model takes a step further: it illustrates the 
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complex process through which work, as a broad and multi-level array of 
influences, relates to the employee’s decision of (one-time or multiple) healthcare 
utilisation.  
Major settings and assumptions 
A person’s employment or work (see Figure 2-2) is treated as a multi- dimensional 
characteristic. On the individual level, it is a point of reference to a number of 
employment related harms, duties, constraints and benefits. Examples are salary or 
in-kind benefits, time spent at work, access to social networks and occupational 
exposures. In addition to monetary income and in-kind benefits, work also 
associates with many non-material factors, such as degree of subordination, 
autonomy, control, job flexibility, or security. On the contextual level, employment 
influences accumulate for a given job place, family, community or geographical 
location. In addition to this, workplace healthcare plans and many other public 
policies represent a vector of contextual employment influences.  
Work is a starting point of the framework. The final step is utilization of healthcare 
services. Other factors and processes are displayed to depict (causal) links between 
a person’s (current) employment and a person’s choice of using healthcare 
services. Health needs and healthcare services are assumed to be generic. The 
framework focuses on employment rather than unemployment related links to 
healthcare utilization. This is because pathways and exposures to risks are rather 
different for these two labour market statuses. 
The starting point of the model is placed at a certain point in time t. This indicates 
any time in a person’s working career, assuming that the individual “currently” 
has a job. As such, occupational history influences a current job position. 
Nevertheless, the dynamic dimension of the model is simplified to two points in 
time: present (it could also be past) time t and time t+1. This indicates time needed 
for a potential alteration of health status due to exposures, use of healthcare 
services or other influences, including potential occurrence of disease or changes 
within the contextual settings. Utilization per se has no certain marked position 
within the set time frame [t; t+1], and in so doing depicts individual differences. 
Individual differences could be an immediate or delayed response to the 
symptoms, with respect to the healthcare seeking behaviour and the differences in 
timing of provision of healthcare services.  
The determinants of healthcare utilisation and work are listed and structured on 
the left side of the framework. They present three levels of analysis: 1) individual, 
2) family and social network, and 3) policy and external environment level. The 
individual factors (i.e. level one) that influence a person’s initial health and 
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occupational choice are listed on the bottom left side of the model. Levels two and 
three explicitly cover the previously discussed Welfare Pentagon institutions. 
External contextual factors, like physical environment or area socio-economic 
potential, are placed under the level three. This is done because of two reasons. 
First, external contextual factors are closer linked to certain institutional 
determinants (e.g. social policy rules are related to poverty level). Second, we wish 
to explicitly portray household and social network related influences.  
The model also acknowledges that all levels of analysis undergo a continuous 
change as well as reciprocal influences. Furthermore, they represent significant 
effects on the person’s current job status (work) and the level of health needs as 
experienced at the time of a certain employment. For example, family processes 
influence the predisposing and enabling background of the individual. Families 
and social networks are also important “filters” for many contextual influences. 
Public policies influence family formation.  
Empirical evidence confirms various inter-links. Members of certain ethnicities are 
often found to live in the economically disadvantaged or environmentally polluted 
areas. They are disproportionately employed in manual professions or in 
hazardous work environments (e.g. Dressler, Oths, & Gravlee, 2005; Krieger, 1999; 
Krieger et al., 1997). A person’s ability to choose a job position might be limited by 
such a living environment given his knowledge of workplace related benefits and 
occupational exposures, as well as his perceived medical needs, professional 
abilities and wishes. The situation also implicitly points to circular links, because 
people’s activities, educational and work options bring high returns to the area’s 
wellbeing level too.  
Explanation of pathways 
The model presents two main directions of pathways (i.e. horizontal and vertical), 
through which personal choices and contextual factors influence employee’s 
healthcare seeking behaviour (see Figure 2-2).  
The horizontal pathway depicts how work is related to health risks and needs. As 
WHO (2006) indicates, many occupational health problems arise from new 
information technologies and automation, new chemical substances, physical 
energies or biotechnologies, transfer of hazardous technologies, rising 
psychological workload, problems related to growing mobility of worker 
populations, occurrence of various new occupational diseases, etc. According to 
this report, the highest health risk industries are mining, forestry, construction and 
agriculture. One-fifth to one-third of workers within these sectors may suffer 
occupational injury or disease annually. On the other hand, service and office jobs 
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increasingly contain high psychological stressors and ergonomic problems, which 
cause job dissatisfaction and affect health and productivity.  
Health status might be altered, depending on the intensity and duration of work 
related exposures and stressors, as well as individual susceptibility to the health risks. The 
model also depicts that the worry of health status might occur before the actual 
appearance of the symptoms of illness. This could be linked to the knowledge of 
occupational health risks. The worry about health in combination with an 
individual’s propensity to seek care could lead to a decision to use preventive 
healthcare services. However, if a person is not risks averse, he or she might wait till 
the appearance of specific ill health symptoms. The severity of the symptoms 
influences if a person seeks an immediate or an unhurried request for healthcare 
services. Some workplaces also acknowledge certain symptoms as related to work 
environment without the medical evaluation. Examples are red eyes or breathing 
problems. Often, workplaces voluntarily aim to remove the responsible catalysts of 
such health problems. Then, healthcare utilisation would not be realised. If 
catalysts could not be removed, access to lighter duty work could be offered. This 
consequently affects a person’s need to use or not to use healthcare.  
In general, a change in (perceived or evaluated) health while being employed leads to 
different working abilities. This depicts a circular link between employment type 
and health. Depending on the job and the nature of the related health changes, an 
individual might need to choose a different work: continue working full time, but 
in a different job position; lose some ability to work; become unable to work in the 
original job duty, etc.  
The vertical pathway traces influences on healthcare use by work related benefits and 
constraints. In addition to this, the vertical pathway depicts multi-level influences.  
Work and health needs are linked not only via horizontal pathways. Depending on 
the job nature, people might bring chemical or psychosocial effects from work to 
their families (i.e. vertical pathway). On the other hand, family and social networks 
influence a person’s perception of the symptoms, knowledge of the treatments, as 
well as responsibility and ability to seek healthcare.  
Material and non-material attributes of a person’s employment have both been 
proved to have a direct impact on health and healthcare seeking abilities (e.g. 
Marmot & Wilkinson, 2001). Their effects within the model are placed within the 
family level of determinants. We make this vertical link from the individual to the 
family level, as we believe that individual capacity to pay for healthcare is formed 
on the household, rather than on the individual level. For example, many women 
have little or no personal income, but live in a high income household. As such, 
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household income is a better measure of an individual’s ability to pay and access 
healthcare than an individual income level (Kupek, Dooley, Whitaker, Petrou, & 
Renton, 1999; Nguyen & Häkkinen, 2006; van Doorslaer, Koolman et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, numerous public policies are designed to account for and increase 
household’s abilities in reaching healthcare.   
A number of non-monetary benefits are associated with participation in the labour 
market. Among them is healthcare insurance. As already mentioned, access to 
healthcare insurance can differ if a person works in the informal or formal labour 
market. Based on WHO (1995), information on the benefits of healthcare system is 
also very difficult to disseminate among the workers of the informal sector or 
among the self-employed. Furthermore, there are significant differences in 
insurance benefits per employment sector or company and these gaps are 
widening. This has been shown by studies on workplace related healthcare 
insurance plans in the US (e.g. Lipscomb et al., 2006). Furthermore, health 
insurance could be organized publicly or privately. Private insurance plans could 
completely replace public insurance plans, provide additional coverage for services 
excluded from the public insurance scheme or increase a choice of provider and 
timing of service of provision.  
Overall, monetary and non-monetary returns to work (in combination with the other 
individual and institutional determinants) create a specific healthcare-seeking 
behaviour and influence the demand for healthcare services. The observed 
utilization rates are the result of the supply side factors too.  
The supply side of healthcare services could either enhance or impede healthcare 
utilization through five major dimensions: the financial and non-financial costs, the 
quality of services, the spatial distribution of services, the information on availability and 
effectiveness of services, and the quantity and types of services. For example, the quality 
of healthcare services might be low due to limited medical education on specific 
occupation related risks. Lack of appropriate assessment of occupational history 
might lead to an inadequate treatment and to an underestimation of the life-course 
effects (e.g. Chaix, Isacsson, Rastam, Lindstrom, & Merlo, 2007; Lipscomb et al., 
2006; Liukkonen, Virtanen, Kivimaki, Pentti, & Vahtera, 2004). Lipscomb et al. 
(2006) also report that supply of healthcare services and perception on healthcare 
seeking may be distorted by employer engagement in the provision of healthcare 
services or employer’s preferences on healthcare providers and insurers.  
  
Chapter 2: Employment and healthcare use P a g e  | 31 
 
Fi
gu
re
 2
-2
. C
on
ce
pt
ua
l f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
- e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 h
ea
lth
ca
re
 u
se
  
 
 
 
P a g e  | 32 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF PUBLIC POLICIES 
 
Overall, public and workplace policies might mediate the relationship between 
work exposures and the treatment of work related illnesses and injuries. They 
might also create inequalities in healthcare use. For example, the self-employed or 
the employed in the informal sector might not be covered through national 
healthcare plans or might only be covered for major risks. It is also observed that 
employees concerned about becoming unemployed, are less likely to speak up 
about their rights to healthcare access and are less likely to seek medical care 
(Lipscomb et al., 2006).  
The model also acknowledges that contextual determinants, such as public polices, 
political representation or area socio-economic potential, have a significant influence on 
the healthcare supply. For example, politically “disempowered” regions and 
groups are found to lack provision of the services (Mobarak, Rajkumar, & Cropper, 
2004). Lipscomb et al. (2006) also reports that unionized workers are more likely to 
have health insurance if compared to the non-unionized workers. 
The last element of the model is the eventual utilization of healthcare services: an 
outcome variable of the discussed processes and needs. After the first contact is 
made, a person might also decide to a follow up on a medical advice or not. This 
depends on the needs, individual characteristics, received care quality or advice by 
the medical professional. Finally, the model depicts that, depending on the 
received healthcare, a person might be exposed to new working abilities and seek 
different job options. 
2.6. Conclusions 
Quite a few empirical studies explain employment related determinants of 
healthcare use. General frameworks for the study of healthcare use behaviour also 
exist. As such, the concepts presented in this study are not new. However, they 
extend into the yet un-explored areas and make a few conceptual contributions.  
In this study, we show that there is a lot of un-pooled and multi-disciplinary 
evidence on employment influences in healthcare use. What is missing is a 
structural approach in accounting for the overall employment influences and 
tracing the specific channels of its influences. We therefore propose a conceptual 
framework which depicts through which direct and indirect routes employment, 
as an array of multi-level factors, impacts an individual healthcare use. 
Furthermore, our acknowledgment of diverse institutional influences, relying on 
the theory of social risk management, enables a better understanding of a 
differentiated healthcare use. This also highlights the role of diverse public policies 
beyond the impacts of the healthcare system per se. 
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Historically frameworks for analysing the determinants of healthcare utilization 
have been highly focused on the role of individual factors, which has resulted in 
neglecting institutional influences. Moreover, most of the occurring empirical or 
theoretical researches focus on a selective number of separate institutional factors. 
In contrast, we argue that the social risk management theory sets up better 
theoretical grounds for drawing a complete and comparative picture of pathways 
through which all types of existing societal institutional arrangements have a role 
in an individual’s ability to satisfy occurring health needs. We suggest 
distinguishing between the two major groups of contextual influences in 
healthcare use: institutional and external (or non-institutional) factors. Institutional 
factors refer to the Welfare Pentagon: families, markets, social networks, 
membership institutions and public authorities. Such classification acknowledges 
the role of the healthcare system and goes beyond it.  
We apply the proposed contextual determinants’ structure for the development of 
a conceptual framework of employment related influences in healthcare use. 
Healthcare utilization is depicted in this model as an outcome of a process in 
which a person – and specifically an employee - goes through various stages of 
health and healthcare need assessments and is continuously influenced by diverse 
external and institutional factors. Employment characteristics refer to income and 
other material and non-material returns to work, workplace rules, occupational 
sector regulations or overall employment choices available within the region of the 
residence (in a broad sense). All these factors are shown to be interlinked with 
certain other contextual and individual determinants of healthcare use.  
Overall, throughout the study we highlight the following employment and 
healthcare use links:  
 Labour markets provide easier access to employment. Consequently they 
create better possibilities of acquiring healthcare services. A better labour 
market functioning (i.e. collection of tax revenue) also guarantees a more stable 
healthcare system financing, and thus a better healthcare supply.  
 Employment provides easier access to diverse public institutions. 
Consequently it provides easier access to healthcare services at times of 
inactivity or extraordinary health needs (i.e. via state credited health insurance 
contributions, subsidized health insurance schemes, paid sick leave, etc.).  
 Compared to informal employment, formal employment usually allows 
having easier access to health insurance schemes, and, thus, facilitates access to 
healthcare services.  
 Diverse returns to work - income, fringe benefits, vacation time, etc. - affect a 
person’s need for and ability to use healthcare services. For example, a specific 
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job could reflect an employer’s choice in the provision of healthcare services 
and insurers.  
 Healthcare use varies by occupational sectors. This is related to the available 
health insurance plans (i.e. service versus manual sectors), to flexibility of job 
arrangements (i.e. using healthcare during office hours); to differences in 
occupational health exposures (i.e. injuries, work related diseases, induced 
disability), etc.  
 Public and workplace policies on (occupational) health standards and services 
can mediate relations between the work exposures and the use of healthcare 
services.  
 Work relations, as a type of social networks, have both negative and positive 
effects on healthcare use through positive or negative social support.  
 Current employment is endogenously related to a person’s occupational 
history, and thus to the previous occupational exposures, as well as current 
and past health status.  
 
This study proposed complex accounting for employment influences in healthcare 
use might be difficult to capture in empirical studies. However, the suggested 
structure and explicit references to potential multi-level influences provide a more 
systematic way for carrying empirical analyses. The review of overall influences 
also serves as a valuable explanation for sources of (often) unexplained variation. 
Further research is needed to define the scope of influence of these links within 
certain national socio-economic and cultural settings. Further research is also 
needed to test if observed differences in employment (types) lead to inequitable 
(unjust) use of healthcare services. If such evidence is established, further actions 
could be called upon with respect to relevant social policy design improvements.  
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3.1. Introduction  
Recent empirical studies increasingly document larger public healthcare spending 
and at the same time widening variation in healthcare use, especially found on the 
grounds of diverse socio-economic characteristics. A number of studies call for an 
attention to further explore links between the socio-economic characteristics and 
healthcare use (i.e. 2009; Goyder et al., 2005; Jiménez-Martín, Labeaga, & Martínez-
Granado, 2004; Menendez, Benach, Muntaner, Amable, & O'Campo, 2007; 
Pohlmeier & Ulrich, 1995; van Doorslaer, Koolman, & Puffer, 2002; van Doorslaer, 
Masseria, & OECD Health Equity Research Group, 2004). A better understanding 
of healthcare use determinants, as socio-economic characteristics, could lead to 
easier implementable (compared to health system changes) public policy 
responses.  
Employment, as an array of diverse occupational and job characteristics, is a 
particularly interesting socio-economic determinant of healthcare utilisation. 
Employment characteristics relate to monetary and non-monetary returns, both on 
individual and contextual levels (see Chapter 2 of this thesis). However, studies on 
its overarching impact on healthcare utilisation are rare, and if so, are often 
dominated by focus on income related aspects.  
In this study, we aim to empirically test which and how employment 
characteristics explain individual differences in healthcare use. For this purpose, 
we focus on Luxembourg study case. We use micro-level administrative social 
security data of 2006, which provide both individual healthcare utilisation rates 
and diverse socio-economic characteristics. We focus on exploring one general and 
one specific healthcare type: ambulatory and dentist care.  
Why is it interesting to investigate Luxembourg for studying employment related 
influences? The country is one of the most ethnically diverse and mobile 
employment markets in the world. However, due to its high commuter labour 
force and thus inflated GDP levels, many international empirical studies exclude 
Luxembourg as an outlier. Other studies exclude Luxembourg due to a lack of 
relevant data. As a result, healthcare utilisation pattern in this EU country is 
largely under-explored.  
We structure this Chapter in the following way. First, we review Luxembourg 
country social settings, with a specific attention paid on certain labour market 
features and healthcare system description. Second, we present methodological 
structure of the paper: data in use and empirical model details. Third, we present 
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and discuss empirical study results. Finally, we conclude and discuss potential 
future research, as well as some policy implications.   
3.2. Review of Luxembourg social settings  
Population and the labour market  
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is situated in between Belgium, France and 
Germany. Administratively, it is divided into 12 cantons and 116 communes (i.e. 
an equivalent of municipalities)7. Luxembourg City, the country’s capital, has a 
population of around 82000 inhabitants. The national language of Luxembourg is a 
West Germanic language Luxembourgish. In addition, French and German 
languages are also officially used for judicial and administrative purposes.  
Luxembourg is often quoted to be one of the most prosperous world economies, 
attracting numbers of foreign workers to seek better economic opportunities. 
Mainly due to economic immigration, the country’s population increased from 
around 340 thousands of people in 1970 to around 469 thousands in 2006. In the 
latter year, foreign origin residents constituted 41 % of the overall population, 
making it one of the highest foreign origin resident rates observed worldwide (i.e. 
STATEC, 2010)8. The largest foreign nationality groups include Portuguese (15%), 
French (5%), Italians (4%), Belgians (4%), Germans (2%), as well as immigrants 
from former Yugoslavia or Cape Verde9. Most of the foreign nationals have been 
attracted to Luxembourg due to its immense economic growth10, especially in such 
sectors, as financial or IT services, transport and communication industries 
(STATEC, 2003).  
Close ties between the economic growth and migration have also resulted in 
intense ethnic disparities within the economy. For example, STATEC (2003) 
observes that around 40% of the working population with Luxembourg nationality 
works in the public and parapublic administration. These jobs predominantly 
require holding of Luxembourg nationality. Foreign workers dominate such 
sectors as construction (only 15% of Luxembourgers employed), retail, hotels or 
food service (only 10% of Luxembourgers employed). For specific nationalities, 
                                                          
7 Unless otherwise stated, information reference date is January 1, 2006.  
8 According to the UN (2006) estimates, each working day Luxembourg also receives a cross-border 
workforce, which constitutes around 40% of the resident working population. 
9 Percentage of total resident population, 2006 estimates (STATEC, 2010). 
10 From the mid-1980s until 2000, the average GDP real growth rate was more than 5%, far exceeding 
the rates observed in other EU countries except of Ireland (STATEC, 2003).  
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Portuguese are, for example, reported to dominate the construction sector, while 
Germans are mainly employed in financial and business services.  
Healthcare system organization 
Luxembourg’s health care system is based on three fundamental principles: 
compulsory social health insurance, free choice of provider for patients and 
compulsory provider compliance with the fixed set of fees for services (UN, 2006). 
The insured people pay pre-defined co-payments for the national health services, 
with the levels ranging from 0% to 100% depending on the healthcare service 
(WHO, 2006). Overall, out-of-pocket expenditure11 in Luxembourg is reported to be 
among the lowest in OECD countries, at 1.5% of final household consumption 
(OECD, 2009).  
Statutory health insurance covers 99% of Luxembourg population 12  and is 
managed by the Union of Sickness Funds (called National Health Fund as of 2009), 
as well as nine occupational sickness funds (Kerr, 1999). The sickness funds are 
responsible for the reimbursement of the health care expenses incurred by the 
insured person13 and in principle act as agencies for direct contact with the insured 
members. People are assigned automatically to a respective occupational sickness 
fund according to their professional group or employer14. By law, a membership 
with a specific sickness fund should not involve any differences with respect to 
healthcare access. The Union of Sickness Funds is in charge of all other 
administrative responsibilities regarding healthcare insurance financing.  
Based on the OECD (2009) data, 59.4% of Luxembourg population had a 
complementary private healthcare insurance in 2007 (i.e. to cover hospital co-
payments, pre- and post-operative and, convalescence costs, dental prostheses, 
surgical treatment abroad, etc.). Mossialos & Thomson (2002) report that the 
                                                          
11 According to the OECD definition of out-of pocket expenditure, the term should cover cost-sharing 
(i.e. co-payments), self-medication and other expenditure paid directly by private households. 
12  Civil servants and employees of European and international institutions have their own health 
insurance funds. Based on OECD (2009) data, 97.9% of Luxembourg population was covered by public 
health insurance in 2007.  
13  Other functions of sickness funds include: payment of the flat-rate maternity benefit, reimbursement 
for the funeral allowances, administering cash benefits for sickness, etc.  
14 The mentioned sickness funds are: 4 sickness funds for the employees of the private sector (i.e. for 
manual workers or the blue-collar workers - CMO; for white-collar workers of the private sector - 
CMEP; for self-employed – CMPI; the sickness fund for the agricultural sector - CMAGR); 2 sickness 
funds for the employees of the public sector (i.e. for civil servants and state employees - CMFEP; for 
civil servants and employees of local authorities – CMFEC); 3 enterprise funds (i.e. for ARBED 
company’s manual workers - CMOA; for ARBED white-collar workers - CMEA; the Luxembourg 
Railways Medical Insurance Association - EMCFL). 
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population which does not have a complementary health insurance are mainly 
foreigners and construction workers.  
Healthcare use in Luxembourg: existing evidence  
Few studies discuss (social) determinants of healthcare use in Luxembourg, and if 
so, the obtainable evidence is often highly lagged in time. The most often quoted 
reasons behind Luxembourg case exclusion relate to unavailability of relevant 
comparative data, small survey sample size or Luxembourg’s outlier position with 
respect to a number of income indicators.  
For example, a recent study on healthcare utilisation inequities in Europe (i.e. Bago 
d’Uva et al., 2009), excludes Luxembourg analysis due to a limited number of 
available ECHP15 survey data waves. The same reason is mentioned regarding 
Luxembourg exclusion in van Doorslaer, Masseria, & OECD Health Equity 
Research Group (2004) or Schulz  (2004). A study by Hurst & Siciliani (2004) 
reports that Luxembourg does not have significant waiting problems for elective 
surgeries. However, it excludes Luxembourg from further comparisons with the 
other OECD countries due to the small implemented survey size for Luxembourg 
(i.e. OECD Waiting Time Project) and large cross-boundary people flows.  
The ECHP data for 1996, Luxembourg included, is used in van Doorslaer, 
Koolman, & Jones (2004) cross-sectional study on the sources of inequalities in the 
use of GP and specialist services. This study points to high and significant pro-rich 
inequity in total specialist visits in all studied countries (i.e. 12 EU member states), 
except Luxembourg and Belgium. Luxembourg is hereby referred to as a 
“somewhat special case because of its small size (and sample), the lack of academic 
hospitals, the high degree of cross-border care delivery and the unclear distinction 
between a specialist and a general practitioner”. This study however suggests that 
income is significant and negatively related in explaining subsequent specialist 
visits in Luxembourg. Furthermore, lower income groups are found to use more of 
GP services compared to higher incomes: both in terms of likeliness to seek and the 
frequency of using. Previously, Doorslaer et al. (2002) noticed that preferential 
treatment of lower income groups via certain co-payment reductions or 
exemptions could explain a (slightly) higher healthcare utilisation among lower 
                                                          
15  European Community Household Panel is a cross-national longitudinal survey focusing on 
household income and living conditions, including health characteristics (EPUNET, 2003). Full ECHP 
data format for these countries has actually been collected for 1994-1996, and then for remaining ECHP 
data collection years (1997-2001) replaced by an ECHP format derived national surveys, called PSELL in 
Luxembourg case.  
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income groups in Luxembourg (also in Belgium, Ireland and Spain). The latter 
observation, though, has not yet been confirmed in the latter study.  
Aside income driven inequalities in healthcare use, we are not aware of other 
studies exploring a wider array of employment influences on healthcare use given 
Luxembourg local settings.  
3.3. Methodology 
Data and selected population  
The study uses a newly developed micro database from the Luxembourg social 
security records - the Social Security Data Warehouse (SSDW). SSDW is 
constructed by the Inspection Générale de la Sécurité Sociale (IGSS) and pools 
information from diverse operational files of the country’s social security system. 
In 2006 SSDW data there are diverse social security records of 462323 residents of 
Luxembourg16.  
Information regarding the healthcare use is available in relation to the compulsory 
healthcare insurance system: how many times and what types of services have 
been used and reported to the national health insurance system. Utilisation of 
services covered by private insurance are not reimbursed through occupational 
sickness funds and are therefore not observed in this dataset. 
Household is constructed using two sources of information: registers of marriage 
and information on family benefits. Thereby, the constructed household refers 
more to a nuclear family definition – children and people in charge of them (i.e. 
parents, foster care givers, etc.) – rather than to a usual survey type household 
construct.  
We focus on the analysis of the population aged 18 to 55, which is identified as 
having a status of an employee within the social security dataset17. The social 
security records are most reliable precisely for these people due to the payments of 
social security contributions, taxes, etc. Students, self-employed, unemployed 
people or people who have no affiliation with any identifiable employer are 
excluded from the further analysis. The selected lower age threshold aligns with 
                                                          
16 Non-resident commuting population of Luxembourg is not included in the dataset. Information on 
the people working for multinational organizations, such as the EU, is also excluded, unless the latter 
people are identified as beneficiaries of the social security system through co-insurance plans.  
17 Due to age selection 209825 observations are dropped; due to job status selection 80765 observations 
are dropped.  
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the age of majority18. The upper age threshold (55 years) is chosen to closely 
associate with an average working career ending age - 57 years (i.e. Goerens, 
2006)19. We also exclude records of people who have no identification of the 
employment sector (42 observations dropped) and no distinction of the working 
class category (4102 observations dropped). Additionally, we exclude cases, which 
do not have an identified residence place (11 observations), as well as some 
extreme values with respect to the hours worked per month and the income levels 
(total of 62 observations). This result in 167446 cases of the final employee 
population (hereinafter referred to as the ‘selected population’ or ‘employees’).  
Luxembourg social security records contain information on personal gross salaries, 
but not on the household disposable income. We consider that disposable 
household income is a better measure of individual’s ability to pay and access 
healthcare than the personal gross employment income. Thereby, this study uses 
an external project REDIS outcome variable - the Luxembourg tax-benefit 
microsimulation model simulated household disposable income20. The gross salary 
level is utilised as an additional job characteristic.  
In addition to the SSDW and REDIS data, we also obtain and organise the external 
aggregate information on the selected socio-economic settings of the country. This 
information mainly relates to municipality (i.e. commune) level characteristics, 
such as population density, unemployment level and regional economic under-
development. Furthermore, based on STATEC (2004) data, we construct variables 
indicating commune density of doctors (both general practitioners and specialists) 
and dentists.  
Despite the richness of the SSDW and additional sources’ data, it is noteworthy 
mentioning some major limitations of this dataset. For example, information on a 
potential cross-border healthcare or private insurance is not included. The data 
also collects information on the “facts”, while the reasons (e.g. as in survey data) 
behind the observed choices are unknown (i.e. the reasons for working fewer 
hours/months). We also do not have time-related information, such as years in 
                                                          
18 The age of majority is defined by the law and implies the full assumption of all the legal (adulthood) 
rights.  
19 The legal retirement age threshold is 65 years for both men and women.  
20 The project REDIS, a joined  CEPS / INSTEAD and Inspection Générale de la Sécurité Sociale  project is 
co-financed by the FNR within the multi-annual programme “Living tomorrow in Luxembourg”. It 
explores the coherence and distributional effects of Luxembourg social transfers (i.e. direct taxes, social 
contributions and social benefits in cash) through the use of microsimulation models. The project uses 
the anonymised administrative micro-data as an input into the microsimulation model. The 
Luxembourg module of EUROMOD – the EU wide tax-benefit microsimulation model - is specifically 
adapted to this dataset for simulating the disposable household income. More information on 
EUROMOD could be found at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod.  
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employment, or an indication of the educational level of the workforce. The latter 
factor is often considered as an important determinant of healthcare use. In this 
study we have to rely on the education related determinants, such as an 
occupational category/sector, gross salary level or age. For example, based on de 
Broeck (2008), women in Luxembourg are noted to have on average a lower 
educational level than men, but this is changing for the younger generations. 
Women aged 20 to 24 are observed to have a completed secondary education more 
often than men.  
Empirical model 
Dependent variables  
Our dependent variables are two types of healthcare service utilisations: 1) the 
number of yearly (ambulatory and stationary) GP and specialist visits and 2) the 
number of yearly dentist visits. The GP and specialist visits mainly refer to the 
consultation type of visits, such as questioning of the patient, a clinical exam or 
related therapeutic prescriptions (technical types of contacts, such as surgery or 
radiology, are not included). We further on refer to this utilisation category as 
“consultations” or “ambulatory care”. Visits to dentists cover both general and 
“technical” services mainly due to a more technical nature of the dental care per se. 
We further on refer to this utilisation category as “dentist visits” or “dental care”.  
The dependent variables have been selected based on the multiple rationales. First, 
our main interest is to explore how employment relates to general and specific type 
of healthcare. Second, consultations are not split into more specific components of 
general practitioner and specialist services due to a rather unclear distinction 
between the two categories in Luxembourg, as already noted by Doorslaer, 
Koolman, & Jones (2004). Third, the SSDW dataset is not yet fully adapted for 
healthcare research analysis, with this study being the first attempt of a kind. Many 
other variables, while interesting to explore, are not yet available due to the 
database’s continuous technical development and time constraints.  
The selected dependent variables have numerous other strengths if compared to 
the survey reported variables. For example, surveys collected healthcare use 
information has been often criticised due to recall errors (e.g. Bago d’Uva, 2006) or 
too short (i.e. selected months) surveyed periods (e.g. Pohlmeier & Ulrich, 1995). 
This has often caused limited variance and large excess of zero observations (i.e. 
non-use) in the dependent variables.  For example, Pohlmeier & Ulrich (1995) note 
that 90% of the respondents did not report visiting a general practitioner or a 
specialist more than three times during the used survey quarter. The SSDW dataset 
provided healthcare use variables refer to the entire course of 2006, ensuring a 
large variation within the dependents variables.  
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Table 3-1. Summary statistics of dependent variables 
 Consultations Dentist visits 
All population Employees All population Employees 
 
 
 
Number 
of counts 
per year  
0 20.36% 16.47% 48.77% 43.79% 
1 10.15% 12.06% 6.22% 4.60% 
2 9.86% 11.43% 10.04% 10.82% 
3 9.21% 10.31% 7.37% 8.58% 
4 8.22% 9.00% 4.78% 5.51% 
5 7.17% 7.78% 3.68% 4.36% 
6 6.06% 6.43% 2.94% 3.47% 
7 4.98% 5.09% 2.37% 2.78% 
8 4.22% 4.27% 2.00% 2.31% 
9 3.49% 3.33% 1.62% 1.96% 
10 >= 16.28% 13.83% 10.21% 11.82% 
Total population 462,323= 100% 167,446 = 100% 462,323= 100% 167,446 = 100% 
Max. number of visits  120 69 243 161 
Variance  31.52 24.32 40.03 41.48 
Mean   5.07 4.77 3.36 3.79 
Conditional mean*  6.37 5.71 6.55 6.75 
Conditional variance* 31.32 23.74 57.18 53.85 
 Given that a contact has taken place (yi >=1) 
Source: own presentation 
Table 3-1 displays the summary statistics of the dependent variables. We present 
both total and the selected population figures. Despite similar trends in healthcare 
service utilisation, employees are shown to be more “preventive” users of both 
ambulatory and dentist care - they have fewer observations of the non-use in 
comparison to the total population. A couple major differences between the 
employees’ utilisation of consultations and dentist care also exist. First, fewer 
employees seek dentist services (56%) compared to ambulatory consultations 
(84%). Second, if seeking healthcare, employees use dental care more frequently 
(mean of visits 6.74 versus 5.71 respectively).  
Model selection 
The above reported distributions point to a large proportion of people having no 
visits, a majority of people having up to 10 visits per year and a smaller share of 
people reporting a very frequent use of healthcare visits (>=10). The summary 
statistics also point to variances being considerably larger than means: variance of 
consultations (among employees) is 5 times larger than the mean, and variance of 
dentist visits - 11 times larger than the mean.  
Variance exceeding the mean (i.e. over-dispersion feature), large number of zeros 
and the presence of the long right tail are commonly observed in many diverse 
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healthcare utilisation applications (e.g. Hidayat & Pokhrel, 2010; Pohlmeier & 
Ulrich, 1995; van Doorslaer, Koolman et al., 2004). The usual way to account for 
such a distributional pattern is via zero-inflated models, such as zero-inflated 
negative binomial distribution (ZINB), or via hurdle models, often described as a 
two – part model in the count data literature21.  
Figure 3-1 graphically displays how well negative binomial distribution (i.e. 
indicated as “neg binom prob” on the graph) fits the distribution of observed values. 
It shows a relatively close match, except of larger deviations occurring around the 
observational value of “one”. Such a break in distributional pattern is quite typical 
for healthcare use data and is often explained by two rather than one data 
generation processes. Both zero inflated and hurdle models could be exploited to 
deal with such distribution, as they both recognize a different data generation 
process behind zero and positive count values. However, it has been shown in the 
literature that the hurdle mode is a more suitable empirical model specification for 
the healthcare data analysis. This is due to its closer match with an underlying 
economic theory (i.e. a principal-agent theory), as well as due to the often high 
proportion of zeros that remains un-explained after over-dispersion specification 
in the zero inflated models, such as zero inflated Poisson model (e.g. Jiménez-
Martín et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2007). The hurdle model, initially proposed by 
Mullahy (1986), assumes that zero and non-zero observations of the dependent 
count variable come from two different data generating processes and are 
modelled independently, as the first stage is more related to a person’s choice to see 
a doctor, when the second stage refers to both patient and doctor induced use of 
healthcare services. Following van Doorslaer, Koolman, et al. (2004) the doctor role 
is significant due to the prescribed follow-ups, referrals to the other specialists, etc.  
The recent academic research also points to the potential use of a finite mixture 
(latent class) models or combined latent class hurdle models as potentially out-
performing econometric specifications compared to hurdle models (e.g. Bago 
d’Uva, 2006; Deb & Trivedi, 2002; Jones et al., 2007). Finite mixture (FM) models 
stress that differences exist between infrequent and frequent users rather than 
users and no-users, as in the hurdle models. Deb & Trivedi (2002) argues that FM 
models are better suited to analyse healthcare utilisation data, given that it usually 
represents individuals at different times of their sickness episodes. 
                                                          
21 Poisson, the most common count data model, is not suitable in this case due to its requirement on 
conditional mean being equal to conditional variance (e.g. Jones, Rice, Bago d’Uva, & Balia, 2007). 
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Figure 3-1. Observed versus negative binomial distributions: employee population 
 
Source: own presentation  
Critical notes on the use of FM models also exist. Jiménez-Martín et al (2004) 
present mixed empirical findings with respect to hurdle versus FM model use and 
suggest a hurdle model for the analysis of the annual data of specialist visits, while 
a FM model - for GP visits. This is due to the observation that specialist visits are 
usually related to one sickness episode and, therefore, hurdle models might fit the 
underlying data generation process better. The latent class models are also being 
criticized for their statistical rather than (economic) theory approach, as well as 
usually low ability of splitting population into more than two or three number of 
(latent) classes (i.e. Jochmann & Leon-Gonzalez, 2004; Jones et al., 2007).  
We choose the hurdle model as the primary framework for this analysis22. First, the 
hurdle model provides the best theoretical fit with supply and demand related 
influences in healthcare utilisation and aligns with the proposed theoretical 
framework on employment related influences in healthcare use (see Chapter 2 of 
this thesis). Second, as obtained data is cross-sectional (i.e. 2006 year), the 
possibility of testing a combination of a hurdle and a finite-mixture model, which 
would combine advantages of both latent and hurdle class models, as proposed by 
Bago d’Uva (2006), is excluded. Following Jones et al. (2007), such a combination in 
the cross-sectional context poses identification problems. Third, we use an 
extensive list of objectively evaluated health status covariates, including indication 
on sickness episodes. As the disease evaluations are done by doctors, we treat this 
                                                          
22 For comparative purposes, we do attempt to estimate a zero inflated negative binomial model (the 
Vuong test results are significantly in favour of this rather than a standard negative binomial model). 
We allow the zero inflated probability to be dependent on the full covariate list. Due to the high number 
of parameters, this model is not able to converge. When the zero inflation probability part is set to 
constant, we do acquire comparable results to hurdle. However, in such a case we cannot offer an 
explanation behind the zero generating process. 
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as an additional evidence of supply side effects in healthcare utilisation process 
(i.e. relying on a principal-agent theory).  
Hurdle model specification 
We denote yi (where i=1,…,N is the count data) two respective utilisation variables: 
ambulatory visits or dentist care. We estimate separate hurdle models for each of 
them. Following the hurdle model set-up, as discussed by Gurmu (1998), we divide 
yi into a binary and positive count variables:  yi with i=0 or 1 and yi with i ranging 
from 1 to some maximum value. We denote a ray of all explanatory variables as xi . 
Explanatory variables xi are selected to be the same across two model stages, 
however their estimated impacts β are allowed to be different.  
We use a logit model to analyse the binary yi variable. Here, the log-likelihood for 
the binary choice, following Jones et al. (2007), is equal to:  
LogL1=∑y=0 log[1-P1(y>0|x)] + ∑y>0 log[P1(y>0|x)], where P1 denotes logit distribution.  
Within the second stage of the hurdle model, we employ a zero truncated negative 
binomial (NB) model to analyse the positive count of yi. The log likelihood for the 
positive count is expressed as:  
LogL2=∑y>0 log[P2(y|x, y>0)], where P2 denotes a truncated at zero NB2 distribution23.  
The log-likelihood of the hurdle model is equal to the sum of the two separate log-
likelihood functions LogL1+LogL2. We estimate this set-up of the hurdle model 
using STATA software.  
Determinants 
We rely on the same list of covariates for the analysis of both ambulatory and 
dentist care. This allows highlighting if employment-related impacts are diverse or 
analogous for different healthcare types. Furthermore, the existing literature 
provides more (if any) evidence on employment influences for ambulatory rather 
than dental care. The list of associated hypotheses regarding the latter healthcare 
is, therefore, particularly limited.  
Overall, the selected determinants refer to an extensive list of factors24 covering 
both individual and contextual level influences (see the entire list of determinants 
and summary statistics in Appendix 1). In the following sections we describe the 
                                                          
23 In the NB2 specification, the conditional variance is expressed as a quadratic function of the mean 
(e.g. Greene, 2008).  
24 As noted before, administrative data has its own limitations. This highly shapes the final list of 
covariates. The final list of included determinants follows the Chapter 4 proposed structure and refers 
to both individual (enabling, need, predisposing) and contextual (institutional and external) influences.  
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main employment attributes and the associated hypotheses. We also review a 
potential role of nationality and briefly introduce the other control factors.  
Employment characteristics and associated hypotheses  
Our prime interest variable is employment. This refers to an array of diverse 
factors, distinguished across the individual and contextual level influences 
(although the two can overlap). Individual employment determinants cover 
monthly number of working hours, number of months worked per year, 
unemployment, occupational category, membership within a specific occupational 
sickness fund, gross salary level and (cash) bonuses. Contextual determinants refer 
to the occupational sector, regional economic and unemployment characteristics, as 
well as workplace attributes. Disposable income is also accounted for, but at the 
family rather than at the individual level. Additionally, a family’s at-risk-of 
poverty status is considered. We briefly discuss each of these determinants.   
A dummy variable is used to indicate if a person has worked full 12 months 
(fullyear25) – the predominant job type in Luxembourg (about 90% of the selected 
population). Based on the existing research evidence, one could expect that people 
in seasonal (temporary) or transitory employment are less likely to use healthcare 
compared to those in a year-round employment (e.g. Schorr, 1990). According to 
EUROFOUND information (Wlodarski, 2010),  temporary work in Luxembourg 
traditionally applies more to industrial and construction sectors. Many young 
people also have short term-contracts for the “entry” positions.  
We account for a contractual nature of jobs following observations of substantial 
frequency peaks at certain thresholds. Three variables are created: working part 
time, (part_time; <= 80 hours per month, 8% of population), full-time (full_time; 80% of 
population) and over-time (over_time >176 hours per month; 12% of population). Two 
primary healthcare utilisation effects could be associated. On the one hand, higher 
work intensity could cause more stress and exposures to occupational hazards, 
and, therefore, induce seeking more of healthcare services, and particularly 
ambulatory services. On the other hand, a high(er) work intensity could also be 
related to limited available time for both ambulatory visits and dentist care. Part-
time jobs could be related to higher financial insecurity and reflect selectivity into 
the jobs (i.e. working mothers). Based on Wlodarski (2010), people working part-
time in Luxembourg are usually those who provide domestic services, fill in 
replacement positions (i.e. teaching) or are the temporary agency workers. They 
could be both low and high skilled employees, such as cleaners or IT consultants. If 
so, diverse healthcare use effects could be expected. 
                                                          
25 Here and further on: parentheses provided titles in the Italic font refer to the variables’ names.  
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To specifically account for any unemployment time within the year of analysis we 
use a dummy variable, which indicates an unemployment benefit receipt (unempl; 
3% of all employees). Based on international evidence, such as Yuen & Balarajan’s 
(1989) study on Britain, men in unemployment but seeking work have higher GP 
utilisation rates compared to those in employment. On the other hand, lower 
utilisation of healthcare services could also be expected, especially if financial 
strains pertain to the time in unemployment. For example,  this type of negative 
association between unemployment and dental care use is observed in Finland 
(Nguyen, Häkkinen, & Rosenqvist, 2005). 
Four occupational categories are distinguished: blue-collar (bluecollar; 40% of all 
employees), white-collar (whitecollar; 41% of all employees) workers, civil servants 
(civil; 17% of all employees) and other types of employees (othercategory; 2% of all 
employees). Occupational categories refer to different job profiles and duties. Based 
on Luxembourg survey of occupational stress 26  (Wlodarski, 2006), blue-collar 
workers experience three times higher stress levels compared to senior managers. 
Consequently, this could signal a higher healthcare use. International research 
shows diversified trends of healthcare use in relation to the occupational category. 
For example, a study by Whitehead, Evandrou, Haglund, & Diderichsen (1997) 
finds a higher use combined GP and outpatient visits by non-manual employees in 
Sweden, whereas manual workers tend to use more of GP services, but less of 
specialist care in the UK. In both countries, no socio-economic differences in 
healthcare use were observed in 1970s and 1980s, pointing to a rather recent 
appearance of disparities.  
We also distinguish among employees’ membership with an occupational sickness 
fund (CMO, CMEP, etc.). As mentioned before, allocation to a sickness fund is 
automatically determined by the job position. We therefore mainly refer to this 
variable as an additional indication of a socio-professional classification (e.g. 
working in private or public sector; civil, white-collar or blue-collar workers; 
employment with a specific company, as ARBED 27 , etc.). Some (unobserved) 
administrative differences might also exist between the sickness funds influencing 
differentiated healthcare utilisation (e.g. via health knowledge dissemination). 
Generally, we do not expect to see large differences in healthcare utilisation 
patterns across the funds’ members, unless the constructed variables refer stronger 
to the underlying socio-professional classification rather than the membership per 
se.  
                                                          
26 Occupational stress is caused by such factors  as ‘change’, ‘demands of others’, ‘lack of control’, 
‘physical environment’, ‘frustration’, ‘work organisation’, etc.  
27 As a result of mergers of companies: Arcelor and ArcelorMittal as of 2002 and 2006 respectively.  
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Employment within different occupational sectors is accounted for. The 
corresponding variables are constructed in relation to NACE codes and refer to 11 
sectors (n_sectorX), such as manufacturing, hotels and restaurants, public 
administration work, work at the community level organisations, etc. Hypotheses 
with respect to occupational sector influences are rather limited due to lack of 
empirical evidence, especially given Luxembourg settings. Generally, we expect 
people in healthcare sector to use more of healthcare services due to work related 
health knowledge and social contacts within the healthcare sector. Occupational 
sectors, such as business activities, might also indicate higher utilisation of 
healthcare services due to more flexible personal time management. Transport or 
construction sectors are expected to reveal less of healthcare utilisation due to more 
stringent time (and geographical location) constraints for contacting healthcare 
specialists. The sectors (i.e. trade, cleaning, hotels, restaurants and catering) with 
the highest occupational stress (Wlodarski, 2006) are expected to use more of 
healthcare too. On the contrary, the sectors with the lowest reported stress levels 
(i.e. manufacturing, teaching, the public sector or financial services) should then 
associate with the reduced healthcare use. Overall, we expect the same 
occupational sector to have similar impacts for using either ambulatory or dental 
care.  
We are also interested to see if an economic potential of the residence area has an 
impact on the healthcare use. Two municipal level variables are constructed. The 
first one points to the areas of very high unemployment (high_unempl; 15% of all 
employees) - 1.5 times higher than the country average (5.4%). The second one 
indicates economically deprived areas (deprived; 21% of all employees) and is created 
based on the EC (2006) information on regional aid provision to the economically 
disadvantaged areas. Increasing international research evidence points to lower 
probabilities of healthcare use among people living in the disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods (Kirby & Kaneda, 2005).  
The number of employees in the company describes a workplace (i.e. work 
environment, occupational health standards, etc.) and also refers to the extent of a 
social network potentially acquirable via the job. We distinguish among six 
company types: one person (onep_firm; 4% of all employees), micro (micro_firm, 12% 
of all employees), small (small_firm; 27% of all employees), medium (medium_firm; 21% 
of all employees), large (large_firm; 8% of all employees) and very large (vlarge_firm, 
28% of all employees) companies. Following Goerens (2006) report on Luxembourg, 
working (health related) conditions have been improved in many workplaces. 
Most changes, however, occurred in the large companies (more than 250 people) 
and least changes – in the small (fewer than 20 people) companies. Better working 
conditions could relate to lower healthcare needs. On the other hand, more 
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stringent working (time) regulations within the larger companies could create 
constraints in seeking healthcare.  
The logarithm of the equivalised household’s disposable income (ln_eqdinc) is used 
as an indication of the person’s monetary well-being. Overall, we expect higher 
income levels to be strongly associated with a higher use of dentist services in 
Luxembourg. This relates to numerous cross-country observations on significant 
pro-rich dentist care utilisation. Income, on the other hand, is often reported to be 
negatively associated with the use of GP services. As our dependent variable on 
consultations pools information on both GP and specialist services, the direction of 
the income effect is ambiguous, especially given that the higher use of specialist 
services is usually observed for the higher income families. We also check the 
impact of living at-risk-of-poverty (poor; 10% of all employees). A relative poverty 
concept is used to create this dummy variable, with poverty line defined as 60% of 
median equivalised household disposable income. The expected effect follows 
income related observations. 
Five gross salary levels, based on the quintile distribution of gross salaries, are also 
constructed (quintileX). They indicate low to high paid jobs and refer to an array of 
material and non-material returns to work (e.g. low to high skilled jobs, managerial 
positions, etc.). We also use an opportunity of working with a social security 
dataset to discuss the potential influence of bonuses: usually surveys do not 
include or do not contain enough observations on bonus receipts. Indication of 
bonus receipts (bonus; 73% of all employees) covers both material (i.e. income) and 
non-material returns from work too. The non-material aspects relate to potential 
over-time, extra-ordinary efforts at work, a higher managerial position, a more 
active use of the workplace’s social network, etc. To better capture some of these 
effects, we indicate if a person received bonus is very (h_bonus; >= mean gross 
salary) or moderately high (m_bonus; >= 0.6* mean gross salary). If the income 
effect is dominant, we are going to observe the same pattern of influences as 
already discussed for household disposable income. Negative influences are not to 
be excluded too.  
Nationality influences  
Aside the direct role of employment, we are also interested in highlighting the 
healthcare use variation in relation to the ethnic background. In the fore-presented 
(default) hurdle model, employment influences on healthcare use are evaluated 
controlling for nationalities’ effects. As a sensitivity analysis, we also implement a 
modification: we exclude nationalities in the used determinants’ list. The aim is to 
see if, which and how employment influences would be altered.  
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Such a sensitivity analysis on the links between nationality and employment is due 
to our previous observations of an ethnically segregated Luxembourg labour 
market. We distinguish between 15 nationality groups, with the largest nationality 
being Luxembourgish (53% of all employees). Other large nationality groups are 
Portuguese (22%), French (6%), Italian (4%), Belgian (4%), German (2%), various 
nationalities of former Yugoslavia (2%) and Cape Verde. Our expectations on 
either higher or lower healthcare utilisation by non-Luxembourgish nationals are 
quite limited28. Aside cultural differences (i.e. cultural norms, but also language) a 
geographical proximity to the homeland could play a role. If so, non-EU 
nationalities would be noted to have a comparable utilisation to the 
Luxembourgish people, whereas those living close to the homelands would be 
expected to have a lower use of healthcare services, at least because of potential use 
of the cross-border care. If nationality is not controlled for, (some of) it related 
effects would be potentially “absorbed” by the employment characteristics.  
Other control factors 
We use an extensive list of objectively evaluated individual health needs’ 
estimators: 1) sickness leave duration, 2) a number of sickness episodes per year, 
and 3) an array of different disease diagnostics29, which are constructed in relation 
to the International Disease Code (ICD) classification. The three covered categories 
of health needs are recognised as hardest to obtain, however, the most influential 
predictors of healthcare use. For example, the lack of data on sickness episodes 
have been often recognised as a serious issue for a hurdle model specification, 
annual data analysis or overall unexplained heterogeneity (e.g. Pohlmeier & 
Ulrich, 1995; van Doorslaer, Koolman et al., 2004). Few empirical studies though 
yet exist using sickness leave or disease diagnostic code information. In addition to 
these three groups, maternity and disability variables are constructed on the basis 
of respective benefit receipts. Aside informing on the health needs, they also reflect 
the design of the state transfers.  
                                                          
28 Few studies explore immigration background and healthcare utilisation patterns in Europe. The 
existing research points to either higher use rates among immigrants versus native-born individuals or 
provides with no conclusive evidence (e.g. Muñoz de Bustillo & Antón, 2009; Solé-Auró, Guillén, & 
Crimmins, 2009) 
29 Health status variables are often considered as endogenous variables in healthcare utilisation studies, 
especially if subjective health status measurements are used. This study relies on the objectively 
evaluated health needs.  Furthermore, instrumental or lagged variables, which are often used to correct 
for endogeneity in health (e.g. van Doorslaer, Koolman et al., 2004) were not obtainable within this 
study scope. Thereby, following arguments provided by van Ourti (2004) – only mixed evidence 
available regarding endogeneity of the health status variables and a limited scope of the lagged 
variables in correcting endogeneity problem - we choose not to account for endogeneity issues in this 
study. This potential caveat is to be solved in the follow-up researches.  
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We also control for family arrangements, such as household size (on average 2.5 
people), family status (i.e. single, married, separated or widowed) and some 
specific household types (i.e. single parents with children, a family with a new-
born child, a person taking care of the dependent). A number of (other) 
municipality level descriptions are included using STATEC data. They are 
constructed in order to capture environmental, administrative, political and other 
socio-economic aspects of the person’s surroundings. Municipal densities (i.e. 
municipal population/doctors) of ambulatory care providers and dentists are also 
controlled for.  
Additionally, we include control variables for gender, age (age and age squared), 
as well as age related employment (i.e. volatile jobs at the very young ages) and 
gender influences. Some other interaction terms referring to occupational 
specificities are covered too. For example we control for situations where a person 
works full year and is still noted to receive an unemployment benefit (presumably 
technical unemployment or other unknown/administrative reasons). A dummy 
variable is also used to control for cases with no disposable income. Some 
occupational sectors’ specificities are taken into account by interactions with 
working hours.  
3.4. Results 
Here, we discuss the role of employment characteristics and nationality in 
healthcare use. Table 3-2 reports the associated hurdle model coefficients. Bolded 
coefficients are significant at p =<0.05. Coefficients of the other explanatory 
variables are reported in Appendix 2.  
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Table 3-2. The hurdle model results – determinants of prime interest 
 Consultations Dentist visits 
Part I Part II  Part I Part II   
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
Employment characteristics: 
fullyear 0.630 0.040 0.102 0.014 0.573 0.032 -0.102 0.025 
unempl 0.622 0.101 0.179 0.033 0.258 0.077 -0.066 0.062 
over_time 0.163 0.070 -0.021 0.021 0.039 0.048 0.014 0.035 
part_time -0.318 0.062 -0.064 0.024 -0.178 0.052 -0.068 0.042 
bluecollar -0.414 0.171 -0.393 0.040 -0.086 0.101 -0.158 0.070 
civil -0.770 0.196 -0.314 0.043 0.055 0.118 0.161 0.076 
othercategory -0.643 0.128 -0.445 0.029 -0.267 0.073 -0.176 0.048 
quintile1 0.321 0.040 0.097 0.010 0.007 0.024 0.055 0.017 
quintile2 0.043 0.027 0.019 0.007 -0.064 0.018 0.048 0.012 
quintile4 0.042 0.025 -0.007 0.007 0.045 0.018 -0.014 0.012 
quintile5 -0.179 0.030 -0.077 0.009 0.074 0.022 -0.059 0.014 
bonus -0.020 0.021 -0.070 0.006 0.003 0.015 -0.001 0.011 
h_bonus -0.200 0.081 0.052 0.034 -0.348 0.069 0.076 0.050 
m_bonus -0.088 0.065 0.012 0.024 -0.099 0.052 0.034 0.035 
ln_eqdinc 0.324 0.023 0.037 0.008 0.328 0.018 -0.061 0.013 
poor -0.327 0.035 -0.062 0.010 -0.138 0.025 0.001 0.019 
n_mine_man_ut 0.016 0.042 0.001 0.013 0.129 0.029 0.009 0.021 
n_construction -0.132 0.042 -0.025 0.013 -0.029 0.029 -0.017 0.022 
n_trade 0.053 0.037 -0.003 0.011 0.107 0.026 -0.039 0.018 
n_hotels_rest 0.038 0.049 -0.066 0.015 0.188 0.035 0.106 0.025 
n_transport 0.272 0.046 0.126 0.014 0.162 0.033 -0.029 0.023 
n_financial 0.232 0.035 0.107 0.011 0.222 0.026 -0.021 0.018 
n_public 0.592 0.041 0.272 0.012 0.198 0.028 0.009 0.019 
n_education 0.012 0.087 0.071 0.029 0.150 0.067 -0.113 0.045 
n_health -0.066 0.042 0.009 0.011 0.189 0.027 -0.053 0.018 
n_community 0.231 0.058 0.026 0.016 0.256 0.039 -0.056 0.026 
n_household 0.343 0.111 -0.018 0.026 0.417 0.064 -0.103 0.043 
n_other 0.111 0.074 0.028 0.022 0.190 0.052 0.028 0.037 
onep_firm -0.078 0.055 -0.014 0.018 -0.048 0.042 -0.055 0.030 
micro_firm 0.001 0.034 -0.026 0.010 0.041 0.024 0.023 0.016 
small_firm -0.017 0.028 -0.031 0.008 0.033 0.019 -0.017 0.013 
med_firm -0.003 0.028 -0.017 0.008 -0.024 0.019 -0.044 0.012 
large_firm 0.016 0.034 -0.009 0.010 -0.052 0.024 -0.009 0.016 
CMEP -0.328 0.169 -0.403 0.039 0.109 0.100 -0.275 0.069 
CMFEP 0.739 0.212 0.081 0.049 0.257 0.129 -0.449 0.087 
CMPI 0.172 0.206 -0.174 0.056 0.349 0.140 -0.244 0.094 
CMOA 0.158 0.101 -0.086 0.028 -0.132 0.065 -0.004 0.049 
EMCFL 1.284 0.222 0.301 0.052 0.243 0.137 -0.351 0.091 
CMFEC 1.005 0.217 0.177 0.050 0.359 0.133 -0.416 0.089 
CMAGR 0.186 0.260 -0.146 0.077 0.535 0.194 -0.046 0.119 
CMEA -0.393 0.185 -0.381 0.047 0.250 0.116 -0.301 0.079 
deprived 0.027 0.024 0.010 0.006 -0.065 0.016 0.039 0.011 
high_unempl 0.005 0.037 0.019 0.010 -0.053 0.025 0.009 0.017 
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 Consultations Dentist visits 
Part I Part II  Part I Part II   
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
Nationality: 
Portugal -0.186 0.026 -0.081 0.007 -0.327 0.017 0.077 0.012 
France -0.537 0.031 -0.105 0.011 -0.589 0.023 0.022 0.017 
Italy -0.179 0.041 0.004 0.012 -0.175 0.029 0.051 0.020 
Belgium -0.759 0.036 -0.133 0.013 -0.727 0.028 0.029 0.021 
Germany -0.722 0.046 -0.133 0.016 -0.508 0.036 -0.032 0.026 
f_Yugoslavia 0.041 0.063 -0.075 0.015 -0.387 0.037 0.126 0.028 
UK -0.871 0.069 -0.204 0.029 -0.802 0.058 -0.112 0.046 
Netherlands -0.639 0.082 -0.126 0.030 -0.365 0.065 -0.117 0.047 
CapeVerde -0.437 0.100 -0.145 0.028 -0.710 0.066 -0.072 0.053 
Spain -0.265 0.099 -0.053 0.030 -0.496 0.070 -0.058 0.052 
Denmark -0.293 0.121 -0.034 0.040 -0.409 0.092 -0.128 0.064 
Tajikistan -0.230 0.129 -0.174 0.055 -1.162 0.121 -0.102 0.108 
Poland -0.746 0.131 -0.222 0.049 -0.518 0.103 0.378 0.079 
Sweden -0.930 0.118 -0.170 0.052 -0.979 0.104 -0.159 0.086 
other_nation -0.500 0.043 -0.144 0.015 -0.608 0.033 0.040 0.025 
Other explanatory variables (see Appendix 2)
 
Log L = -56685.89 Log L = -350630.99 Log L =  -106190.64 Log L = -264640.63 
Hurdle Log L = -407316.88 Hurdle Log L = -370831.27 
N=167446 N= 139866 N=167446 N= 94114 
Note: ‘Estimates’ refer to the coefficients as obtained from each part of the hurdle model.  
Employment influences 
Overall, we find that employment characteristics are relevant sources of influences 
in healthcare use. Their impacts, though, could present both comparable and 
opposing impacts given one or another healthcare type, and for a contact or a 
subsequent healthcare use. For example, we observe that employment 
characteristics are more significant in explaining the probability rather than the 
frequency of dentist visits. The effect is less apparent for ambulatory care. We also 
note that individual level determinants, such as work intensity or occupational 
category, are more significant in explaining the use of ambulatory rather than 
dental care. Contextual factors (i.e. economic deprivation, unemployment level, 
occupational sector), on the other hand, are found to be particularly important in 
predicting the probability of the (first) dental contact. Furthermore, probability of 
seeking healthcare, be it consultations or dental care, is rather uniformly influenced 
by the same employment characteristics. However, a more notable divergence in 
the effects of different employment attributes appears when explaining the 
frequency of utilisation. We discuss these observations in more detail.   
An all year-round employment in comparison to fewer months at work relates to a 
higher probability of both contacting and using ambulatory care. The same effect is 
noted for contacting dental services. However, the full-year employment implies a 
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lower frequency of dental care utilisation. This finding comes with a degree of 
surprise. Our initial expectations were associated with temporary or “entry” work 
positions (i.e. work, associated with less than full-time employment) implying a 
reduced use of healthcare.  
Any unemployment time experienced during the year of analysis is associated 
with a higher probability of contacting and using ambulatory care. The same 
directional effect is also observed for contacting dental care, but no significant 
effect is noted for explaining the frequency of dental care utilisation. Our initial 
hypothesis suggested that people in search of work also use more of healthcare. In 
this study, no precise link however could be established between the receipt of an 
unemployment benefit and employment search. Our findings, on the other hand, 
do not endorse the reverse prospect of people in receipt of an unemployment also 
having higher financial strains. Based on this hypothesis, we should have observed 
a lower healthcare utilisation rate.   
Working over-time in comparison to full-time increases a probability of a contact to 
ambulatory care. The effect is negligible in explaining the overall dental and the 
frequency of ambulatory care. Working part-time significantly decreases both the 
probability and the frequency of consultations. A similar negative effect is also 
noted for the probability of having a dentist visit. The effect is though insignificant 
for the frequency of dental visits. Overall, the direction of the over-time effect 
corresponds to our expectation that a higher stress and exposures to the 
occupational hazards increases a probability and a frequency of consultations. The 
part-time work effect is also in line with the initial hypothesis. It arguably suggests 
that part-time job related (financial) insecurity reduces the likelihood of a more 
active utilisation of healthcare services. It could also pertain to fewer occupational 
exposures when working less.  
An occupational category has a higher role in explaining ambulatory rather than 
the dental care. We note that in comparison to white-collar workers all other 
occupational groups have a lower probability of seeking consultations. For dental 
care, the same directional effect is only noted among the workers without a clear 
indication of occupational category. The civil servants and blue-collar workers do 
not disclose significant differences from the white-collar workers in seeking dental 
care. An occupational category has a somewhat smaller, but a rather similar effect 
in explaining the frequency of consultations too: all other occupational groups 
have a lower use of ambulatory care in comparison to white-collar workers. A 
diverging role is though noted for the dental care: civil servants tend to use dental 
services most frequently, “followed” by white-collar, blue-collar and other types of 
workers respectively.  As such, our expectations regarding the occupational 
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category are partially not-fulfilled. We have expected a more clear-cut segregation 
of healthcare use among the manual and non-manual categories. This applies for 
dental, but not for ambulatory care.   
The gross salary level has a different directional effect in explaining the contact to 
ambulatory and dental care. People with the lowest salary levels use consultations 
more often in comparison to those with the middle range salaries (i.e. the third 
quintile), whereas those with the top salaries (i.e. the fifth quintile) – more often. 
The opposite effect is observed for dental care: people with the highest salaries 
(both fifth and the fourth quintiles) seek dental care more often compared to those 
with the middle range salaries, while the second quintile is found to have a 
lowered tendency of contacts. The gross salary has a similar role though in 
explaining the frequency of both ambulatory and dental care. Namely, the lower 
salaried people have a slightly higher use of services in comparison to the middle 
and the very top salaries.  
Overall, the receipt of a bonus does not have a large explanatory power, and if so – 
the effect is negative (i.e. in explaining the subsequent use of ambulatory care). 
High (in comparison to low) bonuses are observed having a negative effect in 
seeking both ambulatory and dental care. Interestingly, the latter observation 
aligns to the negative high gross salary effect noted for ambulatory care, but not for 
dental care. A few explanations could emerge regarding the negative effect of top 
bonuses. This could signal a differentiated use of health services among the people 
with the very top remuneration packages. For example, these people might tend to 
use the cross-border rather than Luxembourg healthcare – information on which is 
not provided in our dataset. Additionally, given that a negative bonus effect is the 
strongest in explaining a contact rather than a frequency of healthcare use, it could 
point to different preventive care behaviour.  
An increase in family income is associated with an increasing probability of a 
contact – both for consultations and dental care. The effect on the frequency of the 
use is however divergent: higher family disposable income has a positive effect on 
the use of consultations, but a negative effect on the use of dental care. These 
effects are observed given controls for the lowest family incomes: we note that 
living in a family at-risk-of poverty has a significantly negative effect on seeking 
both consultations and dentist services.  
In summary, our expectation that a higher income level, be it gross salary, bonus or 
disposable income, is going to be associated with a higher use of at least dentist 
services is only partially met. While overall an increase in a family’s disposable 
income is associated with a higher probability of seeking ambulatory and dentist 
care, varied top/low income effects are also noted for these two healthcare types. 
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Arguably, they reveal different behaviours at the ends of income distributions and 
also point to different non-monetary influences pertaining to diverse remuneration 
schemes.  
Employment with a specific occupational sector reveals to be a strong determinant 
of the healthcare contact, especially for the dental services. Additionally, this 
determinant has often opposite directional impacts in explaining the use of dental 
and ambulatory care. The reference category here is working in the business sector. 
We find that all other sectors are associated with a higher probability of having at 
least one dental service per year. For consultations, the construction sector is noted 
to have a lower contact probability than the business sector, and all the other 
sectors – either a comparable or a higher contact. An occupational sector has also a 
somewhat more limited but still a significant role in determining the frequency of 
healthcare use. Furthermore, the sector impacts are highly divergent in explaining 
the use of ambulatory and dental care. For consultations, the pattern is actually 
rather similar to the one noted above: in comparison to the business sector, 
working in the construction, plus in the hotels and restaurants’ sector, implies a 
lower use of consultations. For dental care, most sectors, except of the hotels and 
restaurants, are associated with a lower use of dental services. As such, the sector 
influence in determining the contact and the frequency of usage is highly different 
for dental care. We also note that the sectors which do not have significantly 
different dental care usage (in comparison to the business sector) are mining and 
manufacturing, construction, transport, financial or even public sector. Precisely 
these sectors, except of mining and manufacturing, have the strong explanatory 
powers for the frequency of ambulatory care. Other reverse effects are also present. 
The sectors, such as trade, health or household work, show insignificant effects for 
ambulatory, but not for dental care. Working in the hotels and restaurants is noted 
to increase dental, but to decrease ambulatory care usage. The same reverse 
directional effect is also noted for the educational sector.  
 Overall, our initial hypotheses regarding the occupational sector role in 
Luxembourg are mainly rejected. First, people working in, for example, the 
healthcare sector do not tend to use more services in comparison to most other 
sectors. Second, among the sectors with the noted higher occupational stress 
exposures, only work in the household sector is related to a higher probability of 
contacting both ambulatory and dental care. Third, the sectors with the lowest 
stress levels (i.e. manufacturing, teaching, the public sector or financial services) 
have an increased, rather than reduced, use of ambulatory care, and mainly an 
insignificant or decreasing impact on the use of the dental services. 
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The company size does not display any significant effect on the decision to contact 
any of the two healthcare services. The only exception is that working in a large 
compared to the very large company has a negative effect on making the first 
contact for the dental services. A more significant differentiation by the company 
size is noted though for the frequency of utilisation: employment with the very 
large companies (almost) uniformly associates with a higher use of ambulatory 
care. The effect is less significant but still comparable for dentist care too. As such, 
our expectation that employment in the very large companies could relate to more 
rigorous working hours or better working (at least healthcare wise) conditions - 
and thus reduce healthcare use - is not approved. Instead, it seems that working in 
the very large companies creates higher demand or better settings for a more 
frequent use of, as a minimum, ambulatory care.  
Membership with a certain occupational sickness fund, just like a work in a specific 
occupational sector, has a highly diverse utilisation effect on ambulatory and 
dentist services. Our main reference category here is CMO – a fund for manual or 
blue-collar workers of the private sector. Two affiliations are found to have a lower 
than the CMO probability of seeking ambulatory care: both are the private sector 
funds for white-collar workers, namely CMEA and CMEP. For dental care, the 
lower probability of a contact is only noted for the CMOA fund members – 
ARBED’s fund for manual workers. As such, the lowest probability of seeking 
dental care is associated with the manual workers of the private sector. All other 
affiliations imply either higher or insignificant difference in contacting both 
ambulatory and dentist care. CMEA and CMEP membership also implies a lower 
use of ambulatory care, once the first contact has been made. The same directional 
effect is also observed for CMOA and CMPI (i.e. a fund for self-employed).  
Membership with the CMFEC, a fund for civil servants and employees of local 
authorities, and the EMCFL (a medical insurance association of the Luxembourg 
Railways) reveals a higher utilisation of ambulatory care. For dental care, no fund 
is associated with a higher utilisation rate than observed for the CMO. In 
summary, our analysis shows that there exists a differentiated use of healthcare 
services across the members of occupational sickness funds – a finding we were 
uncertain about, when setting the initial hypotheses. Given controls for income 
levels, occupational sector and category (among others), this shows disparities 
across the private and public sectors, as well as other (yet) un-captured 
occupational features.  
Finally, two included contextual factors – living in the economically deprived or 
high unemployment areas – have no significant effect on either contacting or using 
ambulatory care. Living in these residential areas though has a significant and 
negative effect on initiating the contact with dentists. On the other hand, once the 
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first contact is made, living in the deprived areas is associated with a higher use of 
dental services. As such, our findings do not support our initial expectation of a 
reduced use of healthcare services in the economically deprived areas. The 
findings are actually mixed and depend on the healthcare service type.  
Nationality influences 
In comparison to Luxembourgish people, all foreign nationals have a lower 
probability of seeking either ambulatory or dental care. The same holds for the 
frequency of ambulatory care use. A couple nationalities, though, are noted to have 
a more frequent use of dental care in comparison to Luxembourgish people.  
Overall, we have expected that the probability of a contact would be lower for 
nationalities of Luxembourg neighbouring countries, such as France, Belgium or 
Germany. This is confirmed for all three countries. Furthermore, the probability of 
a contact, be it consultations or dental care, is also lower for all other ethnic groups. 
It is likely that such a lower overall contact with the Luxembourg healthcare 
system is due to language barriers or a possibility of using services in the 
homeland/ across the border. The observation is rather surprising, though, as some 
of the foreign nationals have been living in Luxembourg since about 1970’s, and 
assimilation effect could have been expected.  
The frequency of ambulatory care use reveals a few other interesting observations. 
Workers with the southern European EU background, as Italy and Spain, do not 
have a significantly different utilisation of ambulatory care in comparison to 
Luxembourgish. So are Danish. All other nationalities have a lower use of 
ambulatory care in comparison to Luxembourg nationals. This comes rather 
unexpectedly, given that substituting Luxembourg healthcare with homeland 
services is quite cumbersome given geographical proximity or travel costs, at least 
for nationals of far-away and non-EU countries, as Tajikistan or Cape Verde.  
The frequency of dental care use has a different pattern in comparison to 
ambulatory care use. First, less sharp divergences from the Luxembourg nationals 
are traced. Second, Portuguese, Italians, former Yugoslavian nationals and 
particularly Polish are found to have a higher (than Luxembourgish) dental care 
use. Only three nationalities, namely of the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands, are 
still noted to have a lower use. The remaining nationalities, even those with the 
neighbouring home states (i.e. Germany, Belgium and France) have a comparable 
to Luxembourgish dental care utilisation. This implies, that potentially the cross–
border dental care (in contrast to ambulatory care) utilisation is of less 
importance/convenience. As such, this finding contradicts our initial expectation 
regarding geographical proximity to Luxembourg – it seems to have a healthcare 
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use reducing effects for ambulatory care, but not for dental care. The quality of 
dental care might be an answer; however this study does not have any means to 
confirm this. Cultural norms seem to play a larger role too.  
Employment “absorbed” nationality effects  
How much does nationality interact with the diverse employment characteristics? 
As part of the sensitivity analysis, we run the same hurdle model – however, 
omitting a control for the nationality variables. Employment related coefficients of 
this limited hurdle model are presented in Appendix 3. Here, we highlight the 
major observations.  
For seeking ambulatory care, we notice large changes regarding explanation of 
income, occupational sector, occupational sickness fund and a company size (other 
effects are mainly the same, especially in terms of the directional effects). Without 
the control for nationality, one could claim that all gross salary levels are 
significant in explanation of the first contact. So is the receipt of top bonuses. 
Employment in the construction sector, on the other hand, would reveal a less 
significant variation, whereas the work in the healthcare or community services 
would show positive and significant influence on the ambulatory care use. People 
working in the “one-employee” companies appear to have significantly lower 
probabilities in seeking ambulatory care if compared to those working in the very 
large companies.  
For the frequency of the ambulatory care use, we observe analogous changes as 
discussed for the contact of the use. Additionally, we note that without controlling 
for nationality, the membership with the CMFEP occupational sickness fund (i.e. 
for civil servants and state employees) reveals a positive and significant influence 
on the healthcare use.  
For seeking dentist care, the changes of employment impacts are also mainly 
analogous to those observed for ambulatory care. However, even stronger results 
are noted regarding the explanatory power of the bonus variables. For example, 
even the receipt of a bonus would signal a significant and positive explanatory 
relation. Explanation of the frequency of the dental care use in principle would not 
change (except of relatively small size effects) with or without inclusion of the 
nationality variables.  
How is nationality related to the employment variables that reveal the biggest 
coefficient changes? From the data, we learn that higher incomes/bonuses are 
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mostly30 received by Luxembourgish people and in particular a few EU member 
nationals, such as the UK, Denmark and Sweden. At the same time, very few 
nationals of Portugal, former Yugoslavia, Cape Verde, Tajikistan or Poland are 
noted to receive any such high remuneration.  
Construction sector shows a reverse pattern to remuneration for pooling certain 
nationalities. Here, we find very few Luxembourgish, French, Belgians, Brits, 
Dutch, Danish or Swedish workers, but a high over-representation of workers from 
Portugal and the former Yugoslavia. The healthcare and community services do 
not have a very high over-representation of a certain nationality, but employment 
of nationals from the UK, Denmark, Sweden and Tajikistan is particularly low. 
Actually, nationals from the UK, Denmark and Sweden primarily take jobs in the 
financial sector31. Tajikistan and Cape Verde nationals are extremely self-selected to 
work in the restaurants and hotels sector32.  
Ethnic background of employees also varies by company size. For example, for 
one-employee companies, Portuguese, Dutch, Cape Verdeans, Tajik or Polish are 
overrepresented as compared to the average in the population at large.33  The 
medium size companies are over-represented by the nationals of the UK, Denmark 
and Sweden. The very large companies, our reference category for tracing the 
company size influences, have consistently lower shares of all nationalities, except 
of Luxembourgish.  
The occupational sickness fund CMFEP provides health insurance to civil servants 
and state employees. Nationality wise, it is highly dominated by Luxembourgish 
people (consistently low shares of all other nationalities are recorded). The same 
observation holds for EMCFL - the Luxembourg Railways Medical Insurance 
Association. CMOA, the occupational sickness fund for ARBED’s manual workers, 
has a dominant share of two nationalities – Italy and Luxembourg. For the latter 
                                                          
30 Over/under-representation of the nationality in relation to a certain employment characteristic is 
determined in the following way: if share of the nationality within the selected category (i.e. top quintile 
of the gross salary level) over the share of this nationality in the total population is more than 1.5 – we 
refer to it as a large over-representation; if the share of the nationality within the specific category over 
the share of this nationality in the total population is less than 0.5 – we refer to the ethnic group as  
largely under-represented.   
31The over-representation ratios for these nationalities reach such extreme heights, as 4.5, 6.3 and 6.2 
respectively. These are the highest over-representation ratios among all nationalities.  
32 The over-representation ratios for these two nationalities are extremely high: more than 15.5 and 5.1 
respectively. Some other nationalities, as French or Italians, display the next highest over-representation 
shares, but with somewhat lower heights of 2.7 and 2.2 respectively.  
33 The over-representation is particularly large for Tajik employees of one-person companies, with a 
ratio of 4. 
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membership, most of the other nationalities (except of French) are highly under-
represented.  
3.5. Conclusions 
This study is the first empirical investigation linking healthcare utilisation and 
employment characteristics in Luxembourg. The contribution of this chapter to the 
wider literature is twofold. On the one hand, it provides an innovative strategy for 
using administrative data to study health care utilisation in relation to employment 
characteristics. It uses an extremely rich set of cross-sectional data of the 
Luxemburg-resident population. The data were specifically assembled for this 
project from various public institutions by the Inspection Générale de la Sécurité 
Sociale. Our dataset refers to individual level records for the entire calendar year of 
2006, allowing us to analyse individual’s health status and detailed health care 
utilisation. Analysed healthcare refers to the residents’ use of services covered by 
the national health insurance system. One limitation of the study is that we do not 
observe cross-border health care or health services covered by private insurance – 
even if used by the resident population.  
We further enrich this micro-level data by more aggregate information on, for 
example, economic and health infrastructure at the municipality level. The 
administrative nature of the data (i.e. no recall error) and the exhaustive nature of 
information allow accounting for both individual and contextual influences – with 
more than 100 parameters included. One particularly interesting aspect is also the 
availability of detailed information on nationality. 
On the other hand, it provides innovative evidence on the link between 
employment characteristics and observed disparities in ambulatory and dental care 
utilisation. Our results highlight five key findings.  
First, both individual and aggregate employment characteristics play a significant 
role in determining health care use. These effects are particularly strong and 
significant in determining contact with healthcare providers rather than the 
frequency of use – particularly for dental care. In addition, individual level 
employment attributes are notably more influential in explaining the use of 
ambulatory care whereas contextual parameters have a stronger role for dental 
care. 
Second, employment characteristics have effects of varying amplitude and 
sometimes of opposite sign for ambulatory and dental care usage. Our results 
reveal that opposite signed effects are rather common for determining the 
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frequency of health care usage, whereas they are less common regarding (the first) 
access to care. We find that belonging to the top gross salary quintile has a negative 
effect for seeking ambulatory care but a positive effect for dental care – the only 
significant opposite-signed determinant of access. We find negative effects for 
frequency of dental care use but positive effects for ambulatory care for 
characteristics such as full-year work (as opposed to seasonal), household 
disposable income or employment in the educational sector. The opposite holds 
true for civil servants.  
Third, specific employment attributes reveal both expected and unexpected 
influences on healthcare use. Two major expectations are confirmed: full-year and 
overtime work unsurprisingly increase ambulatory care use, and blue-collar 
workers use significantly less dental services. We find an array of unexpected but 
significant effects. For example, workers of the business sector are noted to have 
the lowest overall ambulatory care use, whereas our expectation was an increased 
utilisation rate due to more flexible time management. Workers of the very large 
companies, on the other hand, have unexpectedly the highest ambulatory care 
usage – in spite of generally favourable workplace safety regulations as reported in 
the literature. Similarly, people working in the healthcare sector do not tend to use 
more healthcare services in comparison to other sectors. We also note that 
utilisation varies significantly across occupational sickness funds – showing the 
need for a further investigation of the solidarity mechanisms between funds. 
Fourth, nationality is an important source of variation in healthcare use. We find 
that foreign nationality is always associated with lower probability of seeking both 
ambulatory and dental care. For the frequency of utilisation of ambulatory 
services, a similar result is found.  For dental services, nationals of Portugal, Italy, 
former Yugoslavia and particularly Polish have a higher frequency of utilisation 
than Luxembourg nationals.  
Fifth, the inclusion of both nationality and detailed employment information in our 
dataset allows us to isolate these two effects. Our results indicate that nationality is 
a powerful driver of behaviour in addition to employment characteristics. This 
finding also has implications regarding the wider literature – which generally 
relies on less complete data sources. Our sensitivity analysis reveals that the 
exclusion of nationality leads to an overestimated role of income parameters and 
an under-estimation of non-monetary employment influences – with the ensuing 
policy implications.  
Our analysis reveals several areas for future research. Aside a number of 
limitations already mentioned in this Chapter, the dataset, for example, could be 
expanded by including information on education level or by adding additional 
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years of observations. Additional analysis could also be conducted, such as the 
inclusion of separate indicators of health needs for different types of healthcare 
services or the detailed exploration of the driving forces (i.e. occupational stress, 
financial strains, etc.) behind the observed employment influences. Information on 
(any) preferential treatment of certain population groups when setting the rates of 
co-payments would be interesting to explore in more detail, especially given the 
varied income effects for ambulatory and dental care observed in this study. 
Equity considerations could be further explored too.  
  
P a g e  | 72 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF PUBLIC POLICIES 
 
3.6. Appendices 
Appendix 1. Description and summary statistics of explanatory variables 
We list determinants of prime interest (i.e. main employment and nationality 
effects) and other control variables. Overall, we follow the determinants’ structure 
as proposed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
Variable name Short description[1] Mean SE Min Max 
Employment related factors
quintile1 Quintile 1, gross salary 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
quintile2 Quintile 2, gross salary 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
quintile3*[2] Quintile 3, gross salary 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
quintile4 Quintile 4, gross salary 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
quintile5 Quintile 5, gross salary 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
bonus Receipt of a bonus 0.73 0.45 0.00 1.00 
h_bonus Bonus is >= 35847 (mean gross 
salary) 
0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00 
m_bonus Bonus is >= 0.6 x mean gross 
salary 
0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
fullyear 12 months of work 0.91 0.29 0.00 1.00 
unempl Receipt of an unemployment 
benefit 
0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
over_time Work hours per month >176 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
full_time* 80<=hours per month <=176 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 
part_time Hours per month<80 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
whitecollar Occupational category: white-
collar worker 
0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
bluecollar Occupational category: blue-
collar worker 
0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
civil Occupational category: civil 
servant 
0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
othercategory Occupational category: 
undefined 
0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
n_business Sector: business activities 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
n_mine_man_ut Sector: mining, manufacturing 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
n_construction Sector: construction 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
n_trade Sector: trade activities 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
n_hotels_rest Sector: hotels and restaurants 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
n_transport Sector: transportation 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
n_financial Sector: financial activities 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
n_public Sector: public services 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
n_education Sector: educational services 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
n_health Sector: healthcare services 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
n_community Sector: community services 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
n_household Sector: household work 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
n_other Sector: other activities 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
onep_firm Company size: 1 employee 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
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micro_firm Company size: 2 to 10 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
small_firm Company size: 11 to 100 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
med_firm Company size: 101 to 500 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
large_firm Company size: 501 to 1000 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 
vlarge_firm* Company size: 1001 or more 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
CMEP Occupational sickness fund 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
CMFEP Occupational sickness fund 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
CMPI Occupational sickness fund 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
CMOA Occupational sickness fund 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
EMCFL Occupational sickness fund 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
CMFEC Occupational sickness fund 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
CMAGR Occupational sickness fund 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 
CMEA Occupational sickness fund 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
CMO* Occupational sickness fund 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
ln_eqdinc Logarithm of equivalised 
household (hh) disposable 
10.17 0.63 0.00 12.00 
poor Poor household: equivalised per 
capita hh income < 60% * 
0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
deprived Economically deprived 
communes34 
0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 
high_unempl Communes with high 
unemployment rate35 
0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Nationalities 
Luxembourg* Nationality 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Portugal Nationality 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
France Nationality 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Italy Nationality 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Belgium Nationality 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Germany Nationality 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
f_Yugoslavia36 Nationality: of former 
Yugoslavia countries 
0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
UK Nationality 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Netherlands Nationality 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
CapeVerde Nationality: Cape Verde 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Spain Nationality 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00 
Denmark Nationality 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Tajikistan Nationality 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Poland Nationality 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Sweden Nationality 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
other_nation Other nationalities 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Control factors 
Employment and other variables’ interaction effects
                                                          
34 Based on regional aid provision to economically disadvantaged areas (EC, 2006).  
35 If commune unemployment rate, based on STATEC data (), is more than the country average 5.4% x 
1.5.  
36  This is a composite category of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro 
nationalities.  
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pyear_agr1 Working less than 12 months & 
aged 18 to 24
0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
pyear_agr2 Working less than 12 months & 
aged 25 to 29 
0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
fyear_unempl Working 12 months & in receipt 
of unemployment benefit 
0.02 0.16 0.00 1.00 
overtime_mine Working overtime in mining, 
manufacturing and utilities 
0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
overtime_const Working overtime in 
construction sector 
0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
overtime_trade Working overtime in trade 
sector 
0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
overtime_trans Working overtime in transport 
sector 
0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
overtime_hot Working overtime in hotels & 
restaurants sector 
0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00 
overtime_fin Working overtime in financial 
sector 
0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
overtime_pub Working overtime in public 
services sector 
0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
overtime_edu Working overtime in 
educational sector 
0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 
overtime_he Working overtime in healthcare 
sector 
0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
overtime_com Working overtime in 
community services sector 
0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
overtime_hh Working overtime in household 
sector 
0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
overtime_oth Working overtime in other 
activities’ sector 
0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
ptime_mine Working part time in mining 
etc. sector 
0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
ptime_const Working part time in 
construction sector 
0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 
ptime_trade Working part time in trade 
sector 
0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
ptime_trans Working part time in transport 
sector 
0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
ptime_hot Working part time in hotels & 
restaurants sector 
0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
ptime_fin Working part time in financial 
sector 
0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 
ptime_pub Working part time in public 
services sector 
0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 
ptime_he Working part time in healthcare 
sector 
0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
ptime_com Working part time in 
community services’ sector 
0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
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ptime_hh Working part time in household  
sector 
0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
ptime_oth Working part time in other 
activities’ sector 
0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Individual health needs
sick_days1* No sickness days 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
sick_days2 1 sickness day 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
sick_days3 2-5 sickness days 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
sick_days4 6-10 sickness days 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
sick_days5 11-15 sickness days 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
sick_days6 16-30 sickness days 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
sick_days7 31-60 sickness days 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
sick_days8 61-90 sickness days 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
sick_days9 91-120 sickness days 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
sick_days10 121-363 sickness days 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 
episode_nr1* 1 sickness episode 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
episode_nr2 2 sickness episodes 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
episode_nr3 3 sickness episodes 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
episode_nr4 4 sickness episodes 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
episode_nr5 5 sickness episodes 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
episode_nr6 6 to 122 episodes 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
episode_nr7* No sickness episode 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
surgery After surgery care37 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
cancer Diverse cancers 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
injury Diverse injuries 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
neuro Nervous system diseases 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
infectious Infectious and parasitic diseases 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
digestion Non-infectious diseases of the 
digestive system 
0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
skin Skin diseases 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
musculoskel Musculoskeletal system 
diseases 
0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
degenerative Osteoarticular system 
degenerative diseases 
0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
genito_urinary Diseases of the genitourinary 
system 
0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
dental Dental diseases 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
vision Diseases of the eye and adnexa 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
circulatory Circulatory system diseases 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
respiratory Respiratory system diseases 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 
mental Mental and behavioural 
diseases 
0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
nutritional Endocrine, nutritional & 
metabolic diseases 
0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
pregnancy_compl Pregnancy complications 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
                                                          
3737 Rows from surgery to other_cond are defined in reference to International Codification of Diseases 
(ICD).  
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other_cond Other health conditions 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
gender Gender: women=1; men=0 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
age Age: years 37.64 9.37 18.00 55.00 
age_sq Age: years squared 1504.29 708.16 324.00 3025.00 
age_gr1 aged 18 to 24 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
age_gr2 aged 25 to 29 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
age_gr3 aged 30 to 34 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 
age_gr4* aged 35 to 39 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
age_gr5 aged 40 to 44 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
age_gr6 aged 45 to 49 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
age_gr7 aged 50 to 55 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
female_agr1 female: aged 18 to 24 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
female_agr2 female: aged 25 to 29 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
female_agr3 female: aged 30 to 34 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
female_agr4* female: aged 35 to 39 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 
female_agr5 female: aged 40 to 44 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
female_agr6 female: aged 45 to 49 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
female_agr7 female: aged 50 to 55 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
maternity Pregnancy indication38 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
disability Various disabilities 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 
Contextual- family
care A person taking care of a 
dependent person
0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
hhsize Household size 2.50 1.43 1.00 14.00 
n_dincome Indication of no record of 
household disposable income 
0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 
single_hh one adult + child(-ren)<18(age) 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
newborn_hh # of children under age 1 0.04 0.20 0.00 3.00 
married* Marital status category 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
single Marital status category 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
sep_widow Marital status category: 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Contextual – public institutions
popdoc Commune 733.66 735.39 0.00 3462 
nodoc Commune: no GPs or specialists 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
popdent Commune: residents/dentists 1294.85 1261.0 0.00 4558.0 
nodent Commune: no dentists 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
External contextual factors
Lux_city* Residence place: canton 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Lux_country Residence place: canton 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Capellen Residence place: canton 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Esch_Alzette Residence place: canton 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Mersch Residence place: canton 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Clervaux Residence place: canton 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Diekirch Residence place: canton 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Redange Residence place: canton 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Vianden Residence place: canton 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
                                                          
38 Indication of maternity and disability are based on respective benefit receipts.  
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Wiltz Residence place: canton 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Echternach Residence place: canton 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Grevenmacher Residence place: canton 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Remich Residence place: canton 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
NA_canton Residence place: unknown 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 
density Population/commune area 666.6 604.9 0.00 1951 
high_foreign Commune with high % of 
foreigners39 
0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
low_foreign Commune with low % of 
foreigners40 
0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Notes: [1] - all figures refer to annual observations;  [2] - ‘*’ indicates a reference category in the hurdle model.  
                                                          
39 Foreigners - residents with other than Luxembourg nationality; selected communes: >45% foreigners.  
40 Selected communes: <15% of foreigners.  
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Appendix 2. Hurdle model results – coefficients of control variables 
 Consultations Dentist visits 
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
Coefficients in bold 
font are significant 
at p =<0.05 
Part I 
N=167446 
Part II 
N= 139866 
Part I 
N=167446 
Part II 
N= 94114 
pyear_agr1 0.513 0.061 0.077 0.021 0.347 0.048 -0.173 0.037 
pyear_agr2 0.108 0.059 -0.046 0.024 0.172 0.051 -0.073 0.041 
fyear_unempl -0.400 0.112 -0.087 0.036 -0.314 0.084 0.100 0.067 
overtime_mine -0.166 0.093 0.021 0.027 -0.029 0.063 0.006 0.046 
overtime_const -0.124 0.087 -0.012 0.026 -0.027 0.060 0.059 0.045 
overtime_trade -0.254 0.096 -0.028 0.028 0.069 0.065 0.019 0.047 
overtime_trans -0.526 0.101 -0.156 0.030 -0.188 0.069 -0.001 0.051 
overtime_hot -0.136 0.127 0.027 0.040 0.009 0.090 -0.064 0.066 
overtime_fin -0.416 0.105 -0.040 0.034 -0.185 0.076 0.077 0.054 
overtime_pub -0.191 0.126 -0.092 0.033 0.122 0.082 -0.104 0.055 
overtime_edu 0.311 0.270 0.062 0.080 0.020 0.193 0.151 0.124 
overtime_he -0.083 0.212 0.066 0.050 -0.221 0.125 0.068 0.086 
overtime_com -0.357 0.181 0.000 0.050 -0.174 0.118 0.043 0.084 
overtime_hh -0.462 0.292 0.118 0.061 -0.219 0.162 0.012 0.106 
overtime_oth 0.097 0.231 -0.014 0.059 -0.128 0.142 -0.163 0.106 
ptime_mine 0.373 0.147 0.198 0.056 0.044 0.125 0.012 0.099 
ptime_const 0.237 0.113 0.084 0.050 0.074 0.107 -0.043 0.091 
ptime_trade 0.588 0.100 0.194 0.034 0.309 0.078 0.033 0.059 
ptime_trans 0.314 0.154 0.187 0.053 0.080 0.124 0.140 0.095 
ptime_hot 0.130 0.100 0.092 0.042 0.139 0.089 -0.002 0.072 
ptime_fin -0.339 0.108 -0.053 0.053 -0.341 0.102 -0.144 0.087 
ptime_pub 0.520 0.089 0.092 0.029 0.410 0.067 0.004 0.050 
ptime_he 0.978 0.112 0.237 0.032 0.464 0.076 0.064 0.054 
ptime_com 0.439 0.138 0.193 0.045 0.402 0.105 -0.058 0.074 
ptime_hh 0.270 0.139 0.095 0.037 0.103 0.087 0.121 0.063 
ptime_oth -0.092 0.142 0.046 0.059 0.068 0.123 -0.078 0.099 
sick_days2 0.787 0.045 -0.022 0.013 0.275 0.030 -0.002 0.019 
sick_days3 0.900 0.039 -0.017 0.008 0.154 0.020 0.029 0.014 
sick_days4 1.116 0.068 0.140 0.011 0.070 0.027 0.014 0.019 
sick_days5 1.220 0.092 0.250 0.013 0.034 0.033 0.053 0.023 
sick_days6 1.484 0.096 0.404 0.012 0.073 0.031 -0.003 0.022 
sick_days7 1.611 0.126 0.584 0.013 -0.010 0.036 -0.028 0.025 
sick_days8 1.593 0.187 0.748 0.017 0.024 0.049 -0.058 0.034 
sick_days9 1.539 0.207 0.786 0.020 0.034 0.058 -0.061 0.039 
sick_days10 1.303 0.173 0.972 0.018 -0.012 0.052 -0.070 0.036 
episode_nr2 -0.074 0.050 0.097 0.008 0.009 0.022 0.029 0.015 
episode_nr3 -0.180 0.073 0.156 0.011 -0.029 0.028 0.070 0.019 
episode_nr4 -0.247 0.106 0.160 0.013 0.008 0.036 0.063 0.024 
episode_nr5 -0.281 0.145 0.188 0.016 -0.022 0.045 0.030 0.030 
episode_nr6 -0.480 0.126 0.225 0.015 -0.131 0.041 0.091 0.028 
surgery 1.830 0.153 0.222 0.011 0.296 0.033 0.062 0.021 
cancer 1.191 0.516 0.131 0.041 0.227 0.125 0.065 0.078 
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 Consultations Dentist visits 
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
injury 1.396 0.069 0.132 0.009 0.012 0.023 -0.003 0.017 
neuro 1.468 0.123 0.145 0.011 0.023 0.030 0.000 0.021 
infectious 1.445 0.047 0.097 0.007 0.045 0.018 -0.039 0.012 
digestion 1.283 0.119 0.162 0.012 -0.003 0.033 -0.017 0.023 
skin 1.761 0.277 0.204 0.024 0.064 0.066 -0.057 0.046 
musculoskel 1.575 0.115 0.108 0.011 -0.015 0.029 -0.014 0.021 
degenerative 1.852 0.116 0.146 0.010 0.037 0.026 -0.012 0.019 
genito_urinary 0.884 0.168 0.124 0.019 0.072 0.053 -0.117 0.036 
dental 0.378 0.076 0.093 0.012 0.743 0.034 0.519 0.019 
vision 1.774 0.211 0.303 0.020 0.087 0.057 -0.050 0.040 
circulatory 1.149 0.205 0.151 0.018 0.081 0.052 0.054 0.036 
respiratory 1.927 0.365 0.064 0.028 -0.188 0.078 0.094 0.058 
mental 1.022 0.130 0.011 0.013 -0.069 0.036 0.052 0.026 
nutritional 1.332 0.463 0.233 0.042 -0.164 0.119 0.116 0.086 
pregnancy_compl 0.663 0.247 -0.031 0.023 0.362 0.068 -0.071 0.041 
other_cond 1.088 0.068 0.105 0.008 0.056 0.022 -0.003 0.015 
gender 1.068 0.042 0.304 0.011 0.520 0.027 -0.026 0.018 
age -0.051 0.020 -0.002 0.006 -0.004 0.014 -0.002 0.010 
age_sq 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
age_gr1 -0.234 0.102 -0.153 0.032 -0.074 0.074 0.137 0.053 
age_gr2 -0.070 0.065 -0.100 0.021 -0.093 0.047 0.110 0.034 
age_gr3 -0.005 0.041 -0.028 0.013 -0.040 0.030 0.041 0.022 
age_gr5 -0.001 0.040 0.020 0.013 -0.019 0.029 -0.017 0.020 
age_gr6 0.094 0.065 0.030 0.018 -0.097 0.045 -0.041 0.030 
age_gr7 0.205 0.104 0.053 0.028 -0.197 0.070 -0.023 0.047 
female_agr1 0.013 0.066 0.153 0.019 0.031 0.044 0.001 0.031 
female_agr2 0.067 0.058 0.153 0.016 0.057 0.038 -0.058 0.026 
female_agr3 0.076 0.058 0.076 0.015 0.001 0.037 -0.007 0.025 
female_agr5 -0.060 0.057 -0.053 0.015 -0.031 0.036 -0.028 0.024 
female_agr6 -0.162 0.061 -0.058 0.015 -0.084 0.038 0.025 0.025 
female_agr7 -0.235 0.066 -0.082 0.016 -0.101 0.040 0.002 0.026 
maternity 0.205 0.121 -0.347 0.019 0.249 0.051 -0.168 0.033 
disability 1.316 0.451 0.325 0.077 0.300 0.216 -0.243 0.146 
care 0.189 0.161 0.227 0.037 0.041 0.097 0.051 0.062 
hhsize 0.181 0.008 -0.008 0.002 0.088 0.005 -0.011 0.004 
ln_eqdinc 0.324 0.023 0.037 0.008 0.328 0.018 -0.061 0.013 
n_dincome 2.788 0.278 0.510 0.118 2.802 0.254 -0.156 0.200 
poor -0.327 0.035 -0.062 0.010 -0.138 0.025 0.001 0.019 
single_hh 0.181 0.043 -0.003 0.010 0.159 0.026 0.008 0.017 
newborn_hh -0.057 0.046 0.004 0.013 -0.037 0.031 -0.027 0.021 
single -0.163 0.025 -0.014 0.008 -0.066 0.018 0.023 0.013 
sep_widow 0.011 0.033 -0.006 0.009 -0.091 0.022 0.070 0.015 
popdoc 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
nodoc -0.004 0.039 -0.043 0.011 -0.026 0.027 -0.009 0.018 
popdent 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
nodent -0.004 0.041 0.029 0.011 0.062 0.028 0.075 0.019 
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 Consultations Dentist visits 
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
Lux_country 0.051 0.056 -0.006 0.016 0.100 0.040 -0.021 0.027 
Capellen 0.140 0.063 -0.020 0.018 0.008 0.044 -0.001 0.030 
Esch_Alzette 0.105 0.054 -0.008 0.016 0.028 0.038 -0.019 0.026 
Mersch 0.119 0.067 0.016 0.019 0.099 0.046 -0.004 0.031 
Clervaux 0.126 0.080 -0.020 0.023 -0.031 0.055 -0.165 0.038 
Diekirch 0.090 0.069 0.020 0.020 0.009 0.048 -0.059 0.032 
Redange 0.141 0.077 0.014 0.022 -0.057 0.053 -0.007 0.036 
Vianden -0.038 0.105 -0.012 0.030 -0.050 0.073 -0.086 0.050 
Wiltz -0.064 0.083 -0.110 0.024 0.027 0.058 -0.199 0.040 
Echternach 0.043 0.084 -0.061 0.024 -0.063 0.058 -0.101 0.039 
Grevenmacher 0.145 0.069 -0.005 0.020 0.154 0.048 -0.071 0.032 
Remich -0.046 0.071 -0.062 0.020 -0.054 0.049 -0.030 0.034 
density 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
high_foreign -0.023 0.044 0.007 0.013 -0.003 0.031 0.036 0.021 
low_foreign 0.072 0.057 0.032 0.016 0.012 0.039 0.032 0.026 
_cons -2.547 0.504 0.946 0.154 -4.145 0.361 2.548 0.258 
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Appendix 3. Hurdle model with nationality variables excluded  
Coefficients in 
bold font are 
significant at 
p=<0.05 
Consultations Dentist visits 
Part I Part II  Part I Part II   
Estimate S.E.  Estimate S.E. 
Log L = -57141.068 Log L = -350630.99 Log L =  -107033.28 Log L = -264695.67 
fullyear 0.703 0.039 0.102 0.014 0.633 0.032 -0.100 0.025 
unempl 0.654 0.101 0.179 0.033 0.287 0.077 -0.060 0.062 
over_time 0.209 0.069 -0.021 0.021 0.074 0.048 0.017 0.035 
part_time -0.309 0.061 -0.064 0.024 -0.153 0.052 -0.069 0.042 
bluecollar -0.475 0.170 -0.393 0.040 -0.116 0.100 -0.162 0.070 
civil -0.819 0.193 -0.314 0.043 -0.039 0.117 0.173 0.076 
othercategory -0.751 0.128 -0.445 0.029 -0.381 0.073 -0.169 0.048 
quintile1 0.366 0.039 0.097 0.010 0.019 0.024 0.060 0.017 
quintile2 0.055 0.026 0.019 0.007 -0.069 0.017 0.051 0.012 
quintile4 0.049 0.025 -0.007 0.007 0.056 0.017 -0.018 0.012 
quintile5 -0.205 0.030 -0.077 0.009 0.048 0.021 -0.062 0.014 
bonus 0.015 0.021 -0.070 0.006 0.031 0.015 0.000 0.011 
h_bonus -0.288 0.080 0.052 0.034 -0.446 0.069 0.068 0.050 
m_bonus -0.132 0.064 0.012 0.024 -0.147 0.052 0.031 0.035 
ln_eqdinc 0.331 0.022 0.037 0.008 0.345 0.018 -0.069 0.013 
poor -0.346 0.035 -0.062 0.010 -0.164 0.024 0.000 0.019 
n_mine_man_ut 0.124 0.041 0.001 0.013 0.244 0.029 0.001 0.021 
n_construction -0.054 0.041 -0.025 0.013 0.005 0.029 -0.002 0.022 
n_trade 0.142 0.036 -0.003 0.011 0.192 0.025 -0.042 0.018 
n_hotels_rest 0.044 0.048 -0.066 0.015 0.158 0.034 0.100 0.025 
n_transport 0.352 0.046 0.126 0.014 0.257 0.032 -0.043 0.022 
n_financial 0.213 0.035 0.107 0.011 0.217 0.025 -0.033 0.018 
n_public 0.716 0.040 0.272 0.012 0.360 0.028 -0.010 0.019 
n_education 0.065 0.086 0.071 0.029 0.214 0.066 -0.128 0.045 
n_health 0.078 0.042 0.009 0.011 0.327 0.027 -0.063 0.018 
n_community 0.342 0.057 0.026 0.016 0.368 0.039 -0.064 0.026 
n_household 0.422 0.111 -0.018 0.026 0.484 0.064 -0.090 0.043 
n_other 0.152 0.073 0.028 0.022 0.237 0.051 0.023 0.037 
onep_firm -0.162 0.055 -0.014 0.018 -0.113 0.041 -0.056 0.030 
micro_firm -0.042 0.034 -0.026 0.010 0.011 0.024 0.020 0.016 
small_firm -0.050 0.028 -0.031 0.008 0.006 0.019 -0.021 0.013 
med_firm -0.045 0.027 -0.017 0.008 -0.056 0.018 -0.046 0.012 
large_firm -0.038 0.034 -0.009 0.010 -0.101 0.024 -0.008 0.016 
CMEP -0.479 0.169 -0.403 0.039 0.111 0.100 -0.298 0.069 
CMFEP 0.832 0.210 0.081 0.049 0.443 0.128 -0.482 0.087 
CMPI 0.050 0.206 -0.174 0.056 0.390 0.139 -0.272 0.094 
CMOA 0.098 0.101 -0.086 0.028 -0.085 0.065 -0.026 0.048 
EMCFL 1.368 0.219 0.301 0.052 0.461 0.136 -0.387 0.091 
CMFEC 1.092 0.215 0.177 0.050 0.550 0.132 -0.449 0.089 
CMAGR 0.203 0.262 -0.146 0.077 0.705 0.194 -0.076 0.119 
CMEA -0.437 0.185 -0.381 0.047 0.300 0.115 -0.328 0.079 
deprived 0.037 0.024 0.010 0.006 -0.053 0.016 0.039 0.011 
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Coefficients in 
bold font are 
significant at 
p=<0.05 
Consultations Dentist visits 
Part I Part II  Part I Part II   
Estimate S.E.  Estimate S.E. 
Log L = -57141.068 Log L = -350630.99 Log L =  -107033.28 Log L = -264695.67 
high_unempl 0.001 0.037 0.019 0.010 -0.070 0.025 0.013 0.017 
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4.1. Introduction 
In the light of growing budgetary pressures, the motivation and effectiveness of 
public policies are increasingly subjected to rigorous scientific examination. At the 
same time more diverse data analysis techniques can be applied as the quality of 
data and computing abilities improves. Given ever more complex and multi-
objective social protection systems, there is a rising demand both among academia 
and policy makers for comprehensive analysis tools that are able to highlight the 
costs and the diverse impacts of a given policy while simultaneously accounting 
for complex interactions with other transfers and taxes.  
Microsimulation modelling (a.k.a. micro-analytic simulation) is a distributional 
analysis technique capable of tackling precisely this list of issues. With this method 
simulation is performed on a system of micro-units (i.e. persons, households, etc.). 
It enables the evaluation of diverse real or hypothetical events (i.e. tax-benefit 
system changes) in terms of their macro and micro impacts (e.g. Harding, Keegan, 
& Kelly, 2010; Immervoll & O'Donoghue, 2009).  
In the social sciences microsimulation can be traced back to the 1950s (see Orcutt, 
1957) as an attempt to move computational algorithms closer to an individual 
decision unit (Lewis & Michel, 1990).  However, the approach only started to 
develop more actively during the last two decades when both micro-databases and 
the computing power - two necessary prerequisites - have improved significantly 
(Bourguignon & Spadaro, 2006). Lately microsimulation has been “experiencing a 
boom” (Spielauer, 2011). It is arguably driven by a couple of factors: an increased 
demand by policy makers and the emergence of new research areas focusing on 
complex individual contexts and technological advances. The perceived “boom” in 
microsimulation applications, however, mainly applies to (static) microsimulation 
models in the OECD countries. The technique is scarcely employed beyond the 
developed world (e.g. Davies, 2009; Lelkes, 2007).  
This chapter focuses on the European transition countries. The region is 
particularly interesting because of its relatively high socio-economic and 
technological development, the considerable number of reforms of the economic 
and political systems and the generally insufficient analysis of the distributional 
impacts of all these changes. The main goal of this chapter is to document the 
existing microsimulation tools in the European transition countries and to discuss 
the structural reasons behind their limited use. As some of these reasons are 
necessarily specific to countries we use Lithuania as an illustrative case study.  
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents a quick review of the 
microsimulation modelling technique. The section 4.3 explores microsimulation 
applications in the European transition countries and discusses obstacles to MSM 
development. Finally, the last section presents the Lithuanian case in detail – the 
country with the highest MSM incidence. We review methodological specificities 
of the Lithuanian MSMs, discuss country specific development patterns and 
present a more detailed overview of EUROMOD LT – the most comprehensive 
Lithuanian tax-benefit model so far.  
4.2. Microsimulation modelling for public policy analysis 
In the public policy sphere microsimulation is mainly used for estimating ex-ante 
policy impacts. It provides valuable information to help policy makers make 
choices among the multi-objective public policy layers and thus significantly 
reduces the cost of designing more efficient and effective policies. The technique 
can also be used for ex-post analysis – a very convenient feature if actual data on 
causal relations of pre- and post-event conditions are not available. In the next 
sections we review the main technical features of microsimulation modelling.  
What is microsimulation?  
Microsimulation analysis is based on a sample or the entire population of 
individual units such as persons, households, vehicles or firms.  Its purpose is to 
simulate micro-level effects of a certain event. Here, each outcome yi is obtained by 
transforming each (or a combination of) xi in line with given policy rules p and/or 
behavioural parameters. Mathematically, this could be expressed as  
),,( bpxfy ii  , where:  
 yi  is a vector of simulated individual unit characteristics, and is the outcome of 
microsimulation modelling;  
 xi is a vector(s) of observed (baseline) individual unit characteristics;  
 p is a vector of (actual or hypothetical) policy parameters, and  
 b is a vector of behavioural parameters.  
The transformation of xi can have any functional form f (i.e. linear or non-linear) 
suitable for the description of policy rules or behavioural responses. This feature is 
particularly useful in policy simulations where tax and benefit rules are highly 
detailed and depend on individual/household characteristics in various non-linear 
ways. This also helps capturing heterogeneity of the population in a more flexible 
way.  
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A tax-benefit microsimulation model (MSM) is a system in which a programming 
script interlinks two major components: a baseline dataset of micro-units (persons 
or households) and a set of accounting rules on benefit and tax provisions for these 
units. Programming software is an indispensable part of constructing a 
microsimulation model. Existing models use different types of multi-purpose 
programming software such as C++, SAS, Microsoft Access and Excel for 
establishing simulation routines, communicating to micro-databases or storing 
diverse simulation parameters such as policy rules or simulation orders. Spielauer 
(2011) also reports a growing interest in using generic microsimulation languages 
like Modgen. The latter one has been specifically developed and maintained by 
Statistics Canada to facilitate the construction of microsimulation models.  
Diversity 
By now diverse types of microsimulation models have been developed. However, 
researchers often indicate that the taxonomy of the MSMs is not so straightforward 
as each MSM is shaped by specific objectives of the developing institution and the 
backgrounds of its developers (e.g. Mitton, Sutherland, & Weeks, 2000).  
Based on surveys on existing MSM types and features (e.g. Bourguignon & 
Spadaro, 2006; Citro & Hanushek, 1991; Gupta & Kapur, 2000; Harding, 1996; 
O'Donoghue, 2001) we distinguish between methodological and policy features of 
MSMs (see Table 4-1). From a methodological point of view MSMs are first 
categorised by the time dimension criterion: static and dynamic models. Then, 
additional methodological features such as behavioural responses can be 
incorporated. From a policy point of view MSMs can be classified according to the 
coverage of specific sets of policies and by geographical coverage. These four 
categories can be cumulative.  
Static models are based on snapshots of the current population characteristics and 
are used for the first-order distributional analysis of policy impacts. These models 
are sometimes called accounting or arithmetic models as their main goal is to 
unravel the complexity and inter-links of numerous public policies rather than to 
address behavioural changes of the population. Dynamic models “age” the 
characteristics of observed individual units using survival probabilities to build up 
a (partially) synthetic longitudinal database and, hence, enable long-term or life-
course policy analysis.  
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Table 4-1. Main MSM classification criteria 
M
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
Time dimension: 
Static or dynamic 
Policy coverage: 
Comprehensive tax-benefit 
system or selected policies 
Policy application 
Additional features/capacities: 
Behavioural responses, spatial 
features, linkage to macro 
model, etc. 
Geographical coverage: 
Regional, national, or cross-
country model 
Source: own presentation 
Additional methodological features and capacities can diverge on the basis of the 
unit of analysis, the simulation of discrete or continuous time intervals, 
deterministic (i.e. a fixed response to the event) or stochastic (i.e. probabilistic 
response to the event) modelling, etc. Three major methodological capacities can be 
distinguished: inclusion of behavioural response relations such as changes in 
labour supply, savings or household composition; modelling spatial information; 
and combined micro- and macro modelling41.  
For the purpose of evaluating policies usually a choice is made between 
comprehensive tax-benefit microsimulation models and models dedicated to the 
analysis of a specific policy. Decoster et al. (2008) for example, survey more than 30 
diverse tax-benefit MSMs in Western Europe that cover both personal income 
taxes, social contributions and social benefits or focus specifically on the simulation 
of one sector only (i.e. pensions, taxes).  
Regarding the geographical coverage, most of the developed MSMs represent 
national policy systems. Regional microsimulation analyses are much more 
widespread in the US than in Europe. According to Citro & Hanushek (1991) half 
of the US states were using microsimulation modelling by the 1980s, whereas in 
Europe regional models were almost non-existent even in countries with federal 
political systems.  
Cross-country microsimulation models are very rare, mainly because of the 
complexity (e.g. data comparability, varied policy systems) and resources needed 
to build a comparative simulation framework. The most noticeable cross-country 
                                                          
41 Following Zaidi, Harding, & Williamson (2009) linking micro- and macro modelling implies that 
“outputs from microsimulation models are inputs to macro-economic models and vice versa, in order to 
better capture the interplay between individual behaviours and the macro-economic environment 
within which they operate”.  
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MSM is EUROMOD - a static European tax-benefit model that currently expands 
its country coverage to all 27 EU members42.  
Challenges 
We discuss some key challenges related to the accessibility of MSMs, their 
technical development and validation.   
Microsimulation is quite often criticized as a “black-box” technique (Creedy, 
Duncan, Harris, & Scutella, 2002; Spielauer, 2007). A few issues resonate behind the 
statement. First, access to MSMs is rarely (fully) feasible to external users often due 
to property rights but also due to data access issues, etc. This impedes a more 
detailed understanding of the MSM properties especially if external 
documentation on the MSM structure is limited or not available. Second, there is a 
large diversity of MSM construction approaches. This implies that substantial 
model specific knowledge is needed for its usage – a difficult barrier to overcome 
without the support of the developing institution. As such, comprehension of the 
final simulation outcomes or simulation capacities of different MSMs has usually 
been reserved to limited groups of specialists. 
The shortage of proper MSM documentation relates to the other two MSM 
challenges, namely high costs and a lack of aesthetics, as labelled by Spielauer 
(2011). Building an MSM implies working with complexities such as integrating 
and parameterizing detailed policy rules into large-scale models as well as 
combining various data sources and types. The construction costs accrue due to 
various types of demands: people, hardware, software, data, etc. As a result, model 
setup, the development of its interface and the detailed and clear documentation of 
the MSM all contribute to making MSM’s very costly (e.g. Anderson & Hicks, 2011; 
Citro & Hanushek, 1991; Spielauer, 2011). Moreover, the user-friendly presentation 
and aesthetics of  many developed models is often sacrificed on grounds of 
efficiency (more discussion in e.g. Cassells, Harding, & Kelly, 2006).  
Though still an important “inhibitor”, MSM development costs are expected to 
decrease with time as technological equipment becomes cheaper and economies of 
scale (in time spent for modelling) develop as more and more generic templates 
become available for MSM construction (see cases & discussion in i.e. Spielauer, 
2011; Wilkinson, 2011). On the other hand, MSM adaptation for specific research 
questions or national circumstances still requires a substantial time investment.    
As is the case with many other complex modelling techniques MSM developers 
additionally face the challenge to produce trustworthy outcomes. Validation is 
                                                          
42 For more details on EUROMOD see: http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod/ 
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crucial (e.g. Harding et al, 2010). In many cases the outputs of MSMs can diverge 
from reality because of data issues: underlying data quality, biases with survey 
weighting, use of imputed data, etc. Other issues such as the large number of inter-
relations, assumptions and conditions to account for, or even difficulties in 
acquiring external aggregates against which the MSM outputs could be compared 
to (i.e. Klevmarken, 2002) are of importance too. The latter point is particularly 
vital in dynamic simulations as in reality benchmark data often do not exist or are 
likewise based on projections.  
Development directions  
As a response to diverse challenges MSM development undergoes both “soft” and 
“hard” changes. With “soft” changes we refer to a widening public access to 
already developed MSM resources, programming languages and codes, training 
courses, etc. These overtures developed from both within and outside the MSM 
development community as a response to the “black box” critique, but also in 
order to increase MSM usability among researchers, policy makers and wider 
society.  
“Hard” changes relate to at least three types of technical advancements. First, new 
MSMs are being developed.  Some are static, such as new national tax-benefit 
models, others are methodologically different models (i.e. dynamic, spatial, etc.). 
This proliferation of new MSMs is the most widespread development. Second, 
existing MSMs are being enhanced as currently under-explored policies are being 
modelled (i.e. in-kind, contribution history related benefits or indirect taxes) and 
both technical capacities and the coherence of cross-national comparisons are being 
increased. Third, linkages between the existing MSMs (i.e. static and dynamic) or 
MSMs and other modelling resources (i.e. macro, computable general equilibrium, 
cell or agent based modelling) also increase.  
4.3. MSMs in European transition countries 
What are European transition countries?  
The term transition usually refers to the transformation process of previously 
centrally planned economies into market economies. The transformation process 
covers a number of economic and political questions, such as political objectives, 
institutions, laws, tax and benefit systems (e.g. Newbery, 1997).  
In this chapter we use the UN regional grouping of Eastern European countries 
(UN, 2009) to identify the European transition region (further on referred to as 
transition region). The region is then divided into 10 EU and 13 non-EU members, 
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reflecting the gap in the degree of macro-economic stabilization as well as 
structural and political transformation (e.g. Lavigne, 2000). Finally, we differentiate 
countries by the World Bank (WB) assigned country income scale43 (World Bank, 
2009).  
Table 4-2. Country grouping 
 13 non-EU countries 10 EU members 
1. Developed transition countries 
- high income  - Slovenia 
- upper middle 
income  
Croatia 
Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia 
2. S.E.E. (South-Eastern Europe) 
- lower middle 
Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Serbia, Montenegro, F.Y.R. 
Macedonia 
Bulgaria, Romania 
3. CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) 
- lower middle Belarus, Russia - 
- low Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia 
- 
Source: UN (2009), World Bank (2009).  
As shown in Table 4-2 for the analysed sample of countries, average national 
income ranges from high to low income. Generally, the EU member countries have 
higher income levels compared to the non-EU countries – most of them are 
classified as upper middle income countries. Slovenia stands out as the only high 
income country among the entire transition group. Croatia has the highest income 
level among the non-EU transition countries whereas the rest within this group has 
lower-middle and low income levels.  
Identifying applications 
So far, no single registry of worldwide developed tax-benefit MSMs exists. Our 
own review of available resources in the transition region reveals the following. 
First, we identified country specific MSMs reported in the following two chief 
information sources: the list of population-based microsimulation models reported 
to the International Microsimulation Organization (IMA)44 and a number of review 
                                                          
43  This classification serves as a first hand description of the transition region rather than a 
comprehensive overview, which is outside the scope of this review.   
44 www.microsimulation.org 
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articles on MSMs (i.e. Ballas & Clarke, 2000; Citro & Hanushek, 1991; Decoster et 
al., 2008; Dekkers & Belloni, 2009; Merz, 1991; Spielauer, 2007; Zaidi et al., 2009). 
Altogether, these sources describe 113 MSM applications that have been developed 
from the 1960s until recently and are often viewed as leading initiatives on 
methodological and policy analysis grounds. The obtained MSM references affirm 
the leading US position - 25 MSMs. Germany, the UK and Italy have at least ten 
applications. Many other countries, such as Australia, Belgium, Sweden or Canada 
have more than five MSMs. In contrast, these sources reveal only one MSM in the 
transition countries - the model developed by the Hungarian Statistical Office in 
the 1980s for the purpose of income tax and family allowance policies (i.e. Merz, 
1991; Nelissen, 1993).  
Because of such modest results we expanded our search scope by targeting 
information on microsimulation use in the European transition countries within 
larger electronic research databases. A systematic search of English language 
publications via Science Direct, SpringerLink and Sage Journals Online meta-
databases yielded 850 publications for the keywords “microsimulation & 
transition” and 730 publications for the keywords “microsimulation & X country”, 
where “X country” refers to each country of the transition region. We then further 
selected the relevant publications among the abstracts and/or the full contents, 
including reference lists. Publications with the word “transition” used in the 
context other than “transition” region (i.e. transition rules, probabilities, etc.) and 
publications with the word “Georgia” referring to the US state or replicate 
publications have been dropped. As a result, the final list of relevant publications 
radically reduced to 7 articles.  
Finally, we also manually searched for relevant information using the World Wide 
Web (in English and Russian). We identified region-specific publications on MSM 
development, such as publications by  Lelkes (2007), Davies (2009) and Lelkes & 
Sutherland (2009). Additionally, we also scanned the activity reports of a number 
of international institutions that support and/or develop MSM models (i.e. USAID, 
UNU-WIDER45) . Other reviewed material consists of conference publications (e.g. 
O’Donoghue, 2005), references to project outcomes (i.e. CORDIS listed projects by 
National University of Ireland46),  journal articles and studies (e.g. Cornelius, 1995) 
or institutional websites dedicated to specific models (e.g. Essex University; Centre 
for Economic Analysis, CenEA; etc.) and various combined information sources. 
                                                          
45 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); World Institute for Development 
Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER).  
46 CORDIS = Community Research and Development Information Service.  
Chapter 4: Tax-benefit microsimulation – a review P a g e  | 97 
 
Our search efforts resulted in references to 36 MSMs in the 23 European transition 
countries. They include country specific models as well as national systems 
modelled within the EU-wide model EUROMOD (for 10 transition EU member 
states). The policy scopes stretch from entire tax-benefit systems to specific policies. 
For example, five models focus solely on modelling income taxation; three models 
are developed to simulate specific benefits; and three models cover both indirect 
and direct taxation systems. Generally, models are static except for three MSMs 
that include behavioural responses and one model that includes dynamic elements. 
Few MSMs have been constructed in the 1990s or before. The major wave started 
from 2000 onwards and this predominantly in the EU countries. Only seven recent 
resources are identified in the lower middle and low income countries. The 
remaining 29 MSMs are found in the developed European transition countries.  
Overall, the description of the models in the obtained references varies 
substantially from case to case. Some models have a detailed technical description 
available, while information on the other ones is scant and mainly refers to the 
developing institution/persons and the primary model use. A general scarcity of 
information also exists on the MSMs’ wider use either in research or policy 
debates.  
On the other hand, the obtained information provides a useful overview of the 
prevalence of MSMs in the transition region. Figure 4-1 presents the distribution of 
MSMs by country and country groups. The range of identified resources per 
country spans from 1 (in six countries) to 6 (in Lithuania). We found references to 
MSMs in 17 out of 23 European transition countries. A few patterns of MSM 
development emerge.  
Figure 4-1.  MSMs in transition countries 
 
Note: h.= high; u.m. = upper middle; l.m. = lower middle; l. = low; DV. –  developed transition countries.  
Source: own survey 
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and high income EU countries have at least two MSM applications. But we also 
note two MSMs in Russia and Moldova – CIS countries in the lower middle and 
low income group. However, for Russia and Moldova this is a maximum MSM 
count per country, while for the higher income countries the count is a minimum 
count. Among the higher income countries, one would expect to find more MSMs 
in Slovenia. For the lower middle and low income group fewer countries have 
MSM development. In contrast, EU members and countries in the upper income 
group such as Croatia produced at least one MSM initiative.  
Table 4-3. MSM developers  
 MSMs# EUROMOD[1] XLMSM[2] USAID[3] Interntl.[4] Nat. Res.[5] Nat. Gov.[6] 
LT 6 X X X XXX   
EE 4 X X   X X 
SK 3 X   XX   
PL 3 X X   X  
HU 3 X    X X 
CZ 3 X   X  X 
RU 2    X X  
SI 2 X    X  
MD 2  X X    
LV 2 X X     
UA 1  X     
RO 1 X      
BG 1 X      
RS 1     X  
BA 1   X    
HR 1   X    
Notes:  [1] – more details on the “EUROMODupdate” project website  http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/-
euromod/developing-euromod/euromodupdate); [2] -  XLMSM (A Generic Microsimulation Tax-Benefit Model), 
more details in O’Donoghue (2005); [3] - Various publications prepared for or by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID); [4] - Interntl. (other international initiatives): RU - more details on the UNU-WIDER 
website www.wider.unu.edu; CZ in Coulter, Heady, Lawson, & Smith (1997); SK (1) in Coulter et al. (1995) & 
(2) in Trautman (1999); LT (1) via CORDIS & personal communications with developer; (2) in Salanauskaite & 
Verbist (2009); (3) in Cornelius (1995); [5] - Nat. Res. (national projects, initiated by non-governmental 
institutions): SI in Čok (2002), RU in Volchkova et al. (2006), HU in Benedek, Scharle, & Szabó (2007); PL in 
Bargain, Morawski, Myck, & Socha (2007); EE in Lelkes (2007); RS (SRMOD project) more details at 
http://www.fren.org.rs; [6] – Nat. Gov. (national governmental institutions): CZ in Lelkes (2007); HU in Merz 
(1991); EE in Lelkes (2007). 
Source: own survey 
In Table 4-3 we report information on MSM resources by country and by project 
sponsor 47 . Overall, three cross-national initiatives represent the majority of 
                                                          
47 Offspring initiatives, such as the Serbian model SRMOD that is developed using the EUROMOD 
technical platform but outside the EUROMOD project, are counted separately. Russia also expressed an 
interest in adapting the EUROMOD framework as its own national model (Sutherland, 2009). As no 
further information on model development is available yet, we did not include it in this overview.  
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identified resources: the EUROMOD project (all 10 transition EU member states), 
the XLMSM project (6 countries) and various USAID projects (4 countries). Seven 
MSMs have been developed by researchers at international institutions such as the 
UNU-WIDER institution, the Harvard Institute for International Development, the 
Institute of Fiscal Studies, National Galway University, etc. Altogether 
international initiatives account for 75% of all identified resources.  
National projects refer to activities by national researchers or research institutes as 
well as government institutions (or a cooperation of both as is the case in 
Hungary). Such national projects have been developed in Slovenia, Hungary, 
Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Russia and Serbia. Serbia is the only country 
where the national initiative is not complemented by international projects, though 
a link with the EUROMOD platform exists. Estonia and Hungary have the highest 
count of nationally developed MSMs (two models). The four EU members (i.e. 
Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria) do not have national constructions yet. 
They also have among the lowest GDP levels within the EU. 
4.4. Issues behind MSM construction and use 
As noted by Murthi & Tiongson (2008) it is often assumed that people of the 
transition region attach greater value to income equality owing to their socialist 
past. If so, one could expect an extensive use of microsimulation models in the 
region as they are one of the most comprehensive techniques to analyse 
distributional changes as a result of policy shifts. Our review has already shown 
that this is not particularly the case especially when we focus on the national 
initiatives. In this section we explore potential explanations and distinguish two 
major groups of (inter-related) issues: political factors on the one hand and the 
research environment on the other hand. 
Political factors  
A number of studies (e.g. Roberts & Zolkiewski, 1996; Simai, 2006) suggest  that the 
transformation of the post-Soviet systems has led to higher inequality and poverty, 
though the figures vary substantially from country to country. As portrayed by 
Figure 4-2 income inequality is particularly high in some CIS countries, whereas 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia are among the most equal 
countries worldwide. The GINI coefficients indicate that the region as a whole has 
experienced an overall rise in income inequality since the break-up of the Soviet 
Union. More recently, this trend has been (partially) reversed especially in the 
transition EU member states.  
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Figure 4-2. GINI in transition countries, 1989-2006 
 
Note: point observations or breaks in trends are due to missing data 
Source: the TransMONEE database, http://www.transmonee.org 
Observed inequality levels are closely related to national preferences on equality or 
inequality which are then translated into political agendas. For example, Murthi & 
Tiongson (2008) find that the former Soviet EU members prefer greater equality as 
compared to the CIS countries, with the Baltic states (i.e. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) 
have somewhat intermediary preferences48. Countries with the highest preferences 
for equality also possess the most and oldest MSM resources - particularly the 
national ones.  
Microsimulation development is also affected by a country’s political culture that 
can hinder or encourage research initiatives. For example, distributional analysis 
has been restricted in the Soviet Union due to fears of breaking the “equality 
myth” (Davies, 2009). This generally explains the late interest, knowledge and 
development of MSMs in the entire transition region, and particularly in the 
countries with the strongest historical Soviet grip.   
The effect of political structures is not limited to the use of analytical tools but also 
extends to the ease of scientific exchange and knowledge transfers. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union regular communication ways (e.g. language, 
networks) and knowledge channels closed or became irrelevant. On the other 
hand, the enlargement of the EU has offered new opportunities for some transition 
countries to facilitate access to the Western European pool of knowledge. This is 
for example reflected in the expansion of EUROMOD to all new EU member states, 
whereas the CIS and S.E.E. countries are somewhat lagging behind.  
The transition process in itself entails major modelling difficulties and can be seen 
as another key MSM development related factor. Highly diverse, quickly changing 
and complex national policy agendas are more cumbersome to model. For 
example, Coulter et al. (1995) note that in 1989 microsimulation of indirect taxes in 
the Czech Republic was unfeasible as at that time there were 1506 turnover tax 
rates varying from -291% to + 88%. This made the system hard to grasp, document 
                                                          
48 No information of the national preferences in the S.E.E countries is provided in this study.  
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and model in a robust way and partially explains the prevailing construction of 
static MSM models. Roberts & Zolkiewski (1996) and Davies (2009) also find that 
the transition countries’ governments are often preoccupied with impact analyses 
of globalization and adjustment policies and hence pay less attention to micro-level 
policy questions (and associated analytical tools).  
Research environment 
Though early MSM development required “years of effort by large teams of 
researchers” (Spielauer, 2011), nowadays the direct cost of hardware and software 
needed for the development of MSMs is no longer a prohibitive factor, especially 
given the availability of open source/free software programs as well as 
significantly reduced computer costs. Some gaps in the use of information and 
communication technology (ICT) between the transition and developed countries 
as well as within the transition region still exist. For example, Spremić et al. (2009) 
observe that among the new EU member states Estonia is a frontrunner with a 
remarkable increase of personal computers (PC) reaching the Euro area level of 60 
PCs per 100 people by 2008. On the other hand, in 2008 Bulgaria was found to have 
the lowest number of personal computers – around 10 PCs per 100 people.  
Figure 4-3. Democracy and knowledge ranking in transition countries 
2002-2003 2005-2006 
Notes: No data is available on Montenegro, Serbia, F.Y.R. Macedonia, Russia, Belarus and Azerbaijan; the 
democracy ranking is a composite indicator of political, economic and knowledge based information systems, 
socioeconomic gender equality, environmental sustainability, health status and health system. The knowledge 
score covers information on school enrolment, ownership of personal computers, internet use, ICT as % of GDP. 
Source: www.democracyranking.org 
Figure 4-3 reveals a few related regional trends. First, access to information 
technology, expressed as a knowledge score is highly heterogeneous across the 
region. Second, most countries experience a fast ICT development. Third, a high 
correlation between the countries’ democracy ranking and knowledge 
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environment exists: a higher democracy ranking is associated with a higher 
knowledge score.  
As compared to developed countries, the lack of data that could be used for MSM 
development is still a more acute issue in the transition countries. For example, 
Figure 4-2 uses the best available data on the economic and social indicators in 
countries of Central Eastern Europe and CIS - TransMONEE49.  Though it is a 
remarkable achievement in its own right it still suffers from information gaps 
especially in the CIS and S.E.E countries.   
If data are available the transition region faces specific challenges regarding data 
access and use. For example, UNECE (2003) points out that in some countries 
micro-data are still considered a privileged information source for administering 
and controlling state activities. Therefore, restricted access applies to any 
“outsider”. Filer and Hanousek (2002) also report the existence of a “business” 
attitude by government statistical institutions especially when granting micro-data 
access to “presumably rich western academics”: unnecessary difficulties are often 
created in order to collect higher fees. On the other hand, data sometimes can be 
more accessible to foreign researchers particularly when their collection is 
sponsored and administered by international data/project funding organizations. 
Additionally, UNECE (2003) notes that national researchers hardly submit any 
data requests. This reflects the limited capacity for  empirical research in the 
transition region. Consequently, as Trautman (1999) observes, the “existence of a 
staff which can run, maintain, and improve the models” is directly linked to 
(national) MSM development. In a circular way, local expertise is not built if MSMs 
are developed entirely by outside modellers.  
4.5. MSMs in Lithuania 
To illustrate the general challenges we previously discussed we now focus on 
Lithuania – statistically the forerunner in terms of MSM development within the 
European transition region. As information obtained in our own MSM review is 
not sufficient to provide more extensive technical details on all six Lithuanian 
models, we have contacted each of the identified model constructors to gain 
additional information. 
                                                          
49 More information could be found at http://www.transmonee.org 
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Review of applications  
In Table 4-4 we show that the first two MSM applications in Lithuania emerged in 
the 1990s. The first initiative performed a static microsimulation analysis on the 
poverty effectiveness of social assistance policies. The research was carried out by 
the IMF representative in Lithuania based on Household Budget Survey data 
(Cornelius, 1995). A few years later a static tax MSM was developed by the 
Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) with USAID funding. The 
project aimed at helping the Ministry of Finance to conduct basic tax policy 
analyses using micro data from tax returns 50 . The model has included some 
behavioural responses and had a broader capacity to tackle diverse policy issues 
compared to the first MSM application. Regrettably, no further methodological/use 
details of both models are available today.   
Lithuania has also benefited from two cross-national MSM initiatives: the 
adaptation of the XLMSM model and the integration of Lithuania into EUROMOD.   
XLMSM is a general Excel software based microsimulation framework developed 
at the National University of Ireland. It enables the modelling of diverse policy 
research questions in both developed and developing countries. Based on the 
information by the model’s developer51, the XLMSM based Lithuanian MSM has 
been mainly employed for research on the distributional impact of taxation.  
EUROMOD is an EU-wide static tax-benefit microsimulation model developed and 
maintained at the University of Essex. The model is used on the national (e.g. 
academia, state institutions) and European level (e.g. the EU Commission) to 
determine distributional effects of major policy changes, assess revenue 
constraints, etc. The Lithuanian part has been developed from 2010 onwards in 
cooperation with several Lithuanian researchers. Among all Lithuanian MSMs this 
model has the widest coverage of policies (direct taxes, social contributions and 
benefits) and years (2005-2009). The model has been used for the analysis of the 
impact of family transfers on child poverty (e.g. see Chapter 5 of this thesis), as 
well as in wider cross-country research (e.g. Figari, Salvatori, & Sutherland, 2010). 
EUROMOD is currently being updated to cover the policy years 2010-2011.  
The last two MSM initiatives in Lithuania consist of two PhD research projects 
initiated by developers of Lithuanian origin. LitFAMOD was developed in 2008 at 
Maastricht University within the context of the PhD thesis of this author (see 
Chapter 5 of this thesis). It is designed to statically simulate family benefits in 
Lithuania, and particularly to evaluate its 2004 family benefit system reform. The 
                                                          
50 Personal communication with William Trautman, one of the model constructors.  
51 I.e. Cathal O’Donoghue.  
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model allows interactions with the social assistance system, while links with 
contributory benefits or taxes are excluded. LitFAMOD can be seen as a reduced-
scope predecessor of EUROMOD – and thus its reason of existence ceases with 
EUROMOD reaching its operational stage. The LITSIM model is currently being 
developed at the National University of Ireland based on the HBS and FFS data 52.  
Table 4-4. MSMs in Lithuania 
Model 
name 
Model 
type 
Policy 
coverage& 
Input 
data & 
Developing 
institution 
Main users Information source 
LITSIM 
 
Static + 
dynamic 
elements 
Benefits 
(excl.pensions) 
/ n.a. 
HBS, 
FFS / 
n.a. 
National 
University 
of Ireland 
(PhD thesis) 
Academia 
CORDIS; personal 
communication 
EURO-
MOD LT 
module 
 
Static 
Taxes 
&benefits 
(excl. pen-
sions, indirect 
taxation)  
/ 2005-2009 
EU-
SILC & 
LT SILC 
/ 2006 
EURO-
MODUpdate 
project* 
Academia 
& not-for 
profit 
organi-
zations 
Ivaškaitė-
Tamošiūnė et al. 
(2010); Ivaškaitė-
Tamošiūnė et al. 
(2011) 
LitFA-
MOD 
Static 
Family 
benefits  
/ 2004; 2008 
EU-
SILC  
/ 2005 
Maastricht 
University 
(PhD thesis) 
Academia Own information 
XLMSM 
Lithuania 
Static n.a. n.a. 
National 
University 
of Ireland 
Academia 
http://www.pep-
net.org & personal 
communication 
No name 
Static + 
beha-
vioural 
res-
ponses 
Taxes only  
/ (~1999) 
Admi-
nistra-
tive tax 
return 
data / 
n.a. 
HIID & the 
USAID 
LT 
Ministry 
of Finance 
http://www.usaid.g
ov & personal 
communication 
No name 
 
Static 
Benefits only  
/ (1994) 
HBS  
/ 1994 
IMF IMF Cornelius (1995) 
Notes: HBS = Household Budget Survey; FFS = Family Fertility Survey; EU-SILC = Community Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions; LT SILC = the National Lithuanian SILC survey – the source of information for 
the EU-SILC; IMF - International Monetary Fund.  
* - EUROMODUpdate project is carried out by ISER institute, Essex University; EUROMOD LT module is 
implemented in collaboration with a Lithuanian national team, which comprises Lina Salanauskaite 
(Maastricht/Antwerp Universities) & Romas Lazutka, Jekaterina Navickė and Viginta Ivaškaitė-Tamošiūnė 
(Institute for Social Research, Lithuania).  
Source: own presentation 
  
                                                          
52 Personal communication with Tatjana Stirling, the model constructor.  
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Summarising, all Lithuanian MSMs perform static analyses and are mainly based 
on survey data. No public administration has yet developed a full-fledged national 
tax-benefit model that could be routinely used for policy analysis. Out of the six 
recorded MSM applications three are not used outside the scope of the initial 
research questions, one is more used as a generic rather than Lithuanian specific 
model and one is still under construction. Consequently, the EUROMOD LT 
module provides the widest and most recent coverage of the Lithuanian policy 
system, and has the most promising potential for current and future research 
applications. 
EUROMOD’s Lithuanian module: capacities & limitations 
An extensive technical description of the EUROMOD Lithuanian tax-benefit 
policies and their validation is provided in Ivaškaitė-Tamošiūnė et al. (2010; 2011). 
Here we briefly discuss the model’s structure, capacities and limitations.  
The primary aim of EUROMOD simulations is to derive net income from gross 
components: labour earnings; (taxable) benefits; taxes; social contributions; etc. As 
some incomes are observed rather than simulated using policy rules, the 
disposable income is acquired by adding and subtracting various simulated and 
observed components. Due to assumptions of 100% take-up rates and no tax 
evasion final simulation outcomes reflect what disposable income would be within 
a framework of perfect compliance53. Changes in policy rules lead to changes in 
disposable incomes and thus enable the comparison of distributional outcomes 
after the introduction of reforms.  
In terms of the technical structure EUROMOD mainly operates in the following 
software framework. National policy parameters are collected in Excel, data files 
are stored in .txt environment, and C++ programming language is used for 
“communications” between the data files and policy parameters. While 
constructing EUROMOD, STATA statistical software is used to transform original 
national micro-data into the EUROMOD underlying dataset.   
Such a structure has advantages and disadvantages. Excel is a relatively known 
program and permits the integration of a number of user friendly “buttons”. On 
the other hand, the Excel operational mode could create some usage deficiencies. 
Furthermore, the EUROMOD specific programming language (see Appendix for 
an example) should be learnt in order to transcribe policy rules as entered 
parameters must be recognized by the underlying C++ code. The advantage of the 
structure is that the knowledge of C++ language is not required and that the 
                                                          
53 Other behavioural assumptions are feasible to integrate.  
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“EUROMOD” language has been specifically adapted to tax-benefit 
microsimulation.  
The currently available (November, 2011) EUROMOD version covers Lithuanian 
policies from 2005 to 2009. The model enables the simulation of the following 
benefits: unemployment social insurance; maternity and paternity leaves; social 
(assistance) allowances; birth grants; child benefits; and pregnancy grants. The 
simulated taxes and social contributions cover personal income tax, credited social 
contributions (partially), employers, employees and self-employed social insurance 
contributions. The EUROMOD underlying micro-dataset for these policy years is 
derived from the 2006 EU-SILC survey with imputed variables based on 
information from the Lithuanian SILC survey. The latter survey is used as a 
complementary information source, as the EU-SILC does not provide information 
on specific national transfers (i.e. only aggregate information on family transfers is 
available) or other national circumstances (i.e. holding a business certificate – 
information needed to simulate Lithuanian personal income tax policies more 
accurately).  
As EUROMOD is a static model all policy rules are simulated as of June 30 each 
year. Simulating rules on June 30 (the choice made by the EUROMOD developers) 
allows more coherent comparisons across countries and time. However, it also 
means that intermediate system changes are not captured within the year. This 
could cause deviations between EUROMOD simulated and observed incomes. 
EUROMOD offers two robustness checks to deal with this issue: the most 
significant changes are reported in the country reports and if feasible, are 
implemented as alternative policies.   
Differences between observed and simulated incomes could also occur due to 
survey data deficiencies. A potential reason could be a low representativeness of 
survey data for certain population groups and/or the used weights structure. For 
example, this is observed for social assistance benefits where values reported in the 
Lithuanian SILC lead to a vast overestimation of aggregate expenditures.   
Given these limitations of the EU-SILC (e.g. it is less specific in the description of 
national circumstances, such as national transfers) one could wonder why it was 
selected as the main EUROMOD underlying micro-dataset. The key advantage of 
the EU-SILC turns out to be its cross-national availability and comparability. 
Access issues to other data (i.e. administrative records, household budget survey) 
and the quality and type of other datasets are of importance too. For example, as a 
result of budgetary restrictions due to the ongoing financial crisis (as of 2008) the 
Lithuanian HBS data were not collected in 2009 & 2010. Owing to different 
financial arrangements, the data for the EU-SILC continued to be collected.  
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From international to national initiatives?  
Lithuanian MSM resources are mainly developed by or in collaboration with 
foreign institutions either in the EU or the US. In the early 1990s MSM 
development in Lithuania was not so much hindered by a lack of political support 
but rather by a lack of research funding or low(er) ICT access. Since then some 
country specific developments explain both a higher incidence of MSM 
developments as well as the dominance of international initiatives.   
Though very limited in the early 1990s, the use of ICT expanded dramatically in 
Lithuania (see Graph 4) and does not represent a hindering factor anymore. In 
addition, micro-data have become accessible soon after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. According to Cornelius (1995) “Lithuania has been one of the few transition 
economies for which relatively detailed household surveys were available” by the 
mid-1990s. The methodology for these surveys has been developed with support 
from the World Bank and EUROSTAT around 1995. By 2005 Stirling and Lazutka 
(2006) list at least three Lithuanian household surveys suitable for MSM 
development: the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the Family Fertility Survey (FFS) and 
the Household Budget Survey (HBS). The latter one was identified as the most 
suitable one for tax-benefit simulations. The release of the EU-SILC data (in 2007) 
has enabled their adaptation to EUROMOD. Administrative micro-data  on the 
other hand, is still not widely accessible to academia (i.e. Stirling & Lazutka, 2006).  
The dominance of international initiatives is related to Lithuania specific socio-
demographic patterns. It is barely an accident that some Lithuanian MSMs are 
developed by Lithuanian expatriates. Lithuania is the largest emigration country in 
the EU. About 5% of Lithuanian scientists who hold at least one national academic 
degree have emigrated abroad since the beginning of the transition period 
(Užsienio Lietuvių Rėmimo Centras, 2009). According to International Migration 
Outlook (OECD, 2008) net migration since 1990 amounts to an estimated 10% loss 
of the population and has strongly affected the Lithuanian labour market. While 
usually linked to a potential “brain drain” phenomenon, Lithuanian international 
migration has actually facilitated access to the EU MSM knowledge and resources. 
Overall, the recognition and national awareness of MSM increased especially in the 
last few years. For example, according to information by the Labour and Social 
Protection Ministry 54  and the Statistics Department of Lithuania (Statistics 
Lithuania, 2008) the idea of technically preparing and pooling administrative 
records with survey data for MSM analysis is gaining ground. This would help 
develop a more detailed national MSM. In parallel, discussions on the usage of the 
                                                          
54 Personal communication with the Labour and Social Protection Ministry, 09 June 2009.  
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microsimulation technique are increasingly present on the national research 
agenda: the microsimulation technique is referred to as a suitable tool for profit tax 
modelling and forecasting in Mačiulaitytė (2006) and a national MSM is also noted 
as one of the national social policy priorities by the Research Council of Lithuania 
(2008).  
4.6. Conclusions   
Developed countries extensively use tax-benefit MSMs in evaluating ex-ante, ex-
post and hypothetical social policy impacts. The countries of the European transition 
region, though going through numerous structural reforms, make limited use of 
distributional analysis techniques such as MSMs. This chapter is the first attempt 
to systematically record the heterogeneity of MSM development in the region and 
to provide the profile of major development initiatives, model types and obstacles 
behind MSM construction and usage. The Lithuanian case adds insights into the 
country-specific MSM development pattern.  
Overall, information on MSMs within the transition region is scarce with most 
resources being described on project specific websites rather than within the social 
science publications/periodicals. Our survey identifies 36 (past, present or under-
construction) MSMs though available technical descriptions are highly varied. To 
illustrate the Lithuanian case, we have pursued additional personal 
communications with the model developers.  
The emerging “typical” portrait of MSM development in the European transition 
countries could be described as a scarcity of MSMs within a much more active 
environment in the recent past, the dominance of internationally initiated and 
static models, and a higher prevalence of models in more affluent countries. 
Among the international initiatives, which cover 75% of resources, the EUROMOD 
project is particularly interesting because of its scope (all 10 EU member states, a 
full-fledged tax-benefit model, numerous policy years, detailed technical 
information, etc.) and because of its link to the political context (based on EU 
membership).   
Changing national preferences and access to micro-data explain the lack of MSM 
initiatives before the 1990s and the expansion afterwards. Restrictions in 
conducting distributional analyses within the Soviet Union prohibited earlier MSM 
development. Nowadays, high income inequality and low national preferences 
towards a more equal society correlate to low or no use of MSMs, especially in the 
CIS countries.  
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The transition process brings about its own modelling challenges too due to highly 
diverse, quickly changing and complex national policy agendas.  This is reflected 
in the taxonomy of the identified models: all identified models are static MSMs 
with three models including some behavioural responses and one model including 
dynamic elements. The covered policy scopes stretch from specific policies (e.g. 5 
MSMs models on income taxation, 3 MSMs on benefits, etc.) to entire tax-benefit 
systems. These are the most common MSM types in the developed countries too. 
The lag of MSM development in the transition region is also reflected by the fact 
that no initiatives in modelling under-explored policies (e.g. in-kind benefits) or 
linking micro and macro models is recorded yet.  
The case study of Lithuania, the country with currently the highest recorded 
number of MSM applications within the transition region, reveals how important 
diverse contextual national and cross-national factors for stimulating MSM 
development are. All 6 recorded MSMs proved to be international initiatives, 
leading to a low continuation of developed resources by national researchers: most 
of Lithuanian MSMs cannot be accessed anymore or have little capacity to adapt to 
policies outside the initial research scope.  
Of the 6 MSMs in Lithuania the EUROMOD LT module is the most accessible, 
technically best described and most user-friendly model to analyse diverse 
national and cross-national policy questions. Furthermore, the model already 
includes a number of policy years (2005-2009) and is being continuously updated 
to allow more recent research. Its major advantage is its embedding in a cross-
country modelling framework. Its major disadvantages relates to the limited scope 
of simulated national policies (due to the underlying data choice) and a few other 
technical features (i.e. “pure” static modelling, an aged underlying data-set, 
assumptions of 100% tax collection and benefit take-up, etc.).  
The listed EUROMOD LT disadvantages would be easiest to address within the 
framework of a new and more comprehensive national model. More dynamic and 
behavioural modelling would be most welcome for testing second-order policy 
effects and datasets with richer national characteristics could be used (for example, 
by pooling survey and administrative records).  
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4.7. Appendix: EUROMOD Excel Interface 
Version F3.0+ 
 
Child benefit rules (years 2005-2007) transcribed in EUROMOD language 
 
  
Chapter 4: Tax-benefit microsimulation – a review P a g e  | 111 
 
4.8. References 
Anderson, R. E., & Hicks, C. (2011). Highlights of Contemporary Microsimulation. 
Social Science Computer Review, 29(1), 3-8. 
Ballas, D., & Clarke, G. (2000). GIS and Microsimulation for Local Labour Market 
Analysis. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, 24(4), 305-330. 
Bargain, O., Morawski, L., Myck, M., & Socha, M. (2007). As SIMPL as That: 
Introducing a Tax-Benefit Microsimulation Model for Poland. IZA 
Discussion Papers, No. 2988. 
Benedek, D., Scharle, Á., & Szabó, P. A. (2007). Microsimulation in Government 
Decision Making in Hungary. Paper presented at the 1st General Conference 
of International Microsimulation Association. Vienna, 20-22 August, 2007. 
Bourguignon, F., & Spadaro, A. (2006). Microsimulation as a Tool for Evaluating 
Redistribution Policies. Journal of Economic Inequality, 4(1), 77-106. 
Cassells, R., Harding, A., & Kelly, S. (2006). Problems and Prospects for Dynamic 
Microsimulation: A Review and Lessons for APPSIM (No. 63): NATSEM 
Discussion Paper. NATSEM, University of Canberra. 
Citro, C. F., & Hanushek, E. A. (Eds.). (1991). Improving Information for Social Policy 
Decisions: the Uses of Microsimulation Modelling (Vol. 1). Washington, D.C. : 
National Academy Press. 
Čok, M. (2002). A Microsimulation Model for Slovenia’s Personal Tax System. 
Economic and Business Review, 4(1), 75-92. 
Cornelius, P. K. (1995). Cash Benefits and Poverty Alleviation in an Economy in 
Transition: the Case of Lithuania. Comparative Economic Studies, 37, 49-70. 
Coulter, F., Heady, C., Lawson, C., & Smith, S. (1995). Fiscal Systems in Transition: 
The Case of the Czech Income Tax. Europe-Asia Studies, 47(6), 1007-1023. 
Coulter, F., Heady, C., Lawson, C., & Smith, S. (1997). Social Security Reform for 
Economic Transition: the Case of the Czech Republic. Journal of Public 
Economics, 66(2), 313-326. 
Creedy, J., Duncan, A. S., Harris, M., & Scutella, R. (2002). Microsimulation 
Modelling of Taxation and the Labour Market: the Melbourne Institute Tax and 
Transfer Simulator: Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Davies, J. B. (2009). Combining Microsimulation with CGE and Macro Modelling 
for Distributional Analysis in Developing and Transition Countries. 
International Journal of Microsimulation, 2(1), 49-65. 
Decoster, A., De Swerdt, K., Orsini, K., Lefèbvre, M., Maréchal, C., Paszukiewicz, 
A., et al. (2008). Final Report Project Ag/01/116 Valorisation of the 
Microsimulation Model for Social Security Mimosis. Part 2. 
Dekkers, G., & Belloni, M. (2009). Microsimulation, Pension Adequacy and the 
Dynamic Model MIDAS: an Introduction (Project AIM - Deliverable 4.10). 
P a g e  | 112 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF PUBLIC POLICIES 
 
Figari, F., Salvatori, A., & Sutherland, H. (2010). Economic Downturn and Stress 
Testing European Welfare Systems. EUROMOD Working Paper No. EM4/10. 
Gupta, A., & Kapur, V. (Eds.) (2000). Microsimulation in Government Policy and 
Forecasting. New York: Elsevier Science Inc. 
Harding, A. (Ed.) (1996). Microsimulation and Public policy. Amsterdam: North-
Holland, Elsevier. 
Harding, A., Keegan, M., & Kelly, S. (2010). Validating a Dynamic Population 
Microsimulation Model: Recent Experience in Australia. International 
Journal of Microsimulation, 3(2), 46-64. 
Immervoll, H., & O'Donoghue, C. (2009). Towards A Multi-Purpose Framework 
For Tax-Benefit Microsimulation: Lessons From EUROMOD. International 
Journal Of Microsimulation, 2(2), 43-54. 
Ivaškaitė-Tamošiūnė, V., Kazakevičiūtė, J., Lazutka, R., Navickė, J., & 
Salanauskaitė, L. (2011). EUROMOD Country Report: Lithuania (2005-2009). 
Ivaškaitė-Tamošiūnė, V., Lazutka, R., & Salanauskaitė, L. (2010). EUROMOD 
Country Report: Lithuania (2005-2008). 
Lavigne, M. (2000). Ten Years of Transition: a Review Article. Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, 33(4), 475-483. 
Lelkes, O. (2007). Tax-benefit microsimulation models in Eastern Europe. 
International Journal of Microsimulation, 1(1), 54-56. 
Lelkes, O., & Sutherland, H. (2009). Tax and Benefit Policies in the Enlarged 
Europe: Assessing the Impact with Microsimulation Models. In O. Lelkes 
& H. Sutherland (Eds.), Public Policy and Social Welfare (Vol. 35). European 
Centre Vienna: Ashgate. 
Lewis, G. H., & Michel, R. C. (1990). Microsimulation techniques for tax and transfer 
analysis. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press. 
Mačiulaityte, E. (2006). The Ways of Modelling and Forecasting Profit Tax Revenue 
in Lithuania. Ekonomika, 76, 57-67. 
Merz, J. (1991). Microsimulation - a Survey of Principles, Developments and 
Applications. International Journal of Forecasting, 7(1), 77-104. 
Mitton, L., Sutherland, H., & Weeks, M. J. (2000). Introduction. In L. Mitton, H. 
Sutherland & M. J. Weeks (Eds.), Microsimulation Modelling for Policy 
Analysis: Challenges and Innovations: Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Murthi, M., & Tiongson, E. R. (2008). Attitudes to Equality: the "Socialist Legacy" 
Revisited. The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, No. 4529. 
Nelissen, J. H. M. (1993). Labour Market, Income Formation and Social Security in 
the Microsimulation Model NEDYMAS. Economic Modelling, 10(3), 225-272. 
Newbery, D. M. (1997). Optimal Tax Rates and Tax Design During Systemic 
Reform. Journal of Public Economics, 63(2), 177-206. 
Chapter 4: Tax-benefit microsimulation – a review P a g e  | 113 
 
O'Donoghue, C. (2001). Dynamic Microsimulation: A Methodological Survey. 
Brazilian Electronic Journal of Economics, 4(2). 
O’Donoghue, C. (2005). XLMSM: A Generic Microsimulation Tax-Benefit Model. Paper 
presented at the Poverty and Economic Policy General Meeting: Colombo, 
Sri Lanka. 
OECD. (2008). International Migration Outlook 2008. Paris: OECD. 
Orcutt, G. H. (1957). A New Type of Socio-Economic System. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 39(2), 116-123. 
Research Council of Lithuania. (2008). Nacionalinė Mokslo Programa: Socialiniai 
Iššūkiai Nacionaliniam Saugumui. Vilnius, Lithuania. [Electronic Version] 
from http://www.ulrc.lt 
Roberts, B. M., & Zolkiewski, Z. (1996). Modelling Income Distribution in 
Countries in Transition: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis for 
Poland. Economic Modelling, 13(1), 67-90. 
Salanauskaite, L., & Verbist, G. (2009). Reforming Child Allowances in Lithuania: 
What Does Microsimulation Tell Us? In O. Lelkes & H. Sutherland (Eds.), 
Tax and Benefit Policies in the Enlarged Europe: Assessing the Impact with 
Microsimulation Models. European Centre Vienna: Ashgate. 
Simai, M. (2006). Poverty and Inequality in Eastern Europe and the CIS Transition 
Economies. UN/DESA Working Paper, No. 17. 
Spielauer, M. (2007). Dynamic Microsimulation of Health Care Demand, Health 
Care Finance and the Economic Impact of Health Behaviours: Survey and 
Review. International Journal of Microsimulation, 1(1), 35-53. 
Spielauer, M. (2011). What is Social Science Microsimulation? Social Science 
Computer Review, 29(1), 9-20. 
Spremić, M., Šimurina, J., Jaković, B., & Ivanov, M. (2009). E-Government in 
Transition Economies. World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, 
53(84). 
Stirling, T., & Lazutka, R. (2006). I-CUE Feasibility Study: Lithuania (2005 Tax-
Benefit System). I-CUE Project: Improving the Capacity and Usability of 
EUROMOD, Deliverable D3.8. 
Sutherland, H. (2009). Chapter 3 - EUROMOD: Past, Present and Future. In O. 
Lelkes & H. Sutherland (Eds.), Tax and Benefit Policies in the Enlarged Europe: 
Assessing the Impact with Microsimulation Models. European Centre Vienna: 
Ashgate. 
Trautman, W. B. (1999). A Microsimulation Model of the Slovak Individual Income Tax. 
Development Discussion Paper No. 716: Harvard Institute for 
International Development. 
UN. (2009). Millennium Development Indicators: World and Regional Groupings 
[Electronic Version]. Retrieved 2010.02.15 from 
P a g e  | 114 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF PUBLIC POLICIES 
 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Data/RegionalGrouping
s. 
Užsienio Lietuvių Rėmimo Centras. (2009). Socialinis Tyrimas: Kodėl Jauni 
Perspektyvūs Mokslininkai Palieka Lietuvą ir Kas Paskatintų Grįžti? 
[Electronic Version]. Report to Media from http://www.ulrc.lt/. 
Volchkova, N., Gorshkova, E., Lobanov, S., Turdyeva, N., Khaleeva, J., & Yudaeva, 
K. (2006). Microsimulation Analysis of the Consequencies of Monetization 
of Social Benefits in Russia. New Economic School Working Paper, No. 63. 
Wilkinson, K. (2011). Modelling the Impact of Taxes and Transfers on Child 
Poverty in South Africa. Social Science Computer Review, 29(1), 127-144. 
World Bank. (2009). Country Groups. [Electronic Version]. Retrieved 2010.02.15 
from http://go.worldbank.org/D7SN0B8YU0. 
Zaidi, A., Harding, A., & Williamson, P. (Eds.). (2009). New Frontiers in 
Microsimulation Modelling. European Centre Vienna: Ashgate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Family Allowances’ Reform in 
Lithuania: Microsimulation of its 
Distributional Impacts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is published as:  
Salanauskaite, L., & Verbist, G. (2009). Reforming Child Allowances in Lithuania: What Does Microsimulation 
Tell Us? In O. Lelkes & H. Sutherland (Eds.), Tax and Benefit Policies in the Enlarged Europe: Assessing the 
Impact with Microsimulation Models. European Centre Vienna: Ashgate. 
 

Chapter 5: Family allowances’ reform in Lithuania P a g e  | 117 
 
5.1. Background 
Children in Lithuania live in poverty conditions much more often compared to 
other population groups. Lithuanian family benefit system ability to improve 
income situation of families with children is, though, often considered to be limited 
(TÁRKI, 2010). The latter report also points out that family benefits could have a 
much bigger role in combating child poverty, as is in such European countries - 
France, the Netherlands, Austria or Slovenia.   
The situation in Lithuania might have also changed with the recent major reform of 
the family benefit system: in July 2004 the new Law on Allowances to Children came 
into force (Republic of Lithuania, 2004a). This reform aimed at improving material 
conditions of families with children, and especially if living in poverty. 
Furthermore, the new benefits’ design is said 1) to overcome the drawbacks of the 
previous system, 2) is drawn based on the other countries’ experiences, but 3) 
keeping to the national budgetary capacities (The Ministry of Social Security and 
Labour, 2005). Overall, this reform entails a shift from means-tested benefits to a 
more universal system. Due to budget constraints, however, the full reform design 
has been fully implemented in 2008 only. Consequently, the state increased 
spending on benefits to families with children by 23% (20 million Euros) in 2005 
already. By 2008, the state transfers to families with children have doubled 
compared to the levels of 2005. No distributional impact analysis of this reform has 
yet been implemented.  
This chapter aims to fill in the knowledge gap on the distributional impacts of this 
reform and on the poverty/inequality effectiveness of Lithuanian family benefits’ 
system. Both issues are highly under-explored given the national context. Our 
analysis concerns all state cash financial support for raising children, which we 
further on refer to as family benefits. Various other family policy instruments, such 
as childcare services, tax allowances or social insurance benefits, are important 
family policy instruments too. Nevertheless, these measures are left outside the 
scope of this analysis due to the chapter’s focus on highlighting monetary weights 
of the cash support instruments. The same is true for cash social assistance though 
it also plays an important role in the real world. Due to changes in household 
income following the reform, actual entitlements to social assistance benefits might 
have changed too. We do observe that while spending on family benefits increased 
by 23% (from 2004 to 2005), spending on cash social assistance to low-income 
families dropped by 24% (or 14 million Euros). This might indicate an increase in 
household income because of new family benefits, which simultaneously moved 
some households out of social assistance dependence. On the other hand, many 
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other reasons than the family benefit reform could be responsible (e.g. improving 
overall population wages and pensions). Nevertheless, analysis linking expenses 
on social assistance and family benefits is not yet conducted.   
This chapter, therefore, systematically evaluates linkages and monetary impacts of 
both family and social assistance benefits - the main cash support instruments to 
families with children in Lithuania. It assesses direct (reform affected family 
benefits) and indirect (reform affected family benefits plus social assistance) 
monetary impacts. Furthermore, as the reform was introduced gradually, we look 
at poverty and inequality effects of the initial (July 1, 2004) and final reform 
implementation (January 1, 2008) designs.  
The chapter begins with a brief review of studies on family benefits, as a 
determinant of child poverty, in the EU and Lithuania. Then, we explore legislative 
regulations of the Lithuanian family benefits’ and social assistance system before 
and after July 1, 2004. Here, we determine what benefits are relevant for this study 
and what inter-connections between them exist. Next, we assess the EU-SILC 
(2005) micro-dataset in terms of its simulation potential of Lithuanian family policy 
measures. This study uses a static microsimulation approach in order to determine 
each household’s entitlement to family and social assistance benefits before and 
after the reform. As no other microsimulation model is accessible for this type of 
analysis, own static benefits’ microsimulation model LitFAMOD is developed to 
carry out the study. The last section of this chapter analyses and discusses direct 
and indirect, initial and final distributional impacts of the reform using a range of 
standard inequality and poverty measures. 
5.2. Combating Child Poverty: a European and a Lithuanian 
concern  
A recent synthesis report on child poverty in the EU member states notes that 
overall children are at greater risk of poverty than the rest of the population, with 
the difference between overall and child poverty largest in most of the new 
member states, such as Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania or Lithuania (Frazer 
& Marlier, 2007). The report also highlights that poverty severity is most acute in 
the three Baltic States, Poland and Southern EU member states, such as Italy, Spain 
and Portugal. Generally, child poverty rates in the EU are getting to such 
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disturbing heights, that the EU identifies the situation as “calling for urgent 
integrated actions across a wide range of social, economic and cultural policies55”.  
Despite growing concerns over long-term implications of an increasing number of 
children being raised in extreme poverty conditions, public policy responses to 
tackle the situation are rather limited and lagged. Heikillä et al (2006), for example, 
show that the EU countries (before 2004) with above average post-transfer national 
and child poverty rates, particularly Mediterranean countries, have less efficient 
poverty reduction measures. A study by Matsaganis et al (2007) on child poverty in 
Southern Europe identifies that observed inefficiency in poverty reduction is 
highly due to eligibility restrictions for income support (as is the case in Greece 
and in Italy) and low benefit levels of existing transfer schemes (as in Spain and to 
some extent in Portugal). The latter finding is confirmed by a number of other 
studies which indicate that lower child poverty rates are attributed to more 
generous child benefit programmes (i.e. Bradshaw and Finch, 2003; Notten and 
Gassman, 2008). Links between Lithuanian child poverty levels and the design of 
its (family) benefit system are not yet explored. Overall, few empirical studies 
carry analysis on the poverty effectiveness of family benefit systems in the new EU 
member states (after 2004 enlargement).  
Impact of transfers on the poverty rates is also known to be highly dependent on 
initial inequality of market incomes, as well the overall tax-benefit structure in the 
country. Thereby, Atkinson et al. (1995) find that for example Norway has both a 
low poverty rate and a low level of transfers, whereas the UK and Ireland have the 
opposite.  
The debate on the effective design of anti-poverty programmes also relates to the 
issue of universal versus selective policy measures. Cross-national empirical 
evidence suggests a more mixed pattern of the redistributive effects of means-
tested benefits compared to non-means-tested entitlements (Nelson, 2007). These 
findings vary based on the levels and design of the benefits offered (Notten and 
Gassman, 2008; Hölsch, & Kraus, 2002). The results are also highly dependent on 
the institutional settings of selected countries, the initial distribution of market 
income, and the balance of means versus non-means tested benefits. Nelson (2007) 
finds for instance that the high degree of poverty reduction in Sweden and 
Germany is achieved by non-means tested benefits, while means-tested benefits 
achieve a greater alleviation of poverty in the United Kingdom.  
Despite lack of national empirical studies, poverty concern is highly present in 
Lithuanian policy discussions. The Lithuanian Poverty Reduction Strategy, approved 
                                                          
55 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/child_poverty_en.htm (accessed on 01.10.2008) 
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in 2000, highlighted that one of the major national goals is to reduce the poverty 
level for large and single parent families. At that time, policies to combat poverty 
among Lithuanian families with children were specifically designed along selective 
lines by using means-tested family benefits (Aidukaite, 2006). Since 2004, the 
Lithuanian family benefit system has shifted towards a more universal provision. 
The Law on Allowances to Children (Republic of Lithuania, 2004a), which became 
effective as of July 1, 2004, is the main trigger of these systematic changes (further 
on referred to as the “reform”). This law aimed to redesign existing family benefits 
and to ensure their compatibility with the rest of the social security system, which 
was reformed intensely during the last decade. The introduction of the universal 
child benefit system also explicitly aimed at combating child poverty, especially for 
large families (Republic of Lithuania, 2004b; National Report on Strategies of 
Lithuania for Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2006–2008, 2006). 
The new law abolished four existing family benefits, introduced two new benefits 
and redefined amounts and eligibility conditions of some other transfers to 
families with children. Corresponding to the reform induced changes, the total 
state spending on family benefits increased from 253 million LTL56 in 2003 to 363 
million LTL in 2005. This was mainly due to the introduction of a universal child 
benefit, commonly known as “child money”. As the law established a gradual 
implementation of this child benefit (due to budgetary restrictions), full reform 
implications were delayed until 2008.  
Despite embedded anti-poverty objectives of the new family benefit system, its 
actual distributional effects are not straightforward and not yet empirically tested. 
As the National Report on Strategies of Lithuania for Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion 2006–2008 (2006) indicates, the largest number of children in poverty is 
found among children from three to five years old. In 200557, these families were 
mainly entitled to the universal child benefit (and social assistance benefits). 
Families with children under three years old experienced a comparatively lower 
impoverishment. This was partially explained by a larger (in terms of benefit size 
and types) state support available to this age group. The current at-risk-of-poverty 
rate for single parents and for couples with three or more children remains more 
than 40 % – before and after the reform. This is twice the total poverty rate.58 
Furthermore, the recent study on child poverty in the EU links such high latter 
child poverty rates to the less-effective income support system to families with 
children if compared to the other EU member states (TÁRKI, 2010). The report, 
                                                          
56 3.4528 LT = 1 EUR 
57 The reference year of the conducted analysis 
58 EUROSTAT (At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers, by household type: accessed on 10.07.2008) 
and Statistics Lithuania data (http://www.stat.gov.lt/en/pages/view/?id=2246) for 2005 and 2006.  
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however, does not provide with a more detailed evaluation of the poverty 
effectiveness of the newly designed family benefit system due to the lack of 
Lithuanian tax-benefit microsimulation model (in 2009) to conduct this type of 
analysis.   
5.3. The Lithuanian family policy reform of 2004: main 
strands 
Family policy in this chapter includes non-contributory cash measures that are 
specifically targeted at families with children. Table 5-1 gives an overview of all 
such measures in Lithuania around the reform year 2004. In addition to this, it 
traces changes in Lithuanian social assistance system during the same time period.  
As Table 5-1 shows, the total budget of family benefits increased considerably from 
2003 (253 million LTL) to 2005 (363 million LTL) - mainly due to the reform. The 
amount is expected to increase further on, as the reform comes into full swing from 
2008 onwards. This is already indicated by 2007 data: the closest available 
administrative data before the final implementation of the reform. We briefly 
discuss the specific pre- and post-reform measures here59.  But before we do this, 
we must mention two important parameters of Lithuanian social policy: the 
“minimum standard of living” (MSL) and the “state supported income” level 
(SSI)60. MSL was equal to 125 LTL (36.2 EUR) per person per month in 2004, and 
SSI to 135 LTL (39.10 EUR) (Statistics Lithuania, 2008). 
Direct effects  
Direct reform effects measure cumulative change in household disposable income 
due to change in eligibility and (or) size of benefits, which were defined by the new 
Law on Allowances to Children61.  
                                                          
59  More specific details on this in and other benefits, discussed in this Chapter, can be found in 
Appendix 1.  
60 The MSL refers to a specified income level aimed at the satisfaction of basic needs. The SSI is the 
Government approved personal income level after taxes and contributions, but before transfers of cash 
social assistance. Both measures are used as administrative tools for benefit calculation rather than tools 
for poverty monitoring,   
61 Apart from the hereby described family benefits, two more measures belong to the family policy 
domain: baby diapers and municipal support. These benefits are defined outside the scope of the Law on 
Allowances to Children, and were not affected by the reform.  
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The concerned changes we brought by the abolishment of the four following 
monthly benefits: 
1. The family allowance – a categorical benefit, i.e. non-means-tested and non-
contributory cash benefit (for a detailed description of this benefit and the 
following ones, see Appendix 1).  
2. The benefit for families raising three or more children – a (partially) means tested 
benefit.  
3. The orphan’s stipend – a categorical benefit.  
4. The maternity benefit for studying women – a categorical benefit.  
In 2003, these four measures accounted for around 70% of the total budget of 
family benefits (see Table 5-1).  
As of July 1, 2004, two benefits, which were partial adaptations of some of the 
abolished benefits, were introduced: 
1. The child benefit – a monthly categorical benefit.  
2. The pregnancy grant – a lump-sum benefit. 
In 2005 these two measures took up around 72% of the total budget, which 
corresponds approximately to the share of the abolished benefits in the pre-reform 
period.  
We expect this share to increase, though, when the reform comes into the full effect 
in 200862. This is mainly related to gradual eligibility extension of child benefit 
rules, as summarized below: 
- As of July 1, 2004 (further on referred to as the “initial implementation of the 
reform”) child benefit is granted to all children up to age 3. If raised in families 
with three or more dependent children (commonly called “large families”), the 
child benefit is also granted to dependent children up to age 24 if in full time 
secondary or higher education. The latter entitlement to large families 
remained unchanged during the entire reform period.    
- Since September 1, 2006, the child benefit is paid to all children up to age 9.  
- Since September 1, 2007 the child benefit is also paid to all children up to age 
12. 
- Since January 1, 2008 the child benefit is paid to all children up to age 18 or 
older if in full time secondary education. We further on refer to this stage as the 
“full implementation of the reform”.  
                                                          
62 The reform has been fully implemented in 2008; however aggregate date on beneficiaries is not yet 
available at the time of this analysis.  
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Table 5-1. State spending on non-contributory family policy measures 
 Beneficiaries, 1000 of people Budget expenditure, M LTL 
 2003 2004 2005 2007 2003 2004 2005 2007 
FAMILY BENEFITS         
1 Birth grant 29.85 29.56 29.52 29.76 22.39 22.30 28.52 30.09 
2 Maternity 
benefit for stu-
dying women [2] 
0.21 0.20 - - 0.05 0.04 - - 
3 Pregnancy 
grant**  
- 3.79 8.15 6.67 - 0.95 2.04 1.72 
4 Family 
allowance [2] 
76.56 74.7 - - 82.88 47.32 - - 
5 Child benefit [3] - 268.22 323.04 320.58 - 102.40 260.73 350.66 
6 Benefit to cons-
cript’s child 
0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.02 
7 Benefit for fami-
lies raising 3 & 
more children [2] 
43.54 41.27 - - 78.59 44.21 - - 
8 Guardianship 
benefit 
9.13 9.49 11.33 11.73 48.58 51.07 62.18 70.00 
9 Orphan’s 
stipend [2] 
2.48 3.00 - - 14.88 15.6 -  
10 Grant for 
housing 
1.30 1.66 2.24 3.09 5.43 5.43 7.50 2.56 
11 Subsidy for 
baby diapers [4] 
- 29.30 10.80 - - 5.08 2.11 - 
Total transfers  - - - - 252.92 293.6 363.1 455.05 
SOCIAL 
ASSISTANCE 
        
1 Social benefit 119.45 83.46 54.15 36.62 94.31 69.60 52.82 52.13 
2 Compensation 
for housing 
utilities 
428.34 n.a. n.a.  n.a. 105.1 64.4 30.93 33.66 
3 Municipal 56.39 50.70 49.86 n.a. 4.31 4.70 6.50 9.7 
4 Free school 
meals [5] 
158.00 141.00 115.28 83.00 60.98 61.04 60.68 54.70 
5 Free school 
supplies [5] 
21.00 40.00 56.00 57.00 0.20 1.00 2.00 8.90 
Total social assistance - - - - 264.92 200.70 152.93 159.09 
 Share within total, % 
 2003 2004 2005 2007 
FAMILY BENEFITS     
1 Birth grant 8.85 7.60 7.85 6.61 
2 Maternity benefit for 
studying women 
0.02 0.01 - - 
3 Pregnancy grant - 0.32 0.56 0.38 
4 Family allowance 32.77 16.12 -  - 
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5 Child benefit - 34.88 71.81 77.06 
6 Benefit to conscript’s child 0.05 0.02 0.01 - 
7 Benefit for families raising 3 
& more children 
31.07 15.06 - - 
8 Guardianship benefit 19.21 17.39 17.12 15.38 
9 Orphan’s stipend 5.88 5.31 - - 
10 Grant for housing 2.15 1.85 2.07 0.56 
11 Subsidy for baby diapers - 1.73 0.58 - 
Total transfers  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE     
1 Social benefit 49.45 41.78 33.93 32.77 
2 Compensation for housing 16.22 18.16 21.62 21.16 
3 Municipal support  2.26 2.82 4.18 6.10 
4 Free school meals 31.97 36.64 38.98 34.38 
5 Free school supplies 0.10 0.60 1.28 5.59 
Total social assistance 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Notes: [1] - Within this table, beneficiaries are families. The exception is free meals to pupils and free school 
supplies, where beneficiaries are children receiving these entitlements. One should also note that the term “family” 
is used in the administrative context and means spouses or persons living together, or one of the parents, as well 
as their own and adopted children under 18 years of age (see Republic of Lithuania, 2004a). This family concept 
also includes persons between the ages 18 and 24 who are unmarried and not cohabitating: full-time pupils and 
students of general education schools or other institutions of formal education. [2] - Benefit erased since July 1, 
2004; [3] - Benefit introduced on July 1, 2004; [4] -Temporary benefit. [5] - - non-cash benefits directed at children 
(for information purposes only, more details in the following laws: Republic of Lithuania, 1999; Republic of 
Lithuania, 2006).  
Source: the primary source of data is Statistics Lithuania www.stat.gov.lt [accessed on April 30, 2008]; the 
secondary source of data is the Ministry of Social Security and Labour http://www.socmin.lt [accessed on 
November 15, 2008] 
Some benefits were not or only minimally affected by the 2004 reform. These are: 
1. The birth grant – a lump-sum benefit.   
2. The benefit to a conscript’s child – a monthly categorical benefit.   
3. The guardianship benefit – a monthly categorical benefit.  
4. The grant for housing – a lump sum benefit.  
Indirect effects   
Change in household income due to direct reform effects may alter eligibility and 
size of other income maintenance transfers, most notably social assistance. 
Thereby, we define indirect reform effects as changes in household disposable 
income because of recalculation of social assistance benefits. This is mainly due to 
the fact that family benefits are included in the calculation and testing of family 
income for the purpose of granting social assistance. Modelling indirect effects 
shows to what extent a change in family benefits is counteracted by a likewise loss 
(or gain) in social assistance.  
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Lithuanian social assistance system provides two major monthly cash transfers to 
low-income families and single persons (Republic of Lithuania, 2003):  
1. Social benefit – a means-tested income support benefit.  
2. Compensation for heating, hot and cold water costs – a means-tested 
reimbursement of utility, such as gas, heating and water, costs.  
Neither social assistance nor family benefits are taxable in Lithuania.  
5.4. Methodology  
This chapter uses a static microsimulation approach in order to determine each 
household’s entitlement to family policy measures before and after the reform. A 
static microsimulation enables evaluating distributional impacts of a certain tax-
benefit policy system on a selected point in time (e.g. Spadaro, 2007). The static 
approach implies analysis of short-term effects for a given population. Due to data 
shortage, as well as numerous and rapid reforms in Lithuania, behavioural 
responses are not estimated in this study63.  
At the time of the analysis (i.e. 2008-2009) no national tax-benefit microsimulation 
model (MSM) is available to test distributional impacts of this family benefits’ 
reform (Immervoll et al, 1999; Lelkes, 2007). Hence, for the purpose of this study, 
we develop our own MSM. The model, named LitFAMOD, is a static STATA 
software based partial (concerned benefits only) microsimulation model. It consists 
of two major components. First, the EU-SILC (Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions) 2005 survey data for Lithuania is used as the underlying micro-
database. Second, a set of rules on benefit provisions for the individuals and 
households, as well as calculation of their disposable incomes before and after the 
reform, are programmed in STATA language.  
EU-SILC capacity to simulate non-contributory family policy measures  
EU-SILC collects comparable cross-sectional and longitudinal multidimensional 
micro data on income poverty and social exclusion in European countries 
(EUROSTAT, 2007b). It provides information on a number of household attributes, 
such as income, social exclusion, housing, health, education and participation in 
the labour market.  
                                                          
63  A more detailed discussion of static microsimulation methodology as well as microsimulation 
resource availability in Lithuania is provided in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
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Since 2005, the dataset contains information on income and living conditions of 
Lithuanian people. The Lithuanian part of the database is collected via a survey of 
12,117 individuals, coming from 4,441 households. The average household size is 
2.5 people. EU-SILC 2005 information on Lithuania refers to demographic 
information for 2005, but to income information of 2004. For the purpose of this 
analysis, we use EU-SILC demographic variables at the end of income reference 
period (2004) in order to better align with income information.  
The EU-SILC does not distinguish among different national transfer types, as 
indicated in Table 5-1. Instead, it provides with the aggregate categories, such as all 
family or social exclusion benefits. Thereby, evaluation of national benefits should 
be based on the simulated, rather than observed values. For simulation purposes, 
other EU-SILC variables, such as age, family composition or incomes, are used. The 
detailed overview of EU-SILC contained variables and their potential to carry 
simulation of Lithuanian family benefits is presented in Appendix 164. Out of Table 
5-1 indicated 14 cash benefits, 6 benefits could be simulated using EU-SILC data: 5 
family benefits and a social (assistance) benefit. A benefit to conscript’s child is 
further excluded due to lack of children among the identifiable conscripts. 
The relative weight of the four family benefits, which are simulated, constitutes 
around 73% of the state budget for all family benefits in 2003 and 2004.  This share 
increased to 80% and 83% in 2005 and 2007 respectively. In 2004, social benefit 
consumed around 35% of the state budget on means of social assistance.  
Simulated policies 
Due to family benefits’ interaction via income testing, the sequence of benefit 
simulation is conducted in a predefined order, which is indicated by numbers in 
parentheses (see Figure 5-1).  
                                                          
64 This study is the first one evaluating EU-SILC capacity to simulate Lithuanian non-contributory 
benefits.  Previously, Stirling & Lazutka (2006) assessed the Household Budget Survey, the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), and the Family Fertility Survey (FFS) as potential MSM input datasets for 
Lithuanian policies’ inclusion into EUROMOD – the EU-wide tax benefit microsimulation model. At the 
moment of this study, Lithuanian policies are still on the way to be implemented in EUROMOD, but 
using the EU-SILC data.  
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Figure 5-1. The simulation framework 
 
Source: own presentation 
Because of gradual implementation of the child benefit, this study simulates two 
reform scenarios: the initial schedule, effective as of July 1, 2004, and the final schedule, 
which became effective as of January 1, 2008. Other policies, as well as socio-
economic and demographic structure of the population are held constant. We use 
Lithuanian policies (on family benefits and social assistance) specific rather than 
EU-SILC database definition of a child for the purpose of simulations65. Appendix 
2 provides further details on the overall structure and selected technical 
parameters of the constructed LitFAMOD MSM. 
Measuring distributional impacts  
There are a number of ways to measure distributional impacts; this chapter focuses 
on a selection of commonly accepted inequality and poverty indices66:  
- The Laeken indicators: the Gini coefficient, S80/S20 income quintile share ratio, 
and at-risk-of-poverty rate (or also noted as P0);   
- Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) indicators (Foster et al., 1984): poverty gap 
index  (or also noted as P1) and poverty severity (or also noted as P2);  
- GE class measures for inequality aversion parameter a of  values [-1; 2];  
Indicators are calculated before and after (immediate and full design scenarios of) 
the reform; both direct and indirect reform effects are taken into account. Poverty 
line is fixed to the pre-reform settings. Welfare measures are based on household 
                                                          
65 More details on EU-SILC used child definition could be found in EUROSTAT (2007a).  
66  GE indexes and Gini coefficient are obtained through the application of the STATA module 
“ineqdeco” (Jenkins, 1999)66. The FGT family of poverty measures are estimated using STATA module 
“sepov” (Jollife and Semykina, 1999). We use a bootstrap simulation method in order to estimate 
standard errors for both poverty and inequality indexes.  
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disposable income, equivalised with the modified OECD scale67. A change in 
income due to the reform is estimated by adding the difference between simulated 
transfers after the reform (child benefit and birth grant) and simulated benefits 
before the reform (birth grant, family benefit and benefit to families raising three or 
more children). Results are calculated, as well as broken down for household types 
depending on household configuration, age of the children and place of residence. 
EU-SILC definition of household types is used for presentation of simulation 
results68. In order to better capture reform effects for, this chapter also presents 
between- and within-group inequality measures. All associated formulas are 
presented in Appendix 3 of this Chapter.  
5.5. Distributional impacts of family and child benefits 
reform  
Benefit simulation results  
The simulated number of beneficiaries for most of the benefits, as well as their 
intermediate estimation values, match administrative data within the interval of 
(±)10% (see Table 5-2). In-between simulation results are presented in order to 
identify potential sources of observed differences. As Table 5-2 indicates, the 
largest deviations from external estimates are found in a benefit for families raising 
three or more children, child benefit and social assistance, while birth grant and 
family benefit reveal a rather precise estimation. Generally, differences in 
simulations are larger if more diverse causes of possible deviations accrue:   
                                                          
67 Household disposable income is: the sum of all monetary income received from any source by each 
member of the household (including income from work, investment and social benefits) net of taxes and 
social contributions paid and certain unavoidable expenditures (EUROSTAT, 2008). The modified 
OECD equivalence scale assigns a weight of 1.0 to the first household member aged 14 or over; 0.5 to 
each additional member aged 14 or more and 0.3 to each member aged less than 14 years old. 
68  Lithuanian administrative and EU-SILC definition of a child are close matches, though small 
inconsistencies regarding children aged 18 to 23 exists. Under the Lithuanian rules, a child above the 
age of 17 should not be working or a full-time student and not married. In EU-SILC, children are those 
who are economically inactive and living with at least one parent. This implies that some persons 
identified as children under the Lithuanian law, would be classified as adults within the EU-SILC, and 
vice versus. The divergence in a number of children due to the differences in definitions is expected to 
be small. The EU-SILC defined household types are: one person household; 2 adults, no dependent 
children, both adults under 65 years; 2 adults, no dependent children, at least one adult 65 years or 
more; other households without dependent children; single parent household, one or more dependent 
children; 2 adults, one dependent child; 2 adults, two dependent children; 2 adults, three or more 
dependent children; other households with dependent children; other households.  
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- Influences of underlying demographic differences (i.e. over-representation of 
new-born children, as in birth grant, or under-representation of children, aged 
17 to 23, as in child benefit);  
- Identification of eligible population requires use of more socio-economic proxy 
variables to recreate “nuclear” family category, defined as parents or 
guardians and children only (i.e. EU-SILC contains no information on foster 
care and contains limited information  to identify the full-time studying status 
of potentially eligible children).  
- Simulation of social benefit requires means-testing. This might be affected by 
systematic income underreporting due to long recollection period, high non-
response rates among top-income households or other survey related income 
reporting issues69, which could inflate a number of simulated social assistance 
beneficiaries.  
 In addition to simulation deficiencies due to household survey design, differences 
in estimated and reported number of beneficiaries could occur because of actual 
benefit take-up or targeting performance being lower than 100% (i.e. stigma, 
administrative complexity or targeting leakage related reasons)70. Comparison of 
simulated and actual number of beneficiaries is also rather cumbersome due to 
shortage of administrative data. For example, we use the latest available 2001 
Population census data to verify distribution of benefits for large families, even 
though the representation of this data for population in 2004 is weakened by 
relatively rapid changes in fertility rates and migration processes 71 . Also, 
administrative information might contain possible erroneous accounting of 
beneficiaries due to complexities of family identification, when merging quarterly 
collected regional data into the pooled annual central administrative social security 
database72.  
 
                                                          
69 For example, see Milanovic (1999) for more details on income underreporting in transition countries.  
70  More details on targeting and take up rates of social benefit in Lithuania, could be found at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SAFETYNETSANDTRANSFERS/Resources/281945-
1131468287118/1876750-1138736077420/Lithuania_Brief.pdf 
71  More details on fertility rates and international migration in Lithuania could be found at: 
http://www.stat.gov.lt/en/pages/view/?id=1383 
72 Based on personal communication with Social Security and Labour Ministry, 21 May, 2008 
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Table 5-2. Family benefits: simulation versus administrative data  
 
 
Av. yearly 
benefit  per 
beneficiary, 
LTL[1]
Beneficiaries, 
EU-SILC 
data 
Beneficiaries,  
external data  
∆, %  
Total population, beginning of 2005 - 3391098 3425324 1 
Average family size   2.65 3.18 -17 
Transfers to families with children before reform:  
Birth grant  770 (122) 30729 29600 4 
 - children born in 2004 750 (0)  31560 30419 4 
Family benefit 1217 (309)  73409 74703 -2 
- eligible children  1125 (0) 79403 n.a.  n.a. 
 - children aged 0 to 2, beginning of 2005 - 89816 90302 -1 
Benefit for families raising 3 or more children  1668 (351) 54332 41274 32 
- eligible children 330 (36) 183263 n.a. n.a. 
- children aged 0 to 15, beginning of 2005 - 629125 637431 -1 
- children aged 16 to 23, beginning of 2005 - 419068 426712 -2 
- families with 3 or more children until age 18  - 46855 49613[2] -6 
- persons in families with 3 or more children   - 300969 278487[2] 8 
Transfers to families with children after reform:  
Child benefit (immediate implementation) 1341 (832) 206320 266000 -22 
 - children aged 0 to 2, beginning of 2005 1777 (1114) 89816 90302 -1 
 - children aged 3 to 6, beginning of 2005 600(0) 130042 135762 -4 
- eligible children aged 7 to 23, raised in 3 or 600 (0) 148585 n.a. n.a. 
- all eligible children  751 (284) 368443 n.a. n.a. 
- eligible children receiving 0.4 MSL  600 (0) 278627 320000 -13 
Child benefit (full design) 1069 (633) 499714 n.a. n.a. 
- children aged 0 to 17, beginning of 2005 - 743684 746274 0 
- children ages 18 to 23, beginning of 2005 - 304507 317869 -4 
- families with children under 18 - 473404 509973[2]  -7 
- eligible children  - 802954 700000[3] 15 
Social assistance before reform (2004 for external data) 
Social benefit  1629 (1167) 97403 83 463 17 
Social assistance after reform  (2005 for external data) 
Social benefit, immediately after reform  1601 (1112) 95001 54100[4] 76 
Social benefit, given full design of reform  1519 (1035) 89933 n.a. n.a. 
Notes: [1] – Positive values only; [2] – Information from http://www.stat.gov.lt/ (2001 Population census) ; [3] 
– Figure is based on an estimate by Social Security and Labour Ministry =  an average expected number 
of eligible children per month x 12: http://www.vtv.lt/naujienos/socialiniai-reikalai/vaiko-pinigai-
skiriami-visiems-vaikams.html [4] – The large difference in simulated and external data is largely due to 
different reference dates and our simulation of social benefit, mainly based on income rather than 
wealth testing. Simulated social benefit is primarily based on 2004 incomes, whereas external data 
reports distribution of social benefit given 2005 incomes. As no administrative records are available for 
social benefit expenses for the first and the second halves of 2004, the provided external indicator is the 
best estimation on the upcoming dynamics of social benefit.   
Source: own calculation and other reported sources (standard errors presented in parentheses) 
A note should be also made, that selected external data in Table 5-2. Family 
benefits: simulation versus administrative data also refer to expected rather than 
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observed number of beneficiaries (i.e. eligible children receiving 0.4 MSL, children 
receiving child benefit after the full implementation of reform). These data helps to 
assess potential accuracy of ex-ante simulations. 
Disposable household income before and after the reform  
Direct effects 
According to the EU-SILC data allowances to families and children constituted 
around 4% of average household income in 2004. 16% of Lithuanian households 
received transfers to families, which on average amounted to 14% of their 
equivalised disposable income. Allowances to families play an especially 
significant role among poor households: more than 25% of the first income decile 
households receive these transfers. Their average weight within the household 
budget reaches 34%.  
The average simulated weight of transfers to families within household income 
before the reform constituted 16% of recipient households’ income. Around 10% of 
all Lithuanian households receive these types of state transfers.  
With the initial implementation of the reform, annual transfers to families raising 
children increased by around 78 LTL per household (see Figure 5-2). Full 
implementation of the reform would have raised household income by an 
additional 221 LTL per year, revealing a large impact of the reform still to be 
realised. Reform induced income gains are highly diverse for different types of 
households. Households raising three or more children gain mostly from the initial 
part of the reform. On the other hand, full implementation of the reform brings 
relatively higher gains to single parent families and families, raising one or two 
children, as before the reform most of these households were not eligible for 
existing benefits.  
The performed simulation also suggests that despite significantly lower income 
levels, rural households have on average gained less than urban households 
during the initial reform implementation stage. This is largely due to the fact that 
rural households are larger, but poorer than urban households, and therefore had a 
higher incidence of family benefit receipt before the reform implementation.  
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Figure 5-2. Average yearly equivalised household income by household types 
(direct effects), LTL 
 
 
  
Notes : Values inside the bars show income before reform and income changes (in parentheses) due to the 
immediate or full design of the reform; Household types are ranked based on the group’s average pre-reform 
equivalised household disposable income (ascending); Households with children in several age categories are 
assigned to a group based on the age of the youngest child. 
Source: own calculations 
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Furthermore, a breakdown of household by children’s age indicates that 
households with at least one child under age three are found at completely 
opposite sides of the distribution if residence is taken into account: rural 
households annual income is more than 5000 LTL lower compared to their urban 
counterparts. In contrast, urban households with children aged seven or more are 
the poorest household type within this group. All rural households with children 
above age 3 have comparably similar mean income, which is significantly higher 
than income of households with very small children. 
Additionally, Figure 5-2 demonstrates that on average income ranking of the 
analysed household types with or without children did not change due to the 
direct budgetary impacts of the reform. This finding particularly implies that direct 
income gains are not sufficiently large to significantly raise well-being of the most 
vulnerable household types: large families with children, single parent households 
or certain rural households with children. Thereby, poverty and particularly 
inequality implications of the reform are expected to be limited. 
Indirect effects 
As mentioned before, indirect effects measure change in household disposable 
income if change in eligibility and size of the cash social assistance benefit is 
considered. Adding the simulated value of this benefit increases the average 
weight of before reform transfers to families from 16% to 45% of recipient 
households’ income. This corresponds to an increase in simulated yearly 
equivalised transfers from 684 LTL to 859 LTL.   
Though no absolute loss in households’ income is observed, Figure 5-3 reveals that 
gain in income of households’ with children shrinks slightly from 78 LTL to 72 LTL 
when recalculation of social benefit is considered. The drop is even larger if the full 
design of the reform is considered: then income gains on average reduce from 221 
LTL to 206 LTL. This finding proves that analysis of indirect effects is vital in order 
to comprehend the full reform effect on household income.  
A significant loss in reform-related gains is especially observed for households that 
are eligible for social assistance, but with income close to the set threshold. Larger 
drops in income gains due to recalculation of social benefit amount are observed 
for e.g. rural families with children aged seven or more or with children aged three 
to six. Alternatively, the poorest rural households, which tend to raise children 
under three, are less affected by the change in eligibility for social benefit. As their 
income falls greatly below the given social assistance threshold compared to the 
other two household types, the probability of moving out of social assistance due 
to family benefits is much lower. Other relative losers of the reform are found to be 
single parent households.  
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Figure 5-3. Average yearly equivalised household income change due to direct and 
indirect effects (by household types), LTL 
 
 
 
Notes : Household types are ranked based on the group’s average pre-reform equivalised household disposable 
income (ascending); Households with children in several age categories are assigned to a group based on the age of 
the youngest child. Other households refer to such households, where e.g. conventional definition of a dependent 
child/adult cannot be directly applied (i.e. a teenager living without any other adult). 
Source: own calculation  
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Generally, Figure 5-3 confirms that more affluent households are less or not 
affected by reform associated influences on social assistance. Therefore, their 
income change is mainly driven by direct rather than indirect reform effects. For 
example, urban households, which tend to have higher than average national 
income, are less influenced by indirect reform effects.  This is demonstrated by a 
negligible reduction or no change in income due to both immediate and full reform 
implementation scenarios.  
5.6. Poverty and inequality before and after the reform 
Direct and indirect effects: total population  
Before the reform, 20.25% of Lithuanian population were poor73. Due to the initial 
part of the reform quite a few poor households in Lithuania would be lifted just 
above the poverty threshold (see Figure 5-4). Given relatively small child benefit 
amounts and rather minor changes in the amounts of other family benefits, a 0.5 
percentage point decrease in poverty rate and a simultaneous relief in poverty gap 
and poverty severity could be considered as a positive poverty reduction action. If 
the full design of the reform would be implemented, the poverty alleviation would 
become even more significant: at risk of poverty rate would drop by approximately 
1.5 percentage points.  
Evaluation of direct and indirect reform effects confirm the observation that in 
reality the overall positive effect of the reform is lessened for households receiving 
social assistance. We observe a slight increase in poverty measures displaying 
direct versus total reform effects. Remarkably, this difference is not that significant 
as shown by the 95% confidence interval.    
Inequality measures provide a similar picture of income mobility before and after 
the reform: overall inequality slightly reduces during both initial and final phases 
of the reform. It is worth pointing that these changes are only significant if the full 
reform design is taken into account. Full reform implementation would lead to 
greater equality, especially when comparing bottom and top income quintiles. For 
example, with full reform design s80/s20 income quintile ratio would reduce by 
more than 0.3 percentage points. 
                                                          
73 EUROSTAT (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu) estimate for total Lithuanian at-risk-of-poverty rate 
after social transfers in 2005 is 21% (Date of extraction: October 15, 2008)  
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Figure 5-4. Poverty changes: implications for total population 
Note: Income ranking for poverty measures is based on the pre-reform income distribution, while income ranking 
for inequality measures reflects income distribution in pre- and post-reform environments.   
Source: own calculation ('error bars' represent a 95% confidence interval)  
Figure 5-5 also depicts that the overall magnitude of inequality reduction is 
mitigated by relatively lower income gains for households at the threshold of 
receiving social assistance. This is captured by a slight increase in inequality 
measures if in addition to direct effects, indirect effects are also considered.  
Figure 5-5. Inequality changes: implications for total population 
Note: * - GE(α); for α [-1; 0, 1, 2] measures are ranked in α ascending order.  
Source: own calculation ('error bars' represent a 95% confidence interval) 
On the other hand, inequality measures, portraying changes in the upper part of 
income distribution (i.e. GE (2)), point out to almost no significant changes in 
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inequality. This finding goes in line with previous observations that higher income 
households are relatively less affected by the monetary impacts of the reform. 
Direct and indirect effects: decomposition by household groups   
Figure 5-6 displays initial poverty indices before the reform, as well as their 
respective changes due to initial reform set-up and additional change if the full 
design reform is carried out.74 It reveals that all households raising children, except 
urban households with children, are more likely to be poor compared to the 
average poverty rate in the country. All households with children also experience 
poverty alleviation either in one or the other stage of the reform.  
Yet, single parent households, the most deprived population group, gain most 
from the full reform scenario.  The reverse observation holds for large households: 
they gain most from the initial reform scenario. The graph also displays that 
poverty intensity would be first and foremost addressed among single parent 
households. Actually, poverty gap and poverty severity indices reveal that this 
group is the most disadvantaged on all poverty dimensions, and that the full 
reform scenario brings largest gains to it.  
Figure 5-6. Poverty changes (%): implications for selected household groups  
 
Note: household types are not exclusive and ranked based on the group’s poverty rate before the reform 
Source: own calculation 
Rural households with children are among primary gainers, mainly due to the 
initial reform implementation. The rules of gradual extension of eligibility to child 
benefit, based on number of children and their ages, are reflected in moderate 
                                                          
74 Precise indices and associated standard errors are presented in Appendix 3.  
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immediate poverty alleviation among households with children aged seven and 
up.  
In addition to poverty decomposition, we analyse changes in inequality. For this 
purpose we form four broad household groups among dimensions of: living in a 
household with children, children’s age, rural or urban residence place and income 
vulnerability. 
Figure 5-7. Inequality changes (%): implications for selected household groups 
 
 
 
Notes: Groups [I-IV] are composed of mutually exclusive household types, as indicated on y axis; “+” indicates 
observation of an increase in inequality measure 
Source: own calculations 
Figure 5-775 reveals that the most widespread income inequality is observed among 
single parent households. This group is much more heterogeneous compared to 
                                                          
75 Precise indices and associated standard errors are presented in Appendix 3 of this Chapter. Inequality 
between different household types is negligible; therefore, this data is not included here. Within group 
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the next most vulnerable household group: large families with three or more 
children. If pooling these two household types into group II, as displayed in Figure 
5-7, we identify diverse inequality changes during different reform stages. All 
GE(α) measures, and particularly the ones focused on lower incomes, point to a 
sharp decrease in inequality among single parent households due to full reform 
implementation.  
On the other hand, inequality among households with three or more children does 
not display any significant reduction, but rather point to a marginal rise of 
inequality among these families. If taken into account within group II inequality 
reduction, we note that opposing inequality movements led to narrowing income 
dispersion immediately after the reform. This indicates that broadening income 
dispersion among large families significantly reduced overall dispersion within the 
group II after the initial reform. 
Overall, GE(α) measures focusing on higher incomes point to a marginal increase 
in inequality within group III (composed of all households raising children). As 
this group includes households with children, separated by different age 
categories, we conclude that despite slight inequality reduction among specific age 
groups, full reform implementation brings a small inequality increase within 
households with children.  
The breakdown by residence place displays the largest within group inequality 
increase after the full reform implementation. As already observed in Figure 5-2, 
these two household groups have contrasting income profiles.  Therefore, 
aggregate effect of tightening income dispersion among both rural and urban 
households, indicates an increasing income gap among households with children, 
if residence place is considered.  
In sum, the reform has contributed towards narrowing income dispersion for all 
selected household groups (Figure 5-7). This principally holds for the lower part of 
income distribution. However, significant inequality reduction is also expected for 
overall income distribution, especially if looking at income movements among the 
poorest household types: large and single parent families. This analysis shows that 
single parent households are primary beneficiaries of the full design of the reform, 
while large families have received relatively more income gains with initial 
implementation of the reform. 
                                                                                                                                                    
inequality measure is sensitive to group’s composition. As presented in Appendix 3, total inequality 
index GE(α) is composed of each group’s within and between inequality indexes: GE_within(α) + 
GE_between(α), Jenkins (2006).  
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5.7. Conclusions 
This chapter is one of the first attempts to use a microsimulation method for the 
evaluation of public policy effectiveness in Lithuania. We actually develop and 
utilise the first static microsimulation benefit model based on the EU-SILC 
household survey data for the analysis of distributional impacts of Lithuanian 
family benefit system’s reform – LitFAMOD. EU-SILC data enables simulation of 
four family benefits, which together constitute around 73% of the state budget for 
all family benefits in 2004. The simulated social benefit accounts for around 35% of 
the state budget on social assistance in 2004. 
We find that the shift from means tested to universal family benefit system raised 
average population income without causing income losses for eligible households. 
Analysis of direct (only reformed family benefits) and indirect (with changes in 
social assistance) reform effects also suggests that total poverty and inequality 
declined in the country. From this point of view, the reform could be seen as 
effective in terms of reaching its overall anti-poverty goals, even though its 
capacity to alleviate poverty is very limited: we estimate 0.5 poverty headcount 
reduction due to initial and 1.5 percentage points’ reduction due to full design 
reform implementation. This would bring Lithuanian total poverty rate to around 
19%: a level that is around three percentage points above the overall EU at-risk-of-
poverty rate76.  
The magnitude of income changes associated with the reform is small, which is 
also reflected in a small decrease in the number of social assistance recipients. We 
estimate that around 2% and 7% of Lithuanian families would be lifted out of 
dependence on social assistance respectively due to initial and full reform 
implementation. If take-up problems associated with pre-reform means tested 
family benefits are taken into account, actual gains are expected to be higher.  
There are two main types of social implications of our results: one is related to the 
gradual implementation of the reform, which means temporary poverty or income 
loss to certain groups, the other highlights a change in the situation of groups after 
the full implementation of the reform. From a policy point of view, the latter is 
perhaps of greater relevance. 
Due to gradual implementation of this reform, eligibility to universal child benefit 
was initially restricted to families raising less than three children if children were 
                                                          
76 In 2005,  total EU at-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers was at 16% 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu) 
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above age of six. Because of that, we find that poverty reduction among these 
households is much larger in the case of the full reform implementation.  
Our analysis also points to delayed income gains for one of the poorest population 
groups: single parent households. Actually, there are almost twice as many single 
parent households (5.8% of all households) compared to households raising three 
or more children (3.3% of all households), and both of these groups are recognised 
as primary anti-poverty targets. Nevertheless, our research reveals that single 
parent households would obtain income gains comparable to those of large 
families only when the full design reform scenario is implemented. If considering 
indirect effects, their relative gains become even smaller.  
The full implementation of the reform would reduce poverty among rural 
households with children: a more vulnerable population group, especially if not 
only residence place, but also household composition and age of children is 
considered. Actually, our analysis points out that high poverty prevalence among 
households with children under age three is mainly due to extreme 
impoverishment of rural households. Taken into account a potential increase in 
inequality between rural and urban households with children after the full reform 
implementation, additional policy measures targeted at improving income 
situation of rural households seem appropriate.  
This chapter also shows the importance of distributional analysis, given a rapidly 
changing policy context. We hope to have highlighted that this kind of evaluation 
research by using a microsimulation model can be a feasible and useful exercise for 
a country in transition such as Lithuania, both for ex ante and ex post monitoring 
of policy reforms. There is wide scope of potential research in this area. An 
important issue to tackle is of how to handle the rapidly changing demographic 
and socio-economic environment in a transition country. Another route for future 
research is to integrate the simulation framework presented here in a tool like the 
EU-wide tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD (Immervoll, et al., 1999); 
this would open up the perspective of comparing Lithuanian tax-benefit policies 
more easily with those used in other countries. 
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5.8. Appendixes 
Appendix 1: Rules of family benefits and EU-SILC capacity to simulate them  
 Benefit 
type 
Benefit rules   Limitations in  
EU-SILC  
Simu-
lation  
1 Birth 
grant  
The birth grant is a universal lump-sum benefit paid 
upon the birth of a child to one of the parents or a 
guardian. During the course of 2004 this benefit was 
equal to 6 MSL. As of January 1, 2005, the size of this 
benefit was increased to 8 MSL.  
Birth data: EU-
SILC indicates 
the quarter of a 
birth 
Yes  
2 Mater-
nity 
benefit 
for stu-
dying 
women  
A monthly benefit, given to pregnant women in 
full time education who have no right to receive a 
maternity benefit under the Law on Sickness and 
Maternity Social Insurance. The benefit level 
equalled to 0.75 MSL per month and was paid for 
the 70 days preceding delivery. Since July 1, 2004, 
this benefit was replaced by a pregnancy grant.  
Lack of 
information on 
receipt of 
benefit; too few 
observations 
No  
3 Preg-
nancy 
grant  
A lump-sum benefit to a pregnant unemployed 
woman who, is not eligible to receive a maternity 
leave benefit. The grant totals to 2 MSL and is 
given upon the 28th week of pregnancy (70 
calendar days before a baby is due).   
No information 
on entitlement 
to maternity 
(paternity) 
social insu-
rance; too few 
observations 
No  
4 Family 
allowan-
ce 
A monthly benefit for families raising a child up 
to the age of three. Its monthly amount equalled 
0.75 MSL per eligible child. The benefit was paid 
only if a family did not receive a corresponding 
maternity (paternity) social insurance. The reform 
integrated this allowance into the child benefit.  
No information 
on maternity 
(paternity) 
social insurance 
Yes  
5 Child 
benefit  
A monthly benefit for children up to the majority 
age of 18 or older, if they continue in full time 
secondary education. Full-time students from 
families with 3 children or more, who continue in 
secondary or higher education, are eligible for the 
benefit until age 24. The benefit size is determined 
by the child’s age and the size of the family:  
 Child
< age 
3 
Child 
aged 
3 to 6 
Child 
aged 7 
to 18  
Child aged 
19 to 24, if in 
full time 
education  
1 or 2 
children 
0.75 
MSL  
0.4 
MSL 
0.4 
MSL* 
0.4 MSL77* 
3 or more 
children 
1.1 
MSL  
0.4 
MSL 
0.4 
MSL 
0.4 MSL 
* Entitlement available only since January, 2008 
Birth data: EU-
SILC indicates 
the quarter of a 
birth  
Yes  
6 Benefit A monthly benefit paid for each child during the Approx. Yes  
                                                          
77 Only if in secondary education 
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 Benefit 
type 
Benefit rules   Limitations in  
EU-SILC  
Simu-
lation  
to 
conscrip
t’s child 
military service of the father. The level of the 
benefit is equal to 1.5 MSL. The recipient of this 
benefit also has the right to receive a monthly 
child benefit as described above.  
information on 
the duration of 
compulsory 
military service;  
7 Benefit 
for 
families 
raising 
3+ 
children  
A monthly 1.0 MSL benefit for the 3rd child; the 
amount for the 4th and each additional child was 
increased by 0.3 MSL. Income testing 78 was not 
applied for families raising more than 3 children. 
From July 1, 2004, this benefit was integrated into 
the child benefit. The reform also provided an 
income security measure for large families: if the 
calculated child benefit would be lower than the 
previously received benefit for families raising three 
or more children, a family should continue 
receiving the latter benefit until a change in 
entitlement rights occurs.  
Approximate 
reconstruction 
of income list, 
as indicated by 
the law.  
Yes  
8 Guar-
dianship 
benefit  
A monthly benefit for a child placed in a family 
or non-governmental institution during the 
period of the guardianship. Its amount equals to 
4 MSL per month. In some cases the benefit can 
be paid until the child reaches the age of 24. 
Lack of 
information to 
determine 
adoptive 
parents 
No  
9 Or-
phan’s 
stipend  
A monthly benefit paid to unemployed full-time 
students until the age of 24 if both parents have 
passed away. The amount of the benefit was 
equal to 4 MSL. The reform has transformed it 
into the guardianship benefit 
Lack of 
information on 
the loss of 
parents  
No  
10 Grant 
for 
housing  
A lump sum benefit, given to a child upon the 
expiration of guardianship. The benefit is given 
to purchase a dwelling or to cover 
accommodation related expenses. The entitled 
benefit amounts to 50 MSL. It cannot be paid in 
cash, unless the unused part of the grant is less 
than 1 MSL. 
Lack of 
information to 
determine 
adoptive 
parents 
No  
11 Social 
benefit  
A means tested benefit, which depends on the one 
hand on the value of the family or person’s assets, 
and on the other on the level of per capita family 
income. The size of the social benefit is equal to 90% 
of the difference between the amount of SSI per 
family (single resident) and the average monthly 
income per family (single resident).  
Lack of 
information on 
the household 
assets 
Yes/ 
partial 
12 Com-
pen-
sation 
A means tested benefit, which depend on the actual 
cost of heating, sewage and hot and cold water used. 
The granted compensation is equal to the part of 
Lack of 
information on 
the household 
No  
                                                          
78 The income test condition is to have per capita family income less than 3 SSI levels. Income list 
includes income from work, agricultural and commercial activities, property rent, dividends, aliments, 
pensions, scholarship, social support and incomes of other types of activities.  
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 Benefit 
type 
Benefit rules   Limitations in  
EU-SILC  
Simu-
lation  
for 
housing 
utilities  
expenses that exceed the thresholds set under the 
benefit means conditions. 
assets and 
actual expenses 
on utilities  
13 Free 
school 
meals 
Free provision of school meals at the primary, basic, 
secondary or special education institutions during the 
academic year. It consists of lunch and breakfast for 
pupils from extremely low-income families and free 
meals during summer holidays at summer day 
camps. The benefit is granted if the monthly per 
capita family income is lower than 1.5 of SSI or if the 
family receives a social benefit.  
Lack of 
information on 
the attendance 
of summer 
camps/ lack of 
monetary value 
of the provision 
No 
14 Free 
school 
supplies  
During the course of 2004, the provision of school 
supplies was not defined by any particular law, but 
based on the availability of the state assigned budget.  
Lack of policy 
rules 
No  
15 A 
subsidy 
for baby 
diapers 
Only a temporary measure: (introduced in September, 2004 and 
abolished in 2005) 
No  
16 Muni-
cipal 
support 
Lack of information on benefit eligibility rules No  
Additional explanations: (1) Beneficiaries of specific family and child benefits are not identified in EU-SILC. The 
database only contains an aggregate on family/children related allowances, which is defined as financial support to 
households raising children or taking care of relatives other than children (EUROSTAT, 2007a). Due to the 
aggregate nature of this variable, it cannot be used for the identification of receipt of specific transfers. The same is 
true for social assistance benefits. (2) EU-SILC does contain individual demographic information, as well as 
descriptions of personal socio-economic characteristics, which enable full or partial simulation of 9 out of 15 
family policy measures. (3) Due to the lack of EU-SILC information (i.e. foster care, loss of parent, actual expenses 
on utilities, socio-economic status in the previous year) orphan’s stipend, guardianship benefit, grant for housing, 
compensation for housing utilities, the maternity benefit for studying women and the pregnancy grant could not 
be simulated. (4) The benefit to conscript’s child could not be simulated as EU-SILC identifies only 9 persons in 
compulsory military service – none of them have children. (5) Other benefits are excluded from simulation due to 
ambiguous rules or timing of implementation. For example, municipal support is not simulated due to lack of 
clear eligibility rules. A subsidy for baby diapers is excluded from the further analysis, as it was only a 
temporary policy measure (not applicable at the timing of our simulation). Eligibility to free school meals could 
not be simulated, unless by establishing the monetary value of this benefit. (6) The meaning of the “extremely low-
income” families was not explicitly defined until 2006, when the Law on Social Assistance to Pupils came into 
force. Since then, children growing in the families, which have per capita household income lower than 1 SSI, were 
given a right to both free lunch and breakfast. (7)Free school meals could also be granted if special circumstances, 
such as parents becoming severely sick or unemployed due to disability, occur.  
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Appendix 2: Overview of LitFAMOD  
Rationale 
As no microsimulation model yet exists in Lithuania (as of 2008), which could 
enable analysis of the family benefits’ reform, own LitFAMOD partial static 
microsimulation model is developed. This means, that for the first time this chapter 
analysed benefits are parameterized (using STATA programming language) within 
the simulation structure.  
LitFAMOD and other MSMs  
A number of technical parameters of this model could be aligned to the 
EUROMOD – the EU wide tax-benefit microsimulation model. For example, both 
EUROMOD and LitFAMOD use STATA programming language to adjust EU-
SILC data for simulation purposes (adequate data preparation is a major task for 
any MSM construction). Also, LitFAMOD policy rules before the reform are taken 
as of June 30. The same reference date choice is made by the EUROMOD 
developers for simulating each calendar year. As LitFAMOD is tailored for this 
specific analysis, policy rules are transcribed not only on June 30, 2004, but also on 
July 1, 2004 and June 30, 2008.  
Policy years: 2004 and 2008.  
Simulated policies 
Birth grant; child benefit; family allowance; benefit for families raising 3+ children; 
social (assistance) benefit. Other benefits, taxes and social contributions are not 
simulated, but observed from the EU-SILC data (in the aggregate form or as final 
disposable income). 
Software use 
LitFAMOD is entirely written in STATA script, with both policy parameters and 
EU-SILC data treated via the number of subsequent “do” files. The data is stored in 
.txt files. While such a structure is convenient for the purpose of its construction 
aim (i.e. analysis of the family benefit reform in 2004), adjustment of the 
LitFAMOD files for the other types of policy analyses requires significant additions 
and changes into the STATA files’ contents and sequence. The decision to 
implement such a structure is related to a few factors: 1) in case of external model’s 
use, the user has a full control on adjusting the entire model’s parameters; 2) the 
structure is technically feasible, as the model operates within a relatively limited 
number of parameters (i.e. selected benefits only and one country).   
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Simulation routine 
As LitFAMOD is the first Lithuanian MSM, a special attention has been paid in 
establishing simulation order. The selected benefits’ inter-relations have to be 
assessed before establishing the simulation order. Social assistance benefit is 
simulated as the last one, as it requires means-testing inclusive of (simulated) 
transfers to families.  
Assumption on take-up 
an assumption of 100% take-up rates for all transfers to families is assumed.  
Simulation of social (assistance) benefit 
First, income as defined by the law on social assistance is approximated using EU-
SILC available incomes; second, income test is applied and potential beneficiaries 
are identified; third, as no wealth data is available in EU-SILC, diverse 
assumptions of housing characteristics are used to identify potential beneficiaries 
(i.e. households entitled to social housing, households with lower imputed rent 
values are included); fourth, data from administrative records is used to calibrate 
the cut-off value for the wealth test; fifth, combined wealth and income test 
identifies final beneficiaries; sixth, wealth test is not changed for the reform 
scenarios, while income test is applied on the new set of corresponding (simulated) 
incomes.  
Sequence of STATA programming files 
1) merging EU-SILC individual and household level files, identifying Lithuanian 
data; 2) EU-SILC adaptation for MSM purposes (see more detailed explanation 
below); 3) Programming policy rules; 4) Identifying direct effects; 5) Identifying 
indirect effects; 6) Absolute income changes; 7) Poverty and inequality analysis; 8) 
Decomposition by household groups.  
EU-SILC adaptation for MSM 
First, 15 households with non-response inflation factor are dropped; second, babies 
born in 2005 and until the survey data is collected (May-June) are dropped from 
the analysis – this ensures coherence between reference times for demographic and 
income variable;  third, demographic data is available for all included individuals; 
fourth, missing income values are imputed using linear regression method; fifth, 
weighted estimates of demographic variables are checked against the 
administrative records (while number of children under 5 years old has a very 
close match to administrative data, a small under-estimation is observed for the 
weighted number of children/persons between 6 and 24 years old); sixth, EU-SILC 
inconsistencies on partner/parent identifications links are identified and fixed;  
seventh, family units, as defined by Lithuanian laws, are established (moving away 
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from household definition used in EU-SILC); eight, inconsistencies related to 
children “living alone” fixed. 
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Appendix 3: Index calculations  
Common notations  
 y  - equivalised disposable income;  
 w  - personal cross-sectional weight;  
 i – person i.  
 w’i - the weight for person i; 
 z - at risk-of-poverty threshold;  
 α - sensitivity parameter.  
Gini coefficient  
It is defined as the relationship of cumulative shares of the population arranged 
according to the level of income, to the cumulative share of the total income 
received by them (EUROSTAT, 2005):  
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S80/S20 income quintile (Q) share ratio 
The ratio of the sum of income received by the 20% of the country’s population 
with the highest income to that received by the 20% of the country’s population 
with the lowest income (EUROSTAT, 2005): 
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At-risk-of-poverty rate 
The percentage of persons, over the total population, with an income below the ‘at-
risk-of-poverty threshold (poverty line)’, set at 60% of the national median 
income(EUROSTAT, 2005): 
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Poverty gap  
It measures the average difference between the income of poor people (people with 
income below the at-risk-of poverty threshold) and poverty line.  
Poverty severity 
This index is defined as the squared poverty gap index.  
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where α=1 indicates poverty gap index; α=2 indicates poverty severity index.  
General Entropy (GE) inequality measures  
The general formula is the following:  
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where y is the mean national income and α is an income difference sensitivity parameter.  
The parameter α in the GE class represents the weight given to different incomes 
of the income distribution. It can take any real value. GE is more sensitive to 
changes in the lower tail of the income distribution at the lower α values, and vice 
versus.  
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Appendix 4: Decomposition of poverty and inequality measures by household 
groups  
 %, of all 
households 
Before reform After immediate reform, 
direct + indirect effects 
After full reform, direct + 
indirect effects 
POVERTY  P0, %  P1, %  P2, %  P0, %  P1, %  P2, %  P0, %  P1, %  P2, %  
Total 100.00 20.25 6.57 3.24 19.90 6.96  3.15 18.92 5.96 2.90 
Households, 
without 
children  
57.47 16.91 4.91 2.36 16.91 4.91 2.36 16.90 4.90 2.36 
 (0.66) (0.26) (0.17) (0.66) (0.26) (0.17) (0.66) (0.26) (0.17) 
Households 
with children  
42.53 22.40 7.63 3.81 21.81 7.35 3.66 20.21 6.65 3.24 
 (0.57) (0.25) (0.16) (0.57) (0.24) (0.16) (0.55) (0.23) (0.15) 
Households 
with 3 or 
more children  
3.33 44.47 14.24 6.38 41.77 13.47 6.04 40.92 13.24 5.85 
 (1.99) (0.82) (0.47) (1.97) (0.81) (0.46) (1.97) (0.79) (0.44) 
Single parent 
households 
5.82 47.40 17.92 10.07 46.99 17.17 9.62 43.87 15.24 8.28 
 (2.15) (1.14) (0.87) (2.15) (1.12) (0.84) (2.13) (1.07) (0.78) 
Households 
with children 
under age 3 
6.25 24.36 6.85 2.83 24.05 6.55 2.66 23.03 6.29 2.53 
 (1.51) (0.50) (0.26) (1.51) (0.48) (0.25) (1.48) (0.47) (0.24) 
Households 
with children 
aged 3 to 6  
6.99 23.53 8.08 4.05 22.11 7.23 3.58 21.48 6.94 3.46 
 (1.45) (0.63) (0.42) (1.42) (0.60) (0.38) (1.41) (0.60) (0.38) 
Households 
with children 
aged 7 and up  
29.28 21.59 7.70 3.99 21.16 7.58 3.58 19.14 6.65 3.36 
 (0.68) (0.31) (0.21) (0.67) (0.31) (0.38) (0.65) (0.29) (0.19) 
Rural 
households 
with children  
24.13 30.93 10.86 5.44 30.17 10.50 5.25 28.18 9.57 4.68 
 (0.83) (0.38) (0.25) (0.82) (0.37) (0.25) (0.81) (0.35) (0.23) 
Urban 
households 
with children  
18.39 10.29 3.04 1.49 9.95 2.88 1.41 8.90 2.50 1.20 
 (0.62) (0.23) (0.15) (0.61) (0.22) (0.15) (0.56) (0.21) (0.14) 
 
INE-
QUALITY 
Before reform After immediate reform, direct + 
indirect effects 
After full reform, direct + indirect 
effects 
GE 
(-1) 
GE 
(0) 
GE 
(1) 
GE 
(2) 
GE 
(-1) 
GE 
(0) 
GE 
(1) 
GE 
(2) 
GE 
(-1) 
GE 
(0) 
GE 
(1) 
GE 
(2) 
Total  0.36 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.22 0.21 0.27 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
House-
holds 
without 
children  
0.30 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.30 0.22 0.23 0.30 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
House-
holds with 
children  
0.40 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.39 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.34 0.22 0.21 0.25 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
- within 
group 
inequality  
0.36 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.35 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.22 0.21 0.27 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
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INE-
QUALITY 
Before reform After immediate reform, direct + 
indirect effects 
After full reform, direct + indirect 
effects 
GE 
(-1) 
GE 
(0) 
GE 
(1) 
GE 
(2) 
GE 
(-1) 
GE 
(0) 
GE 
(1) 
GE 
(2) 
GE 
(-1) 
GE 
(0) 
GE 
(1) 
GE 
(2) 
 - between 
group 
inequality  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Households 
with 3 or 
more 
children  
0.24 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.24 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Single 
parent 
households 
0.84 0.37 0.36 0.54 0.82 0.36 0.35 0.53 0.61 0.33 0.33 0.49 
(0.12) (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.12) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) 
- within 
group 
inequality  
0.50 0.28 0.28 0.40 0.33 0.21 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.20 0.19 0.25 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
- between 
group 
inequality 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Households 
with 
children 
under age 3 
0.29 0.23 0.23 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.27 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Households 
with 
children 
aged 3 to 6  
0.37 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.33 0.24 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.23 0.22 0.27 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Households 
with 
children 
aged 7 and 
up  
0.50 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.44 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.36 0.22 0.20 0.23 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
- within 
group 
inequality  
0.40 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.39 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.22 0.21 0.27 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
- between 
group 
inequality  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Rural 
households 
with 
children  
0.40 0.24 0.23 0.29 0.39 0.24 0.22 0.28 0.34 0.23 0.22 0.27 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Urban 
households 
with 
children 
0.30 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.29 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.25 0.17 0.16 0.19 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
- within 
group 
inequality  
0.38 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.37 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.32 0.21 0.21 0.26 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
 - between 
group 
inequality  
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Source: own calculation (standard errors provided in parentheses)  
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6.1. Introduction 
Child poverty remains a serious problem across the EU, and especially in the new 
EU member states (NMS), be it with significant variations in extent and intensity. 
Especially children in single parent and large families are the subject of policy 
concern, given that about half of the poor children in the EU live in these two types 
of households(Commission of the European Communities, 2008) (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2008). Compared to other EU countries, Lithuania has 
“below- (EU) average performance in all dimensions of child poverty and well-
being, and particularly in terms of risk of poverty” (TÁRKI, 2011). Poverty in 
Lithuania is especially concentrated among single parent households and 
households raising three or more children. The Lithuanian family system design is 
criticised on poverty effectiveness grounds despite numerous past and recent 
reforms of state provided income support to families with children (Cornelius, 
1995; Kabašinskaitė and Bak, 2006; Salanauskaite and Verbist, 2009). Apparently, 
the implemented policy reforms are not so poverty reduction effective, especially 
when compared to the achievements of other new EU member states (NMS), such 
as Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic or Slovenia (TÁRKI, 2011).  
Most research on the poverty effectiveness of family support tools has 
concentrated on Anglo-Saxon countries and ‘old’ EU member states (Kamerman et 
al., 2003; Levy et al., 2007; Matsaganis et al., 2007). Research within the NMS region 
is still quite scarce, Förster and Tóth (2001) being one of the few examples. The 
region, though, is very interesting not only because of the fast changing socio-
economic environment and demographic conditions, but also because of recent 
reforms in family policy. Actually, (relative) child poverty rates in some of the 
NMS are lower than in a number of richer EU member states.  
In this chapter, we study the poverty effectiveness of family transfers, more 
specifically child benefits and child-related tax advantages. Existing studies often 
point to the size of family transfers as the key factor to reduce child poverty. We 
hypothesize that also the interaction with the design of policies is a crucial factor. 
Our focus is on the Lithuanian system. We compare its effectiveness in combating 
child poverty to that of Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. These 
four countries resemble Lithuanian political and socio-economic circumstances in 
many ways (e.g. Soviet heritage, relatively similar pathways in 
reforming/introducing tax-benefit policies, etc.), though there are also important 
differences (e.g. in terms of share of single parents and large families, work 
intensity in households with children, etc.). The four countries are also selected as 
they all have better child poverty outcomes, which are attributed to arguably more 
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effective family policy measures (TÁRKI, 2011). Our interest is to examine to what 
extent one country’s success story in achieving low(-er) child poverty rates, 
especially among the most vulnerable household types, can be attributed to the 
size and the design of the selected transfers. The study is anchored in 2008 - the 
year when a major family benefit reform has been fully implemented in Lithuania 
(for more details see Salanauskaite and Verbist, 2009). 
The chapter starts with background information on child poverty in the five NMS. 
We also review evidence on the poverty effectiveness of family tax-benefit 
mechanisms. Next, we describe the methodology of policy swapping scenarios 
within the microsimulation framework of EUROMOD. We then present and 
analyse the microsimulation results. Finally, we conclude and suggest some policy 
lessons.  
6.2. Child poverty and family support systems: existing 
evidence  
In 2008 the at-risk of child poverty rate (or child poverty) in Lithuania is above the 
EU and just below the NMS average. However, the at-risk-of-poverty rates (or 
poverty) of large households and single parent households are with over 45% 
extremely high (Figure 6-1), despite the state’s recognition of these household 
categories as major poverty reduction targets (e.g. National Report of Lithuania on 
Social Protection and Social Inclusion Strategies 2008-2010, 2008). This contrasts 
with most other EU countries, where at least one of these categories has a better 
income position. Among our five countries, Slovenia performs best for these two 
most vulnerable household types. In Hungary, similarly to Lithuania, both 
household types have increased poverty risks, though at much lower absolute 
levels. Given these outcomes we pay particular attention in our analysis to the 
poverty outcomes of these two groups.  
Along with socio-demographic characteristics of the child’s family, the parents’ 
labour market positions as well as overall tax-benefit policies are seen as major 
child poverty determinants (Commission of the European Communities, 2008; 
TÁRKI, 2011). Even though cash family policies in itself are often insufficient and 
are actually not meant to fully eliminate child poverty (Bradbury and Jäntti, 2001; 
Cantillon and Van den Bosch, 2003), their role is of high importance, with size and 
design as major parameters.   
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Figure 6-1. Poverty among different households with children in the selected 
countries (2008) 
Notes: Countries ranked by poverty rates (defined as 60% of the median equivalised household disposable income) 
for households with children; Children: persons under the age of 18 or under 24 if economically inactive.  
Source: EUROSTAT 
The size of social spending dedicated to families with children is often considered 
to be the key factor influencing child poverty (e.g. Bradshaw and Finch, 2003; 
Notten and Gassmann, 2008). Figure confirms that a higher share of GDP spent on 
tax breaks and transfers to families with children is associated with lower child 
poverty rates. Among the five selected countries, Hungary spends the largest share 
of GDP on families, and Lithuania the least. Child poverty levels in both countries, 
though, are somewhat higher in comparison to other countries with similar 
spending levels. The best performance is noted in Slovenia: a relatively low share 
of GDP spent on transfers corresponds to a very low child poverty risk. 
The size and the design of the systems are arguably interlinked, with universal 
rather than targeted systems having both higher budgets available and larger 
poverty reduction effectiveness (e.g. Korpi and Palme, 1998; Nelson, 2004). The 
most recent empirical evidence, though, seems to suggest that this observation 
might not be valid anymore (e.g. Kenworthy, 2011). Furthermore, the final poverty 
outcomes are highly country specific due to other complexities of national policy 
systems, socio-demographic environments, original income distributions, etc. The 
benefits’ design is also very diverse. Countries use universal, categorical or income 
selective family benefits. Tax advantages are also increasingly used as an 
important family policy tool (e.g. Figari et al., 2011). The poverty impact of these 
diverse benefits’ designs is often not well assessed, especially for the NMS. Three 
studies on NMS are particularly interesting in this respect. 
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Figure 6-2. Generosity of family transfers and (child) poverty in the EU, 2007  
 
Notes: Tax breaks primarily refer to tax credits; tax allowances are excluded (data not available for Greece, Italy, 
Estonia, Slovenia, Finland, Luxembourg, Hungary, Denmark & Iceland); child poverty calculated on EU-SILC 
2008.  
Source: EUROSTAT, OECD Family Database & Social Observatory data 
Förster and Tóth (2001) study the evolution of benefit types and their effectiveness 
in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the mid-1990s. They find that large 
and single parent families became particularly income vulnerable during the 
economic transition years, with the most dramatic changes for the latter household 
type. Most of the reforms at that time introduced means-testing, which 
consequently increased poverty reduction effectiveness of the programmes. 
Nonetheless, the political will for the reintroduction of universal benefits remained 
and crystallised in the numerous reforms in times of economic upturn (e.g. as of 
2004 in Lithuania). Levy, Morawski, and Myck (2009) evaluate the poverty 
effectiveness of Polish state support to families by comparing it to systems in 
France, the United Kingdom and Austria using EUROMOD. They find that single 
parents in Poland would benefit most if the French system (using both universal 
and means-tested benefits) were adopted, whereas two parent families would 
similarly benefit either from the universal Austrian or from the means-tested 
British systems. TÁRKI (2011) provides the most extensive evaluation of the EU 
countries’ performances in reducing child poverty. It finds low effectiveness of 
income support to families with children in Lithuania. The means-tested benefits in 
the Czech Republic and the universal benefits of Hungary are observed to produce 
similar child poverty outcomes. Social transfers in Slovenia are often seen as not 
specifically targeted at children, however, their effectiveness in reducing poverty is 
noted to be high. As such, the latter two studies do not single out any particular 
benefit type as having higher poverty effectiveness, but rather highlight their 
greatly varied impacts under particular national designs and different socio-
demographic circumstances.  
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6.3. Methodology 
EUROMOD 
Building further on the insights of the studies discussed in Section 6.2, we want to 
use EUROMO, the European static tax-benefit microsimulation model, to assess 
impacts of family policy changes. Using microsimulation models can help to 
highlight the role of certain family support instruments, be it taxes or benefits, 
while at the same time allowing for interactions with the remaining tax-benefit 
structures. This method also enables testing hypothetical public policy designs – a 
usually complex task due to the effects of various counterfactuals. Similar 
approaches, as used here, include Matsaganis et al. (2007) for Southern Europe or 
Immervoll et al. (2001) for a comparison between the UK and the Netherlands. 
We use the tax-benefit microsimulation EUROMOD model (versions F3.0 and 
F2.38), which is a static model. Static means that no behavioural reactions are taken 
into account. Currently (i.e. 2011), EUROMOD embeds policy designs of 21 EU 
countries, among them Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia79. The model was initially designed to cover the 15 “old” EU member 
states, with the NMS being added progressively. For four countries the policy 
system of 2008 is included in EUROMOD and used here80. As for Slovenia, 2005 is 
the policy year yet available - we use the annual consumer price index to uprate 
Slovenian benefits to 2008.   
Table 6-1. EUROMOD included policies & datasets of the selected countries  
 Lithuania Estonia Hungary Czech 
Rep. 
Slovenia 
Source 
database(s) 
EU-SILC +  
nat. SILC 
EU-SILC EU-SILC EU-SILC + 
nat. SILC  
SURS : sample of 
administrative 
records 
Income reference 
year  
2005 2005 2006 2005 2004/2002 
# of  households 4660 5623 8737 7483 4777 
# of individuals 12098 15755 22271 17793 13798 
Source: EUROMOD country reports 
In Table 6-1, we describe EUROMOD input data. Due to earlier implementation, 
Slovenian policies are simulated on a sample of administrative records (Čok et al., 
2008). Other countries use the EU-SILC as basic input dataset. Lithuanian micro-
                                                          
79 More info is available in Sutherland (2001), Lietz and Mantovani (2007) and at  
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod/developing-euromod/euromodupdate 
80 June 30 is the reference date for all policy descriptions. 
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database for EUROMOD is derived from the EU-SILC data with a few imputations 
on the basis of the national SILC survey (Ivaškaite-Tamošiūnė et al., 2010). In the 
Czech Republic, the national SILC additional variables are merged with the EU-
SILC data (Münich and Pavel, 2010). “Pure” EU-SILC is used for Estonia and 
Hungary (Hegedűs and Szivós, 2010; Võrk et al., 2010). As income reference dates 
are “older” than analysed policies, all countries use adjustment factors to update 
income levels to a respective policy year. This implies that the policy year of 2008 is 
set on the socio-demographic structure of 2005, but with income levels uprated to 
2008. Furthermore, EUROMOD assumes full take-up of benefits and full 
compliance with taxes and social contributions81.  
Family cash policies in EUROMOD 
We identify four major types of non-contributory ‘transfers to children’ in the five 
selected NMS: birth grants, universal child benefits, large family allowances 
(which can be labelled as categorically selective) and means tested family 
allowances (income selective)82. This covers 17 different national benefits83. Among 
them, only one benefit type is not simulated in EUROMOD: an Estonian child 
benefit supplement for single parents84. All benefits are not subject to income 
taxation. In Hungary, however, the benefit to large families increases the taxable 
income base. This affects the calculation of personal income taxes due (i.e. the rate, 
tax advantage amount) and consequently the disposable income. All countries also 
use either tax credits or tax allowances to support families with children. These 
measures are simulated in all countries.  
The principal design features and state expenses of both benefit and tax support 
measures are reviewed in Table 6-2Error! Reference source not found. In the latter 
table, countries are ranked from left to the right based on the extent to which they 
rely on means-testing. Lithuania has the most universalistic package, closely 
followed by Estonia. Hungary uses the most complete package of the transfers, 
with larger expenditure share going to universal/categorical benefits. Slovenia has 
                                                          
81  Based on the EUROMOD country reports, full-take up is a plausible assumption for all non-
contributory family benefits in the selected countries. Tax revenues are overall well simulated, with the 
largest deviation (-17%) reported in Hungary and the smallest deviation (+1%) noted in Estonian 
baseline policies.  
82 Contributory benefits or benefits with eligibility conditional on parents’ labour market status are 
excluded.  
83 The validation parameters of simulated benefits (i.e. ratios indicating how well simulated benefits 
match other sources of information) are provided in Appendix 2 of this Chapter along with their 
original names in national languages. 
84 This benefit is not simulated due to lack of information to be defined as a ‘single parent’: this means 
strictly no parenthood information on the second parent (e.g. a father is unknown) or assimilated 
situations (e.g. a fugitive parent). 
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a dominant means-tested child benefit, but universal/categorical transfers are also 
employed, especially when tax advantages for families are taken into account. The 
Czech Republic exclusively relies on means-tested transfers.  
Birth grants are found in all countries, with quite similar benefit rules. The benefit 
is proportional to the number of newborns in all countries, except in Hungary. The 
benefit is particularly high in the Czech Republic.  
Universal child benefits are provided in Lithuania, Estonia and Hungary, though 
the rules are quite different both in terms of eligibility and calculation. In Lithuania 
child benefit is provided to all children up to age 18, and up to age 24, if a child is 
still in education and belongs to a large family. The benefit is increased for children 
up to age 3 if raised in a large family. As such, these two components of the child 
benefit could be considered as a large family allowance. Lithuania does not 
provide these benefits separately, indicating that the demarcation between benefit 
types is not always straightforward. Estonia applies a lower age threshold for 
children who are still in (higher) education (i.e. under 20). It also provides a benefit 
supplement for children younger than 8, with higher rates applicable to those 
below age 3. In Hungary, child benefit is not directly linked to a specific age 
threshold, but depends on the child’s enrolment in education. The benefit size does 
not depend on the child’s age and has a regressive schedule for numerous children. 
Overall, Hungary offers the most generous child benefit provision. 
Categorical selectivity is most explicit in the form of specific allowances for large 
families in three countries: Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia. The Estonian benefit is 
targeted towards families raising seven or more children. In Hungary, families 
with three children or more are entitled, but only if the youngest child is between 
three and seven years old. In Slovenia all families with three or more children are 
eligible. In all three countries, the allowance’s size is uniform per eligible family. 
Hungary offers the most generous support. 
Income selectivity is applied in Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic through 
means-tested child allowances. In the Czech Republic this is the only benefit type 
available, aside the birth grant. Here, the means-tested income threshold is family 
specific and is set in relation to the state determined minimum living standard 
(MLS, a parameter that depends on the age and the number of family members85). 
The benefit size is set per child and increases with age. Hungary applies the 
simplest benefit calculation rules: any family with per capita incomes lower than 
                                                          
85 For example, (monthly) MLS for a child under the age of six is ≈ 70 EUR, for a child aged 6 to 9 years ≈ 
80 EUR, for the first adult ≈ 120 EUR. 
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125% of the minimum old-age pension (OAP86) is entitled to a uniform benefit 
amount. The Slovenian means-tested threshold is much higher than in Hungary. 
The benefit size depends on per capita family income and is gradually reduced to 
0, when reaching 99% of the average gross wage87. Due to the use of per capita 
incomes in benefit calculations, larger families receive proportionally bigger 
benefits.  
Lithuania, Estonia and Slovenia have personal income taxation systems, which use 
tax allowances (i.e. income-independent amounts deductible from taxable income). 
Allowances are increased for families with children. The rules of family tax 
allowances are relatively similar, though levels differ. Lithuanian tax allowances 
differ by family type: the most generous support goes to large families, followed 
by the support to single parent families and, finally, families with up to two 
children. Estonian family tax allowance assigns an identical amount per each child. 
Slovenian family tax allowance increases with each subsequent child. Using 
EUROMOD to calculate the value of these measures, the Slovenian system appears 
to be the most generous. Here, the tax support amount is actually the second 
largest state support to families (after the means tested allowance). The Lithuanian 
tax allowance is relatively small compared to the state expenses on benefits. In 
Estonia, expenses on family tax allowance almost reach the level of the state’s 
spending on the family benefits.  
Hungary and the Czech Republic have tax credits for families with children (i.e. 
deductions from tax liabilities). In Hungary, only families with three or more 
children are entitled to receive a lump-sum family tax credit: around 2% of total 
population. The amount is income dependent. If tax liability is smaller than the tax 
credit, nothing is paid (i.e. it is non-refundable). Both small and large families are 
entitled to an income-dependent tax credit in the Czech Republic. The credit 
amount is proportional to the number of children and is subject to a maximum 
yearly amount. If the tax liability is lower than the tax credit, the difference is paid 
to the taxpayer (i.e. it is refundable).  
 
 
                                                          
86 OAP (≈ 120 EUR per month) is around 15% of gross average wage (in 2008). 
87 About 1160 EUR per month. 
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Table 6-2. State annual expenses & beneficiaries of ‘transfers to children’, in EUR 
(2008) [1] 
  LT EE HU SI CZ 
Birth grant Benefit per recipient, EUR 301.1 317.4 270.4 212.0 544.1[ 2] 
Child 
benefit 
Age thresholds 18 (24) 17 ~17 (~20)  
Size: ∆[ 3] with child age ↓ No No   
Size: ∆ with # of children ↑ ↑ ↓   
Extra1: for single parents No Yes Yes   
Extra2: for young children Yes Yes No   
Extra2: age thresholds  3 3 (8) No   
Benefit per recipient[4] 388.1 332.1 1117.6   
Allowance 
to large 
families 
Age thresholds  17 17 (25)  18 (26)  
Eligibility: # of children  >=7  >=3 >=3  
Benefit per recipient  277.6 1426.0 334.2  
Means 
tested 
allowance 
Age thresholds   17(25) 18 (26) 18 (26) [8] 
Income threshold   1.25*OAP Avg. wage 2.4*MLS 
Size1: ∆ # of children   No Yes Yes  
Size2: ∆ other factors   No ↓ income ↑ age  
Benefit per recipient   756.4[5] 1031.9 353.6 
Tax relief:  
allowances 
or 
credits 
Allowance (A)/credit (C) A  A C A  C 
Age thresholds 18 18 17 (25) 18 (26) 18(26) 
Eligibility: # of children  >=1 >=1 >=3 >=1 >=1 
Size: ∆ with # of children Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Extra: for single parents Yes No  No  No  No  
Means tested No  No  Yes No  Yes  
Support per recipient 48.1 459.0 307.6 738.1 421.1 
Country population, mln. people 3.3 1.4 10.1 2.0 10.2 
Expenses on benefits, mln. EUR (B) 150.0 94.0 1866.9 282.7 369.5 
Per capita benefits, EUR  45.5 69.6 185.8 124.2 36.2 
Expenses on tax relief, mln. EUR (T) 25.2 79.2 52.9 237.8 594.1 
Per capita tax support, EUR 7.6 58.7 5.3 118.9 58.2 
Total “transfers to children”: B+T[6] 175.2 173.2 1919.8 486.1 963.6 
Per capita “transfers to children”, EUR 53.1 128.3 191.1 243.1 94.5 
Per capita “transfers to children”, PPS[7] 88.5 175.8 285.2 319.8 152.4 
Notes: [1] Information refers to actual state expenses, unless otherwise stated; SI data refers to 2005; national 
currency rates have reference date of June 30, 2008; local currency amounts converted using the June 30 exchange 
rate;  [2] No data available, estimation based on [benefit amount, 2008] x [# of beneficiaries, 2005]; [3] ∆ denotes 
‘change(-s)’; [4] EE supplement to the single parents excluded (~15% of the child benefit expenses). [5] No 
administrative data available; EUROMOD simulated expenses used instead. [6] Administrative costs excluded 
(differences by transfer/country could exist). [7] PPS (=purchasing power standard) is a common currency that 
eliminates differences in price levels between countries allowing more meaningful international volume 
comparisons. The used PPS and currency rates for selected countries are provided in Appendix 1 of this Chapter. 
[8] The category pools two means-tested benefits: child allowance (prídavek na díte) and social allowance (socialni 
priplatek). Both are given only to families with children. The rules in this table refer to the larger benefit – child 
allowance. Stricter means testing threshold (i.e. 1.6* MLS) is used for social allowance. Benefit per recipient is 
estimated as total expenses of both benefits divided by recipients of child allowance (five time numerous compared 
to social allowance).  
Source: EUROMOD Country reports and MISSOC  
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Overall, Hungary has the most extensive support using benefits (see Table 6-2): 
about 186 EUR per capita. However, when tax concessions are also taken into 
account, Slovenia is taking the lead in generosity with 243 EUR per capita. 
Lithuania has with 53 EUR the lowest spending on transfers to children. Taking 
into account differences in purchasing power standards (PPS), the per capita 
transfer to children slightly reduces from 1:4.6 (in EUR) to 1:3.6 (in PPS) across the 
selected countries. Still, this indicates high disparities in the generosity levels of the 
identified family benefit systems. Furthermore, Section 6.2 presented observation 
that systems with the most universal design of benefits tend to have the largest 
budgets does not hold across the selected countries. Here, countries with at least 
some means-tested benefits also have the highest budgets available.  
Microsimulation scenarios 
Microsimulation models allow testing distributional impacts of both existing and 
“what-if” policies. In this chapter, we exploit both options.  
In order to check how effective selected transfers to children are in reducing child 
poverty within the national circumstances, we “eliminate” them within the 
country’s tax-benefit system. For this, we use EUROMOD, which means that the 
other tax-benefit rules still play a role in further increasing or decreasing 
household income (e.g. the social assistance safety net may compensate part of 
abolishing family transfers). Other national parameters, such as original income 
distribution or socio-demographic structure, are of high importance too. By 
comparing poverty outcomes with and without transfers to children we evaluate 
the first-order poverty effects of existing arrangements88.  
Swapping policies means that family benefits of a ‘donor’ country are integrated 
into the tax-benefit system of a ‘recipient’ country instead of the existing family 
benefit system. Such swapping allows testing the effectiveness of a specific ‘donor’ 
policy given interactions with the remaining tax-benefit structure and socio-
demographic features of the ‘recipient’ country 89 . We model the impact of 
transfers, assuming a 100% take-up. We think this is a reasobale assumption for at 
                                                          
88 Though outside the scope of this study, behavioural effects would be expected to occur if benefit 
entitlements were to be considerably increased (e.g. larger uncondintional benefits could imply lower 
work incentives). This is one of the reasons for considering budget neutral (swapping) simulation. One 
of the limitations of the latter approach is that we control for the total expenditure level and not of the 
individual entitlements.  
89  For example, based on EUROSTAT and OECD Family Database: largest share of both parents 
working is noted in SI (76%) and LT (61%), the lowest - in HU (39%); largest share of children with 
single parents is in EE (24%), the lowest - in HU (14%); large families are prevalent in HU (34%); lowest 
mean equivalised net annual income is in HU (4827 EUR), the highest - in SI (11709 EUR). More details 
are provided in Appendix 1 of this Chapter.  
Chapter 6: Comparing family support in Lithuania and other NMS  P a g e  | 167 
 
least two reasons. First, this allows comparing the intended systems’ designs. 
Second, take-up is not always well documented, but for the countries where the 
information is available, actual take-up of the family transfers is very high or not 
well researched (e.g. see the corresponding EUROMOD Country reports). 
Simulation biases also occur due to imperfections of the underlying survey micro-
data, inability to fully “parameterize” policy rules, etc., though overall EUROMOD 
simulations provide “reasonably consistent” poverty results in comparison to 
survey data (e.g. see Figari, Iacovou, Skew and Sutherland 2012). 
We analyse three major policy swapping scenarios (see Figure 6-3)90, distinguishing 
between the actual (full) and budget neutral implementation.  
Figure 6-3. Simulation scenarios 
 
Source: own presentation 
In all three swapping scenarios we rely on national monetary references (i.e. 
average gross wage), when converting intermediary monetary parameters (i.e. 
income brackets, eligibility thresholds, etc.). This allows (at least partial) policy 
“adaptation” to national circumstances. The sizes of entitlements depend on the 
scenario. We also employ the annual consumer price index (CPI) to update 
Slovenian transfers (of 2005) to account for changes in purchasing power by 2008. 
This allows a more coherent swap of Slovenian 2005 policies into the Lithuanian 
tax-benefit environment of 2008.  
In Scenario I, we implement the benefits of the four other countries in Lithuania91. 
Swapping of tax support measures is excluded here. In the actual (full) swap of 
                                                          
90 Other scenarios have been considered too. For example, small poverty reduction effects are recorded 
by swapping definitions (i.e. a child, a family, etc.). The size effect of Lithuanian baseline policies has 
been tested by assigning budget levels of the other countries (increasing by approximately 1.8 times for 
a spending level of Estonia, 7 times – for Slovenia, even higher levels – for Hungary and the Czech 
Republic). Small poverty reduction effects (mainly for large families) were noted under the Estonian 
level of spending; poverty in large families was halved (with barely any effects for single parent 
families) under Slovenian spending. Further increases in spending are found to be highly counter-
productive as Lithuanian incomes are unable to absorb ever increasing tax advantages (aside any other 
behavioural effects). We have also estimated that an increase of a Lithuanian budget by 3 to 4 times 
would produce comparable poverty outcomes as under Scenario II presented budget neutral 
implementation of Slovenian policies.  
II. Swap of
benefits & tax advantages: 
actual & budget neutral
I. Swap of
benefits: 
actual & budget neutral
“Borrowed” policies in LT LT policies in other NMS
III. Swap of
benefits & tax advantages: 
budget neutral
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policies, the benefit amounts are introduced at the original levels, except of the 
adjustment for PPS and currency rates (as of June 30) among the analysed 
countries. This actually implies an increase in total benefits’ expenses compared to 
original Lithuanian settings from 1.7 times under Estonian policies to 3.7 times – 
under Hungarian policies. In the budget neutral scenario the simulated state 
expenses (as in the actual implementation scenario) are adjusted to the baseline 
Lithuanian spending by scaling each benefit’s size by the country specific 
budgetary adjustment factor  (ܨ௝௟)92: 
ܨ௝௟ = ∑ ݕ௝௞
௡௜ ∑ ݕ௟௞௡௜൘  
where: j – is a country, from which policies are borrowed; l –Lithuania; n - number 
of simulated recipients given Lithuanian population qualities; k – number of 
transfer types (k); y – total simulated state expenditures.  
Potential changes in taxes or other transfers (e.g. social assistance) are allowed (due 
to benefits’ influence). Appendix 4 illustrates a stylized simulation procedure of 
both budget neutral and actual implementations. In the Czech Republic and 
Hungary the above presented formula serves as the first step in making budget 
neutral calculations. Due to non-linear interactions among benefits (some of the 
benefits are on the list of means-testing for the other benefits), empirical calibration 
is also used in finding the final adjustment factor (see Appendix 5 on intermediary 
parameters of Scenario I).  
In Scenario II, we replace both Lithuanian benefits and tax advantages to children 
with the respective policies of the other countries (see Table 6-2)93. A comparison 
between Scenarios I & II highlights additional influence of the tax support 
instruments. Overall, Scenario II measures the effect of benefits and tax measures 
together. Under budget neutrality both state expenses on benefits (i.e. using scalars 
of Scenario I) and income taxation revenue are calibrated separately to the baseline 
                                                                                                                                                    
91 Swapping benefits’ packages is feasible, as selected transfers represent comparable structures: all 
countries have general provision to children (i.e. birth grants, child benefits); they also give an 
additional support to vulnerable groups, though designs of these transfers are different. For example, 
though Lithuania does not have an explicit benefit to large families, its child benefit includes special 
treatment for large families. The same logic applies when swapping benefits and tax support measures.  
92 The factor could only be applied if there are no interactions between benefits. For example, a different 
factor should be considered as a child benefit is included into the income list of means tested allowances 
in the Czech Republic. In this case, we take the estimated scaling factor as a starting point, with the final 
factor found during the calibration procedure.  
93 Other parameters (tax rate, basic allowance, etc.) of the Lithuanian income taxation system remain 
unchanged.  
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Lithuanian levels (i.e. imposing changes on spending proportions between benefits 
and tax advantages). This means that proportional spending between tax 
advantages and benefits, as observed in Lithuania, is imposed on the foreign 
policies too. The scaling factors for tax support instruments are estimated using 
empirical calibration due to non-linearity in income tax calculation: first, the same 
budgetary adjustment factors are used to scale benefits as in Scenario I; then, 
scaling factors for tax support instruments are estimated using empirical 
calibration due to non-linearity in income tax calculation (see Appendix 6 for this 
Scenario related parameters).  
In Scenario III, we shift Lithuanian transfers and tax instruments for children to 
the other four countries, while keeping the remaining tax-benefit structure of those 
countries unchanged (see Appendix 7 for this Scenario related intermediary 
parameters). We focus on the budget neutral swapping impacts, using analogous 
assumptions as already described in the Scenarios I and II. This scenario shows the 
extent of Lithuanian policies’ effectiveness given different socio-economic and 
demographic settings, as well as interactions with the remaining tax-benefit 
system. Due to budget neutral condition, the composition of spending on benefits 
and tax advantages is matched to the proportions observed in the recipient 
country. This scenario allows testing if Lithuanian policies are indeed less poverty 
reduction effective Lithuanian policies or whether un-favourable socio-
demographic settings drive the observed poverty rates in Lithuania. By adopting 
Lithuanian policies into different and arguably more advantageous (if considering 
lower poverty rates) socio-demographic settings we obtain additional evidence on 
the policies’ effectiveness. 
Policy effectiveness indicators 
We evaluate swapped programmes’ effectiveness by their impact on the two 
measures of poverty (i.e. poverty headcount and gap) before and after 
implementation of a certain scenario (see formulas in Appendix 3). Poverty 
headcount measures the prevalence of poverty and is expressed as a percentage of 
the (total) population with incomes below the certain poverty line. Poverty gap 
points to the shortfall from the poverty line for those people identified as poor. 
Thereby, poverty gap measures both the depth and the prevalence of poverty.  
We present these two poverty indicators for the entire population, all children and 
children in large and single parent families. We use the relative poverty concept 
with the poverty line (60% of the median equivalised income) being recalculated 
for each scenario (see thresholds in Appendix 3). In comparison to the poverty line 
in original Lithuanian settings (about 216 EUR), it decreases by maximum 2% 
(Scenario III, Estonia) or increases by maximum 5% (Scenario II – actual 
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implementation, the Czech Republic) for different scenarios. Using a recalculated 
poverty line means that we maintain the relative character of the poverty line, thus 
allowing for the potential shift in median income following from changes in the 
income distribution (see e.g. Marx et al., 2012). Disposable income is the annual 
sum of total gross household income from labour earnings, plus income from 
investment and savings, plus all types of simulated or observed contributory and 
non-contributory benefits, minus simulated social contributions, minus simulated 
final personal income taxes and observed other taces (i.e. property, wealth taxes). 
Income is equivalised with the EU scale, also called the modified OECD 
equivalence scale. Standard errors (with a 95% confidence level) of poverty 
indicators are computed using Taylor first order linearization with the STATA 
DASP programme94. 
A comparison of the poverty outcomes in the baseline and swap scenarios gives 
the effect of implementing the foreign system. By simulating the budget neutral 
implementation, we can distinguish between the design (the baseline in 
comparison to the budget neutral implementation) and the size (the budget neutral 
in comparison to the full implementation) effects. Statistically significant changes 
between the point (poverty) estimates of a baseline and and a swap scenario are 
determined at the micro-level (i.e. comparing poverty status of each person in the 
two scenarios) with a 95% confidence level. More information on this estimation 
could be found in Appendix 8.  
6.4. Simulation results  
Poverty impacts of baseline policies 
If not for transfers to children (i.e. both benefits and tax concesscions) all countries 
would have higher poverty levels for all groups of interest (see Table 6-3).The 
smallest effect of the transfers is observed in Lithuania (a 7% reduction in child 
poverty rate). The largest role is played by the Hungarian system, with a child 
poverty reduction of around 40%. The analysed systems have varied poverty gap 
and headcount effects for vulnerable household types. 
The Slovenian system is particularly effective for large families, reducing the pre-
transfer poverty rate from 45% to 16% (a reduction of more than 60%). Overall, all 
countries but Lithuania seem to be able to manage poverty risk of this household 
type with transfers to children: a reduction of around 50% in Estonia and Hungary, 
and 36% in the Czech Republic. The poverty reduction rate of large families in 
                                                          
94 More details in Araar and Duclos, 2007. 
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Lithuania is only 8% The same holds for single parent families. Generally, the latter 
group has lower income protection in comparison to large families in all countries. 
The largest reduction is achieved by Slovenian (36%) and Hungarian systems 
(32%). The Estonian (18%) and the Czech systems (15%) have a smaller effect.  
Slovenia also shows a large capacity of cutting poverty depth for large families (by 
85%), and for single parent families (by 73%). These achievements bring the 
poverty gap indicators for these two family types to the lowest levels among our 
countries. The Hungarian transfers to children are important not only in combating 
child, but also for overall poverty. The poverty gap among large families is also 
reduced drastically here (by 75%). In the Czech Republic the pre-transfer poverty 
gap is already small. Its means-tested system, though, achieves less for large and 
single parent families compared to the Slovenian system. The Estonian system 
halves the poverty gap among children in large families. A smaller effect is 
achieved among the other groups. Results on Lithuania reveal the lowest poverty 
gap reducing capacities.  
Overall, simulation on the poverty effectiveness of these countries’ existing 
transfers does not support above-mentioned literature (e.g. Korpi and Palme, 1998; 
Nelson, 2004) observations that a greater targeting achieving less poverty 
alleviation.  
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Table 6-3. Poverty headcount and gap in pre- and post- transfer systems  
 LT-
pre 
LT-
post 
EE- 
pre 
EE-
post 
HU-
pre 
HU-
post 
SI-
pre 
SI-
post 
CZ-
pre 
CZ-
post 
Poverty 
headcount, % 
          
Total 20.8 20.3 18.5 17.5 17.8 13.3 18.3 15.7 9.8 8.5 
 (0.78) (0.78) (0.59) (0.59) (0.52) (0.47) (0.57) (0.54) (0.50) (0.47) 
Children  28.2 26.2 26.5 20.1 32.6 19.6 23.6 15.0 15.3 10.8 
 (1.63) (1.61) (1.22) (1.13) (1.18) (1.02) (1.18) (0.98) (1.07) (0.97) 
- in large (3+) 
families  
48.0 44.3 40.1 20.2 60.2 30.6 44.9 16.2 31.8 20.5 
 (6.22) (6.27) (4.59) (3.41) (3.48) (3.39) (5.57) (4.17) (4.78) (4.55) 
- in single parent 
families   
49.3 45.1 55.7 45.6 44.5 30.2 39.8 25.6 32.9 27.9 
 (6.29) (6.40) (4.48) (4.62) (3.93) (3.54) (5.01) (4.79) (3.50) (3.41) 
Poverty gap, %           
Total 6.3 5.9 5.3 4.9 6.0 3.2 4.7 3.4 1.7 1.5 
 (0.41) (0.39) (0.28) (0.26) (0.29) (0.16) (0.22) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) 
Children  8.7 7.5 8.3 6.2 12.0 4.5 6.5 2.5 2.7 1.9 
 (0.76) (0.68) (0.57) (0.50) (0.67) (0.30) (0.45) (0.19) (0.28) (0.26) 
- in large (3+) 
families  
14.8 12.0 10.9 5.2 26.1 6.3 12.3 1.9 6.0 4.3 
 (2.49) (2.19) (1.54) (0.99) (2.17) (0.83) (2.03) (0.55) (1.26) (1.24) 
- in single parent 
families   
13.9 13.1 18.0 14.1 18.2 6.7 11.3 3.1 5.3 3.7 
 (2.07) (2.01) (1.89) (1.85) (2.33) (1.14) (2.18) (0.61) (0.73) (0.62) 
Notes: Here and further on:  standard errors in parentheses; children defined as persons under the age of 18. 
Shaded cells indicate significant changes between pre- and post- scenarios.  
Source: own calculations using EUROMOD  
Are “borrowed” policies more poverty reduction effective?  
Table 6-4 displays the poverty outcomes of swapping foreign policies – both 
benefits and tax advantages - into Lithuania. Our findings show that the relative 
importance of the size and the design effects of the simulated changes depends on 
the system the household type and the poverty index. 
The full implementation indicates that three systems lead to significantly better 
poverty outcomes than the existing Lithuanian system: the Hungarian, Slovenian 
and Czech systems. This is the case for the swap of benefits, as well as for the 
combined swap of benefits and tax advantages. These three countries include 
means-tested transfers in the child transfer package. An introduction of the 
Slovenian system (both for the benefits-only and for the combined benefit-tax 
advantage scenarios) leads to the best results for large families: poverty is halved. 
Much smaller poverty changes are noted for single parent families and across all 
three swapped systems. The poverty effects of the Estonian system, that resembles 
the Lithuanian design most closely, are highly heterogeneous: no significant 
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changes are noted for population and child poverty with a swap of benefits; small 
but significant poverty reduction is noted for children in large families when 
adding tax advantages; overall small but significant increase in poverty is recorded 
for children in single parents’ families. The latter result is the only negative effect 
across all swaps. The overall results indicate that the effect of the benefit swapping 
tends to be stronger than the effect of swapping tax advantages. Exceptions are the 
Hungarian and the Czech systems, where adding tax advantages leads to a 
significant reduction in poverty risk for single parents. Remember that Hungary 
and the Czech Republic have a tax credit rather than a tax allowance. 
A quick glance at Table 6-4 would tempt the reader to think that the transfer size is 
the major determinant for the reduction of the poverty risk, as budget-neutrality 
leads to fewer significant changes. Having said that, we want to make some 
qualifications regarding the perceived dominance of size effects. First, the results 
are dependent on the system’s design. For example, overall child poverty 
reduction is comparable across all borrowed systems (except of Estonia), however 
the Slovenian benefits’ (only) system leads to the largest reduction in poverty risk 
of large families. The latter system does not offer the most generous benefits’ 
package though. Second, when tax advantages are included, all systems achieve 
significant changes in child poverty. The direction of the changes is varied. For 
example, adding Slovenian tax advantages slightly increases poverty estimates for 
single parent families, while the Czech tax measures achieve coherent and large 
poverty drop for all concerned groups. Third, the use of the indicator matters too: 
with the poverty gap we measure significant reductions for all three ‘successful’ 
systems (HU, SI, CZ), both under budget neutral and full implementation 
scenarios.  
While overall design effect tends to be smaller than the size effect, the final 
comparison is highly dependent on the population group and the system. For 
example, under the Slovenian regime, both the design and the size effects are of 
equal importance for large families (each effect achieves around a 12 percentage 
points reduction from the baseline poverty rate). The design effect is even stronger 
for the poverty gap. As discussed before, Slovenia pays considerable attention to 
large families. It offers an allowance to large families as well as a means-tested 
child benefit, which is advantageous to large families due the benefit’s size being 
linked to per capita income. Hungarian tax and benefit measures reveal equally 
important size and design effects (about 10 percentage points each) for the large 
families too. Overall, the design effect seems to be considerably interlinked with 
the size effect of the policies: the systems with the strongest design effects (i.e. 
Slovenia and Hungary) for large families are also able to achieve the strongest size 
effects. 
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Table 6-4. Poverty headcount and gap under the “borrowed” policies 
 
LT 
base-
line 
Scenario I: Swap of Benefits
Budget neutral Actual 
EE HU SI CZ EE HU SI CZ 
Poverty headcount, % 
Total 20.3 20.3 19.9 18.9 19.4 20.1 18.5 17.6 17.1 
(0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) 
Children 26.2 26.8 25.6 23.1 24.7 25.9 20.4 18.6 18.9 
(1.61) (1.62) (1.60) (1.57) (1.62) (1.61) (1.52) (1.49) (1.53) 
- in large 
(3+) fam. 
44.3 42.6 40.3 32.6 42.9 41.2 24.9 20.4 27.2 
(6.27) (6.29) (6.27) (6.08) (6.29) (6.29) (5.82) (5.60) (5.88) 
- in single 
parent fam. 
45.1 49.3 45.9 45.0 43.6 48.1 39.5 38.1 40.2 
(6.40) (6.29) (6.38) (6.40) (6.44) (6.33) (6.29) (6.50) (6.53) 
Poverty gap, % 
Total 5.9 6.0 5.7 5.4 5.4 5.9 4.9 4.8 4.4 
(0.39) (0.39) (0.37) (0.35) (0.35) (0.38) (0.32) (0.31) (0.29) 
Children 7.5 7.7 7.1 6.2 6.7 7.5 4.9 4.3 4.3 
(0.68) (0.69) (0.65) (0.56) (0.62) (0.67) (0.48) (0.43) (0.46) 
- in large 
(3+) fam. 
12.1 12.1 10.7 7.5 10.6 11.1 5.9 3.1 5.7 
(2.19) (2.20) (2.16) (1.63) (2.02) (2.10) (1.45) (0.99) (1.38) 
- in single 
parent fam. 
13.1 14.3 12.1 12.0 11.9 14.7 8.8 9.5 9.0 
(2.01) (2.10) (1.82) (1.83) (1.92) (2.16) (1.50) (1.58) (1.77) 
 
LT 
base-
line 
Scenario II: Swap of Benefits & Tax Advantages 
Budget neutral Actual 
EE HU SI CZ EE HU SI CZ 
Poverty headcount, % 
Total 20.3 20.3 19.6 18.9 19.6 20.0 18.4 18.5 16.9 
(0.78) (0.78) (0.79) (0.79) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) 
Children 26.2 26.8 24.4 23.0 25.4 25.5 19.7 18.6 16.6 
(1.61) (1.62) (1.57) (1.56) (1.62) (1.60) (1.46) (1.47) (1.50) 
- in large 
(3+) families 
44.3 42.6 34.4 31.1 45.0 41.2 24.1 19.8 25.3 
(6.27) (6.29) (6.11) (6.07) (6.27) (6.29) (5.80) (5.55) (5.85) 
- in single 
parent 
45.1 49.8 45.3 45.2 44.7 47.8 33.2 39.8 29.2 
(6.40) (6.28) (6.39) (6.40) (6.41) (6.34) (5.78) (6.46) (6.66) 
Poverty gap, % 
Total 5.9 6.0 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.9 4.8 5.0 3.9 
(0.39) (0.39) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.38) (0.31) (0.32) (0.26) 
Children 7.5 7.9 6.6 6.1 6.6 7.4 4.3 4.4 2.9 
(0.68) (0.69) (0.59) (0.56) (0.61) (0.67) (0.42) (0.45) (0.32) 
- in large 
(3+) fam. 
12.1 12.4 8.5 7.2 10.5 10.9 3.8 3.3 3.4 
(2.19) (2.23) (1.82) (1.61) (1.98) (2.08) (0.97) (1.09) (0.84) 
- in single 
parent fam. 
13.1 14.6 11.0 12.1 11.5 14.8 7.8 10.1 4.8 
(2.01) (2.11) (1.73) (1.85) (1.82) (2.18) (1.56) (1.68) (1.02) 
Note: Abbrevatiation ‘fam.’ refers to ‘families’ ; shaded cells indicate significant changes between baseline and 
swap scenarios (Appendix 8 provides more details on calculation of significantly different poverty changes across 
the scenarios).  
Source: own calculations using EUROMOD 
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The fact that the budget-neutral swap of the Czech system does not introduce 
significant poverty changes for both vulnerable groups may come as a surprise, 
given the fact that it only has means-tested transfers. The difference from the better 
scoring Slovenian system relates to benefit’s size determination: it is not 
differentiated according to income under the Czech system. Also, the income 
threshold is family type specific (uniform thresholds are applied in Slovenia and 
Hungary). Czech tax measures under the full implementation (hence the size effect 
is dominant), though, achieve the best poverty headcount score for single parent 
households. This is partly due to the fact that the tax credit is non-wastable, i.e. 
when the tax credit exceeds tax liabilities the difference is paid to families. 
In general, the situation of children living in single parent households is least or 
even negatively (i.e. under the Estonian system) affected by the policy swaps. This 
is in line with the designs of the systems, which hardly have advantageous 
provisions for single parent families (especially in comparison to large families). 
Furthermore, original Lithuanian measures include preferential tax rather than 
benefit regimes for single parents. In parallel, the largest relative income 
improvement for this family type is noted under Hungarian and Czech tax 
measures, but only with a considerable increase in the tax relief size if compared to 
the Lithuanian baseline. 
Poverty reduction effectiveness of Lithuanian policies in other countries 
Across all countries, the budget neutral implementation of Lithuanian policies 
worsens child poverty, though to different degrees. 
We observe the largest deterioration in poverty rates and for all concerned groups 
in the Czech Republic, even though the budget neutral Czech policies did not 
achieve significant poverty changes for vulnerable groups in Lithuania. Poverty 
rates in Hungary and Slovenia would also increase under Lithuanian policies. In 
both countries, however, the relative position of the single parent families does not 
change, indicating that neither of these countries has a more effective state support 
package for this group. Estonian budget neutral policies had mixed results in 
Lithuania. The reverse swap worsens poverty situation slightly, except of the 
insignificant change for single parent families. Note, that Estonian policies implied 
a worsening poverty situation for Lithuanian single parent families too.  
The trends in poverty gaps point to larger and negative changes for children, 
particularly if raised in large families, for all systems. The worst performance 
would occur in Slovenia. The poverty gap would also widen for single parent 
households (though to a lesser degree than for large families), especially in 
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Hungary and Slovenia. This is also a somewhat surprising effect, as a much 
smaller effect was detected when swapping foreign policies into Lithuania.   
Table 6-5. Poverty headcount & gap, swapping Lithuanian policies into four NMS 
 EE HU SI CZ 
post LT post LT post LT post LT 
Poverty headcount, % 
Total 17.5 17.9 13.3 13.8 15.7 17.5 8.5 10.6 
 (0.59) (0.58) (0.47) (0.50) (0.54) (0.55) (0.47) (0.50) 
Children  20.1 21.0 19.6 21.3 15.0 17.8 10.8 15.9 
 (1.13) (1.15) (1.02) (1.06) (0.98) (1.05) (0.97) (1.07) 
- in large (3+) families  20.2 21.4 30.6 36.8 16.2 23.8 20.5 31.9 
 (3.41) (3.47) (3.39) (3.51) (4.17) (4.94) (4.55) (4.74) 
- in single parent families  45.6 47.1 30.2 32.2 25.6 26.7 27.9 35.8 
 (4.62) (4.60) (3.54) (3.68) (4.79) (4.80) (3.41) (3.55) 
Poverty gap, % 
Total 4.9 5.1 3.2 3.7 3.4 4.1 1.5 1.9 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.13) (0.14) 
Children  6.2 6.7 4.5 5.6 2.5 4.0 1.9 2.8 
 (0.50) (0.52) (0.30) (0.38) (0.19) (0.29) (0.26) (0.29) 
- in large (3+) families  5.2 6.6 6.3 10.0 1.9 5.2 4.3 5.7 
 (0.99) (1.21) (0.83) (1.24) (0.55) (1.15) (1.24) (1.29) 
- in single parent families   14.1 14.8 6.7 9.4 3.1 6.1 3.7 5.8 
 (1.85) (1.86) (1.14) (1.51) (0.61) (1.29) (0.62) (0.78) 
Source: own calculations using EUROMOD  
6.5. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This study is the first application of a full tax-benefit microsimulation model for 
testing family transfers’ effectiveness within a comparative setting of five NMS. 
EUROMOD, the European static tax-benefit model, allows swapping policies from 
one country to another. Though a number of limitations are associated with using 
such a model, the advantage is its comprehensive structure in handling cross-
national analysis on distributional policy impacts. The policy systems differ across 
five countries in terms of size and design of their non-contributory transfers to 
children: birth grants, universal child benefits, large family allowances (categorical 
benefit), means tested child allowances and tax advantages to families. An 
advantage of using EUROMOD is that also the distribution of tax measures can be 
captured - an often neglected factor which can significantly impact poverty, as was 
illustrated by our results from the Czech and Hungarian systems. 
Literature usually points to the size of the transfers as the major determinant of 
child poverty. Our results confirm it is of high importance. Nevertheless, we find 
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the design effect could be of equal significance and is noted to have a size 
reinforcing effect. The strength of the size and the design effects are also highly 
dependent on the composition of the selected policy measures (universal, 
categorical, income selective) and the parametric choices of the policies’ inner 
design (i.e. thresholds, benefit size determination, etc.).  
Our study confirms that the best poverty score is not necessarily achieved by the 
most extensive means-tested systems - systems - in line with Korpi and Palme 
(1998) observations. On the other hand, “pure” universal systems are found to be 
the least poverty effective. A mix of means-tested and categorical benefits, sensitive 
to characteristics of the poor families, can act as highly poverty effective tools. This 
is the case with the large family allowance in Slovenia or the tax credit to large 
families in Hungary. The common features of these two transfers are a high reach 
of large families and a non-age dependent benefit’s size calculation. As families 
with older kids could be as prone to poverty as those with younger kids, the policy 
design sensitive to the age rather than the number of children seems to be counter-
effective. A higher threshold for means-tested benefits also ensures a higher reach 
of the most vulnerable families. The combination of a generous means-testing 
threshold with benefit’s size dependence on per capita family income seems to be 
the key behind the Slovenian child benefit’s design. This is a major difference with 
the other means-tested benefits, found in the Czech Republic or Hungary where 
the benefit size respectively depends on the child’s age or is uniform for all eligible 
families.  
Our simulations do not reveal any significant design features that would reduce 
child poverty among single parent families in Lithuania. We would have expected 
more positive outcomes given expectations by the analysis of baseline policies (e.g. 
Slovenia’s system reduces the poverty gap for single parents with 73%). 
Apparently, only an increase in size is able to reduce prevalence of poverty among 
single parent families in Lithuania. Poverty gap analysis reveals small positive 
changes, except under the Estonian system. The latter design worsens both poverty 
score and depth among single parent families be it under budget neutral and full 
implementation settings.  
It is essential to stress that aside benefit design and size criteria, policy alignment 
to national characteristics is of high importance. Although Lithuania and Estonia 
have the most similar non-contributory family benefit and tax measures, Estonia 
achieves a much better poverty reduction for both large and single parent families 
within own socio-demographic settings. As such, the observed size and design 
effects interact with a number of country-specific characteristics: socio-
demographic settings, tax and benefit policies, etc.      
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Summarising, we argue that Lithuanian policy makers can indeed learn from 
foreign experiences, if they want to improve poverty outcomes for Lithuanian 
children. It is important to keep in mind though that these lessons need to consider 
the specific socio-demographic characteristics and the wider tax-benefit system of 
Lithuania.   
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6.6. Appendixes 
Appendix 1: Socio-demographic profiles of the selected countries 
Annual gross earnings and purchasing power standards, 2008 (2005 in SI) 
 EU  NMS LT  EE HU CZ  SI 
EUR exchange rate, June 30  n.a. n.a. 3.4528 15.647 242.963 23.893 239.57 
National currency unit n.a. n.a. LTL EEK HUF CZK SIT 
PPS 1.00 n.a. 0.60 0.73 0.67 0.62 0.79 
Mean equivalised net annual 16,756 4,713 4,932 6,331 4,827 6,810 11,709 
Mean equivalised net annual 16,756 n.a. 8,221 8,665 7,235 10,910 14,817 
Note: Exchange rate between Euro and EEK and between Euro and LLT is fixed.  
ݏ݋	ݐℎܽݐ			ܲܲܵ௅்	݉ݑ݈ݐ݅݌݈݅݁ݎ ∗ ܻ	ሾா௎ோ	௔௠௢௨௡௧	௜௡	ா௎	௖௢௨௡௧௥௬ሿ = ሾܺ௜௡	ா௎ோ	&	௉௉ௌ	௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௘ௗ	௔௠௢௨௡௧	௜௡	௅்ሿܲܲܵ௅்	݉ݑ݈ݐ݅݌݈݅݁ݎ
= ܲܲ ሾܵ௢௙	௅்ሿ ܲܲܵሾ௢௙	ா௎	௖௢௨௡௧௥௬ሿ⁄ 		,		 
Source: EUROSTAT and European Central Bank  
Labour market situation of parents, 2007 
 Children in couple households, % Children in sole parent households, % 
Both One Neither  Parent Parent Parent not 
EU 43.6 31.7 4.4 20.3 52.1 14.4 34.1 
Lithuania 61.0 22.0 4.8 12.2 65.2 8.3 26.5 
Estonia 49.0 38.4 2.8 9.8 67.9 5.7 26.4 
Hungary  39.4 44.7 10.4 5.5 52.2 3.7 44.2 
Slovenia 76.2 14.9 1.3 7.6 84.3 3.1 12.6 
Czech 46.6 41.6 3.7 8.1 54.3 6.5 39.2 
Note: children defined as household members aged 0-14; “Other” category includes households with 1 parent 
working full-time & 1 parent working part-time, plus other working or not-working  arrangements.  
Source: OECD Family Database 
Full-time work 
The highest rate of children (76%) living with both working parents is noted in 
Slovenia; the respective rate is also high Lithuania; full-time work of single parents 
is most common in Slovenia, followed by Estonia and Lithuania.   
Part-time work 
Part-time work by one of the two partners is of high importance in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary; part-time work by single parents is highest in Lithuania, 
followed by the Czech Republic.  
Jobless households 
Hungary has the highest rate of children living in jobless households (with both or 
one parent); this ratio for single parent households is very high in the Czech 
Republic too.  
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Selected demographic figures, 2007 
 Share of children living in: Share of families raising: Share of 
families 
with 
children 
Mean age of 
women at 
birth of the 
1st child 
Sole 
parent 
families 
Couple 
families 
Other 
fami-
lies 
1 or 2 
child-
ren 
3+ 
children 
Child 
under 
age 6 
Lithuania 18.3 79.0 2.6 74.2 25.9 49.6 54 25.0 
Estonia 24.0 71.9 3.8 73.9 26.1 57.5 43 25.1 
Hungary 14.4 83.0 2.5 66.5 33.5 51.8 48 27.2 
Slovenia 15.5 83.3 0.7 78.2 21.9 54.5 50 28.2 
Czech 20.8 78.3 0.9 80.1 19.9 52.4 47 27.3 
Source: OECD Family Database 
In all countries, except of Estonia, around 80% of children live with both parents. 
In Estonia, around a quarter of all children live in sole parent families – the highest 
share across our countries. Families with three children are dominant in Hungary - 
approximately one third of all families. Living in small families is the most 
prevalent arrangement in Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Lithuania has the 
smallest share of families with children under the age of 6. The largest share of 
families with children is also observed in Lithuania: 54% of all Lithuanian 
households. On average women have the first child at the age of 25 in both 
Lithuania and Estonia. The first child is usually born around 2 to 3 years later in 
Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic.  
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Appendix 2. EUROMOD: validation parameters & original names of “transfers 
to children” 
Abbreviations:  
Simulation ratios: Ratio ‘recipients’=simulated recipients/actual recipients (i.e. administrative data 
information); Ratio ‘expenses’ = simulated expenses/actual recipients; Ratio ‘sim./input’ = simulated 
expenses/expenses estimated from(survey) input data.  
Simulation 
ratios / 
original 
name  
Hungary* Czech Rep.** Slovenia*** 
Reci-
pients 
Ex-
penses 
Sim./ 
Input 
Reci-
pients 
Ex-
penses 
Sim./ 
Input 
Reci-
pients 
Ex-
penses 
Sim./ 
Input 
Birth grant 
 
0.95 0.93 n.a. 0.81** 1.02** 0.82 1.11 1.26 n.a. 
Anyasági támogatás Sünnitoetus Pomoč ob rojstvu 
Child 
benefit 
1.03 1.07 n.a. 
  
Családi pótlék 
Child 
benefit 
supplement 
   
Large family 
allowance 
1.08 1.07 n.a. 
 
1.07 1.07 n.a. 
Gyermeknevelési támogatás Dodatek za veliko družino 
Means 
tested 
allowance 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.76 1.26 1.00 1.20 1.17 n.a. 
Rendszeres  gyermekvé-delmi Prídavek na díte Ootroški dodatek 
 
2.02 1.35 1.72 
 
Socialni priplatek 
Single 
parent 
allowance 
   
Notes: *- Observations on Hungary  Official social statistics is not collected for the Hungarian means tested 
allowance; **- Observations on the Czech Republic  Birth grant: under-estimation is mainly due to under-
estimated number of new-borns in the input data; Child and social allowances (means tested): EUROMOD 
simulation is not able to capture the drop in a number of actual recipients in 2008. *** - Observations on Slovenia 
 Birth grant: over-estimation is largely due to the assumption that the newly born babies are all children born 
from 2001 to March 2002; Child benefit: over-estimation is mainly due to differences in observed family structures 
and family units which apply for child benefits.  
Source: EUROMOD country reports and MISSOC database 
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Simulation ratios / 
original name  
Lithuania* Estonia** 
Reci-
pients 
Expenses 
Sim./ 
Input 
Reci-
pients 
Ex-penses 
Sim./ 
Input 
Birth grant 
 
0.87 0.89 1.00 0.78 0.78 n.a. 
Vienkartinė išmoka Sünnitoetus 
Child benefit 
1.33 1.12 1.12 1.06 1.04 n.a. 
Išmoka vaikui Lapsetoetus 
Child benefit 
supplement 
 
0.98 1.04 n.a. 
Lapsehooldustasu 
Large family 
allowance 
 
1.12 1.05 n.a. 
Seitsme-ja enamalapselise pere vanema 
Means tested 
allowance 
  
Single parent 
allowance 
 
Not simulated 
Üksikvanema lapse toetus 
Notes: *- Observations on Lithuania  Birth grant: under-estimation occurs as the actual number of children has 
increased from 2005 to 2008; child benefit: over-estimation in the number of recipients could occur due to inability 
distinguishing between full-time and part-time studying status. The assumption is made that all students study 
full time, which is also an eligibility condition. ** - Observations on Estonia  Child birth allowance: Small 
benefit groups, such as childbirth allowance, have some problems with precision but their impact on overall 
expenditures is relatively small. 
Source: EUROMOD country reports and MISSOC database  
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Appendix 3: Poverty measures 
At-risk-of-poverty rate 
The percentage of persons, over the total population, with an income below the ‘at-
risk-of-poverty threshold (poverty line)’, set at 60% of the median disposable 
income (EUROSTAT, 2005): 
100*
'
'
0 


populationTotal
zywithpersons
iw
iw
P  
Poverty gap  
It measures the average difference between the income of poor people (people with 
income below the at-risk-of poverty threshold) and poverty line.  

 

    z
yziw
iw
P i
zywithpersons
populationTotal
'*
'
1
 , where α=1 indicates poverty gap index 
Poverty line of each scenario 
 Lithuania + Country X aspects (in LTL) Country X + LT policies  
 pre post 1A 1B 2A 2B pre post 3 
LT 98.04% 215.7   
EE  100.1% 99.4% 100.5% 99.4% 95.4% 298.5 99.7% 
SI   101.5% 99.3% 104.5% 99.4% 94.4% 400.9 99.9% 
HU   103.0% 99.7% 103.1% 99.9% 94.6% 228.1 100.4% 
CZ   102.8% 99.9% 104.8% 99.9% 95.9% 348.7 99.2% 
Note: “post” – refers to the original country settings (with original benefit-tax policies). These poverty thresholds 
are presented in EUR. “Pre” – refers to the original country settings without (original) benefits and tax 
advantages to families. The poverty threshold for ‘pre” & 1, 2, 3 Scenarios are expressed as a share of a relevant 
“post” poverty threshold.  
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Appendix 4: Main simulation steps 
Example using Scenario I assumptions; Slovenian benefits in Lithuania: main 
simulation steps 
 
 
This figure illustrates a stylized simulation procedure of swapping Slovenian benefits to 
Lithuanian settings, with both actual and budget neutral scenarios sequencing indicated. 
Figure numbering “1 to 8” refers to the order of simulation steps. 
Taxes
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Transfers to 
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LT micro data: baseline
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@ LT micro data
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th
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Appendix 5: Intermediary parameters - Scenario I 
Scenario 1A – actual implementation of benefits (3.4528 LTL=1 EUR) 
 LT “post” EE HU SI CZ 
Birth grant:       
Annual expenses, mln. LTL 32.2 41.5 30.5 28.3 57.0 
Mean annual grant, LTL 1040.0 1377.6 711.0 937.4 1941.2 
# of beneficiary families[1] 30147 30147 30147 30147 29348 
Child benefit:   
Annual expenses, mln. LTL 538.0 866.4 2004.0   
Mean annual benefit, LTL 94.0 149.4/172.7[2] 344.1   
# of beneficiary families 477450 483431/ 109777 [3] 486362   
Allowance to large      
Annual expenses, mln. LTL  2.7 42.2[4] 76.4  
Mean annual benefit, LTL  708.8 3792.0 106.5  
# of beneficiary families  316 7822 59762  
Means tested allowance:       
Annual expenses, mln. LTL   38.5 1043.1 1321.5[5] 
Mean annual benefit, LTL   14.5 353.5 156.1/171.7[6] 
# of beneficiary families   223157 245915 432549[7] 
Total expenses, mln. LTL 570.2 910.6 2115.2 1147.8 1378.5 
Notes: [1] - Definition of “family” (or benefit incidence assessment unit) is country and policy specific. [2]- 149.4 
LTL is the mean benefit of child benefit; 172.7 LTL is the mean benefit of child benefit supplement. [3] – the first 
number refers to the recipients of the child supplement; the second number refers to the recipients of the child 
benefit supplement. [4] - This benefit is included into the taxable income list, but not taxed (i.e. treated as tax 
credit). Hence, it has an impact on tax revenues too. In Scenario 1A changes in tax revenues are not taken into 
account.  [5] – The means tested allowance includes expenses on two benefits (759.0 mln. LTL on child allowance + 
562.5 mln. LTL on social allowance). [6] - 156.1 LTL is the mean benefit of child allowance; 171.7 LTL is the mean 
benefit of social allowance. [7] – the first number refers to the recipients of the child allowance; the second number 
refers to the recipients of the social allowance.  
 
Scenario 1B – budget neutral implementation of benefits  
 LT (base) EE HU SI CZ 
Applied budgetary adjustment factor (Fjl)  1.0 0.7418 0.3330* 0.4968 0.4054* 
* - Additional calibration of the Fjl factor was needed due to interactions among benefits: e.g. child benefit is included in the income 
list when calculating eligibility to a means tested allowance in CZ; allowance to large families is a taxable benefit in HU; allowance 
to large families, child benefit and birth grant are counted as income sources for the means tested benefit in HU.  
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Appendix 6: Intermediary parameters - Scenario II 
Scenario II – actual implementation of taxes and benefits (3.4528 LTL=1 EUR) 
 LT “post” EE HU SI CZ 
State income tax revenue, mln. 7549.2 7372.0 7491.6 7012.5 6730.6 
Mean monthly tax paid*, LTL 443.0 435.9 445.6 425.3 420.7 
* Only positive amounts in income tax paid are taken into account.  
 
Scenario II – budget neutral implementation of taxes and benefits* 
 LT EE HU SI CZ 
Budgetary adjustment factor for 1.0 0.3569 0.7009 0.3927 0.1091 
* Budget neutral scenario is calculated by aligning total tax revenue figures only (to the level of  the LT “post” 
environment). Budgetary adjustment factor for the benefits remains the same as in Scenario 1B.  
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Appendix 7: Intermediary parameters - Scenario III 
Lithuanian tax-benefit measures to families in Estonia 
 EE  post EE+LT (budget neutral) 
Annual (simulated) total expenses on benefits, mln. EUR 96.3 96.3 
- Birth grant  4.0 5.9 
- Child benefit 75.0 90.4 
- Child benefit supplement 16.9  
- Large family allowance 0.4  
Budgetary adjustment factor for benefits (Fjl) - 1.2805 
Annual state income tax revenue, mln. EUR 921.8 921.8
Mean monthly tax paid,  EUR 111.5 115.6 
Budgetary adjustment factor for family tax advantages - 2.8793 
 
Lithuanian tax-benefit measures to families in Hungary 
 HU post HU+LT (budget neutral) 
Annual (simulated) total expenses on benefits, mln. EUR 1613.6 1613.6 
- Birth grant  23.8 92.8 
- Child benefit 1488.0 1520.8 
- Large family allowance 63.5  
- Means tested allowance 38.3  
Budgetary adjustment factor for benefits (Fjl) - 3.0392 
Annual state income tax revenue, mln. EUR 4941.8 4941.8
Mean monthly tax paid,  EUR 170.1 169.2 
Budgetary adjustment factor for family tax advantages - 0.7170 
 
Lithuanian tax-benefit measures to families in Slovenia 
 SI post SI+LT (budget neutral) 
Annual (simulated) total expenses on benefits, mln. EUR 288.6 288.6 
- Birth grant  4.8 9.4 
- Large family allowance 9.0 279.2 
- Means tested allowance 274.8  
Budgetary adjustment factor for benefits (Fjl) - 1.2783 
Annual state income tax revenue, mln. EUR 1607.5 1607.5
Mean monthly tax paid,  EUR 163.5 172.15 
Budgetary adjustment factor for family tax advantages - 8.0528  
 
Lithuanian tax-benefit measures to families in the Czech Republic 
 CZ post CZ+LT (budget neutral) 
Annual (simulated) total expenses on benefits, mln. EUR 552.3 552.3 
- Birth grant  44.7 30.9 
- Means tested allowance (child allowance) 328.8 521.4 
- Means tested allowance (social allowance) 178.8  
Budgetary adjustment factor for benefits (Fjl) - 1.2076 
Annual state income tax revenue, mln. EUR 3596.6 3596.6 
Mean monthly tax paid,  EUR 79.8 81.8 
Budgetary adjustment factor for family tax advantages 
(Fjl) 
- 
31.8468 
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Appendix 8: What are statistically different poverty rates across simulation 
scenarios? 
Tax-benefit microsimulation models are often used to evaluate (child) poverty effectiveness of 
hypothetical public policies (e.g. Immervoll et al., 2001; Corak, Lietz and Sutherland, 2005; Levy et al., 
2009; Figari et al., 2011; etc.). The usual way of evaluating different simulation scenarios is by directly 
comparing obtained point estimates (i.e. poverty headcount, poverty gap, mean income, etc.) rather 
than by evaluating standard errors (confidence intervals) of the difference between the results. The 
same practice is observed not only in (child) poverty simulations, but also in the broader simulation 
field.  
 
In this analysis, we improve the existing practice of comparing point estimates only: we do take into 
account the co-variation between the baseline and the simulations results, when establishing if the 
difference between the two selected poverty estimates is statistically significant. As both baseline and 
simulation results are estimated on the same sample (plus, simulation is a static one, without any 
random draws), the standard error of the difference between the two point estimates of different 
scenarios is smaller than the one reported for a single point estimate (when comparing across different 
population groups within the same scenario).  
 
In the two tables below, we present an example of calculations for establishing a statistically significant 
difference between the poverty scores of different simulation scenarios. We evaluate the difference 
between the observed (baseline) and the simulated variable (i.e. poor people/poverty depth under EE, 
HU, SI or CZ policies). The evaluation is conducted on the individual level. We report the average 
difference from the baseline scenario (in percentage points) and the confidence interval (in parentheses 
below) of this difference. Statistically significant (average) poverty changes are shaded. Under the LT 
baseline, we also report the point estimates and associated standard errors (in parentheses below, at the 
95% significance level).  
 
Swap of benefits, budget neutral implementation: poverty headcount, %  
 LT baseline EE HU SI CZ 
Total 20.3 -0.0 0.3 1.4 0.9 
 (0.78) (-0.28; 0.10) (0.15; 0.49) (1.07; 1.67) (0.71; 1.09) 
Children 26.2 -0.5 0.7 3.1 1.5 
 (1.61) (-1.14; 0.07) (0.11; 1.21) (2.13; 4.11) (0.95; 2.04) 
- in large (3+) families 44.3 1.7 4.0 11.7 1.4 
 (6.27) (-0.22; 3.63) (0.82; 7.08) (6.52; 16.8) (-0.18; 2.99) 
- in single parent 45.1 -4.2 -0.8 0.0 1.4 
 (6.40) (-6.79; -1.69) (-1.9; 0.32) (-0.64; 0.68) (-0.26; 3.16) 
 
Swap of benefits, budget neutral implementation: poverty gap, % 
 LT baseline EE HU SI CZ 
Total 5.9 -0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 
 (0.39) (-0.08; -0.02) (0.15; 0.22) (0.47; 0.60) (0.45; 0.53) 
Children 7.5 -0.2 0.4 1.4 0.8 
 (0.68) (-0.32; -0.10) (0.29; 0.53) (1.14; 1.57) (0.74; 0.94) 
- in large (3+) families 12.1 0.0 1.3 4.5 1.4 
 (2.19) (-0.47; 0.43) (0.70; 1.93) (3.61; 5.38) (1.06; 1.76) 
- in single parent 13.1 -1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 
 (2.01) (-1.85; -0.64) (0.58; 1.44) (0.57; 1.49) (0.79; 1.47) 
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7.1. Main outputs 
This dissertation offers five major outputs that contribute to diverse aspects of 
public policy analysis. Two major outputs develop and discuss methodological 
concepts and approaches valuable for evidence-based distributional policy 
analysis. Three of the major outputs present new empirical evidence on the 
selected policies’ performances. Specifically, we provide new evidence on the 
distributional impacts of one monetary and one in-kind public policy instrument. 
For the former, we refer to family cash support systems in Lithuania and four 
selected new EU member states (i.e. the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and 
Slovenia). For the latter we refer to the utilisation of the national healthcare system 
in Luxembourg. We provide analysis of the distributional consequences of these 
two public policies across population sub-groups in terms of the utilisation of 
services and in terms of the monetary effects on poverty and inequality.  
Theme I of our thesis (“Disparities in Healthcare use - accounting for employment 
influences”) corresponds to two major outputs:  
- Output 1: We propose a structure of healthcare use determinants, which 
explicitly accounts for diverse institutional influences. It then suggests a 
conceptual framework, which enhances understanding of the diverse 
pathways, through which both individual and contextual employment factors 
explain differences in healthcare use;  
- Output 2: We present empirical evidence on how occupational and ethnic 
heterogeneity explains utilisation of national healthcare services in 
Luxembourg, based on the analysis of administrative social security records; 
Theme II (i.e. Distributional impacts of family cash support measures: a 
microsimulation approach) has three major outputs.:  
- Output 3: We survey the major development initiatives, the incidence and the 
reasons for the limited use of microsimulation tax-benefit models in European 
transition economies. We also include a case study of Lithuania as the most 
active country in the field;  
- Output 4: develops and utilises the partial static microsimulation benefit 
model (LitFAMOD) based on household survey data for the analysis of 
distributional impacts of Lithuanian family benefit reform;  
- Output 5: provides cross-country and microsimulation based policy evidence 
on the child poverty effectiveness of the Lithuanian family cash support 
system and offers the first-hand insights on the effectiveness and efficiency (i.e. 
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under budget neutral conditions) of the “neighbouring” countries policies if 
they were implemented in Lithuania and vice versus. 
In the next three sub-sections, we discuss in more detail the evidence we derive on 
the distributional impacts of selected public policies, conclusions regarding 
methodological approaches, conclusions regarding the corresponding data needs 
and the overall policy lessons.  
7.2. Evidence on distributional impacts of public policies 
The design of social policies in the EU is a matter of national competencies. 
Evidence on the effectiveness of national public policies is, however, shared on the 
wider EU or international level and creates a “pool” of policy design knowledge 
and associated challenges. In parallel, empirical evidence provided in this thesis 
provides both country specific and wider policy knowledge.  
National healthcare utilisation 
This dissertation studies the pattern of healthcare utilisation by diverse workers’ groups 
in Luxembourg.  
First, our research reveals that Luxembourg is a particularly interesting case for 
exploring occupational impacts on healthcare utilisation, given the country’s 
highly mobile, as well as socially and culturally diverse labour market. One of our 
major findings actually shows that employment, as an array of diverse attributes, is 
highly interlinked with the impact of other contextual surroundings and other 
socio-economic factors, such as nationality. The latter observation is particularly 
interesting given high ethnical disparities of the Luxembourg labour market. We 
observe that foreign nationals have a lower probability of contacting healthcare, be 
it ambulatory or dental care, compared to Luxembourg nationals. The same 
observation holds for the frequency of ambulatory care. However, a few foreign 
nationalities are also noted to have a higher utilisation of dental services in 
comparison to the Luxembourgish.  Our sensitivity analysis also reveals that 
omitting nationality variable leads to an overestimated role of income parameters 
and an under-estimation of non-monetary employment influences – a notable 
finding, given that many survey based studies do not have sufficient information 
for tracing the influences of ethnic backgrounds.  
Second, the study points to a major influence of employment-related use of 
healthcare.  Our findings reveal that employment characteristics are more 
powerful in explaining contact to healthcare services as compared to the frequency 
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of use. This particularly holds true for the explanation of the dental care use. The 
explicit distinguishing between individual and contextual level employment 
characteristics allows noting diversified impacts: individual level employment 
attributes are found to be more influential in explaining the use of ambulatory care, 
whereas contextual level characteristics have a stronger role for dental care. 
Employment characteristics also have heterogeneous and sometimes opposite-
signed effects on ambulatory and dental care utilisation. Overall, this finding is 
particularly true in explaining the frequency rather than the probability of a 
healthcare use.  This result also shows that the role of employment characteristics 
should be carefully explained in relation to the specific healthcare service type 
analysed. Furthermore, this finding indicates that the way healthcare services are 
defined and aggregated could highlight different utilisation patterns among 
diverse socio-economic groups.  
Our study also reveals a number of specific employment influences. We confirm 
wider literature observations that full-year and overtime work increase ambulatory 
care use, whereas being a blue-collar worker is associated with a lower use of 
dental services. Healthcare utilisation pattern, in relation to a specific occupational 
sector, company type or occupational sickness funds, presents more of unexpected 
results. Given that related initial expectations have been based on very limited and 
the country non-specific indications, the latter findings point to the need of further 
analysis. Overall, the study revealed that differentiated use of healthcare services 
by occupational group requires policy makers’ attention if higher standards in 
population health are to be achieved.  
Family cash support system 
Our findings show that the move from the means tested to a universal family benefit 
system (from 2004 to 2008) has had a small beneficial effect on poverty and 
inequality in Lithuania. More specifically, using a partial tax-benefit micro-
simulation model, we estimate a 1.5 percentage point reduction in poverty 
headcount when the reform is fully implemented. The relatively small poverty 
effect is mainly attributed to the very modest child benefit levels: from 15 EUR per 
month to children above the age 3 up to 40 EUR per month to children under age 3, 
if raised in large families.  
An indirect effect of the above reform is shown to lead to an immediate decrease of 
2 % of the number of families receiving social assistance benefits in 2005 and of 7 % 
in 2008. This indicates how interactive the family benefit system and the means-
tested social assistance system are. The interaction of a higher family benefit with 
the social assistance system implies that some household types are relatively 
“bigger” winners compared to others. For example, our simulations show that 
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single parent households benefit the least from the reforms as a result of this 
interaction. Actually, our study points out that there are almost twice as many 
single parent households (5.8% of all households) compared to households raising 
three or more children (3.3% of all households). According to various government 
documents, both of these groups are recognised as primary anti-poverty targets. 
Nevertheless, our research reveals that single parent households would obtain 
income gains comparable to those of large families only when the full reform 
scenario is implemented. If considering indirect effects (i.e. loss of social assistance 
benefits), their relative gains become even smaller.  
Despite small income improvements brought by the newly designed Lithuanian 
family allowances’ system (in 2008), its overall child poverty reduction 
effectiveness is highly limited. Our study shows that two factors are responsible: 
both the system design and the available transfers’ size. This finding relies on 
international comparisons of how effective differently designed family transfers 
could be, given Lithuanian socio-demographic settings and vice versus. 
Specifically, we evaluate the design of non-contributory cash support measured to 
families, be it transfers or tax advantages, as observed in the four other new EU 
member states that are noted to have more poverty reduction effective policies.   
Our findings show that the Lithuanian cash support system to families would be 
more child poverty effective if some means-testing policy parameters would be 
implemented. Not every means-testing policy is though necessarily the most 
effective way of reducing poverty. This dissertation shows that a mix of means-
tested and categorical benefits, sensitive to the characteristics of the poor families, 
act as the most powerful poverty combat tools. The desired design features of 
Lithuanian family support system could include a high reach of, for example, large 
families, a non-age dependent benefits’ size calculation, a relatively generous 
means-testing threshold and a benefit size, calculated in relation to the actual 
family income (rather than of the uniform size for any family type). These precise 
policy parameters seem to be driving the most successful child poverty reduction 
scenario – a reform along the lines of the Slovenian system. Under the latter policy, 
both the design (i.e. keeping state expenditures constant) and the size (i.e. 
increasing state expenditures to the relative levels as observed in the 
corresponding country) effects are actually of equal importance for large families - 
each effect achieves around a 12 percentage points reduction from the baseline 
poverty rate. This reveals a big poverty reduction capacity.  
Our simulations further show that child poverty among single parent families 
would not noticeably improve if Lithuania were to apply the systems in place in a 
series of other transition countries– especially under budget neutral conditions. 
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This reveals the specificity of Lithuanian socio-demographic conditions, as the 
analysed foreign policies have much higher poverty effectiveness in their original 
settings. It also reveals that cash support to single parent families is an effective 
poverty improving tool, though caveats apply and other support measures could 
be explored additionally.  
7.3. Conclusions on the use of methodologies in public 
policy studies 
From a methodological point of view this study is innovative in several ways.  
First, this study shows that incorporation of the social risk management theory 
could provide the so needed structure in understanding and analysing various 
levels of influences in healthcare use studies. Following this theory, we suggest 
distinguishing between the two types of contextual influences in healthcare use: 
institutional and external factors. The explicit separation of the institutional factors 
enables a clear(-er) recognition that healthcare use is not only related to individual 
choices or needs and healthcare system organization, but also is as a result of other 
public policies, such as educational policies, tax-benefit structure of the country, or 
even migration and economic policies, as observed in the case study of the 
Luxembourg labour market.  
The developed conceptual framework of employment-related influences in 
healthcare use depicts the ways individual and contextual factors interact with 
each other, and what the pathways of employment-related influences are. Our 
findings show that employment affects healthcare use in both positive and 
negative ways via its impact on health status, income effects, non-materials returns 
to work, workplace rules, work related social networks, etc. The developed 
conceptual framework, when applied to the analysis of empirical micro-data, could 
provide a more detailed explanation of inequality sources in healthcare utilisation.  
Second, this dissertation provides evidence that the microsimulation modelling 
(MSM) is insufficiently used not only in Lithuania, but also in other European 
transition countries. We confirm a big gap with respect to the diversity and 
number of MSM applications in European transition countries compared to the 
economically advanced countries. We record (at least) 113 MSM applications in 19 
OECD countries, while we find 36 records of MSM applications in 23 European 
transition countries. Furthermore, information on MSMs within the transition 
region is much scarcer in comparison to relative information abundance on MSMs 
(i.e. technical description and use) in the advanced economies.  
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Our study also reveals an outstanding gap in MSM development between the 
upper income EU member states, often referred as “beyond transition” countries, 
and (most often) the lower income non-EU countries. Income level is, though, not 
the only criterion associated with the MSM development. If it were not for the EU 
or the international development agencies, the gap in MSM development among 
these two sub-groups of transition countries would be even larger. Overall, 
international initiatives dominate the MSM development in the entire European 
transition region – about 75% of all recorded resources. In Lithuania – the country 
with the highest number of recorded MSMs (i.e. 6) - no “pure” national initiatives 
are registered at all. The only full-fledge tax-benefit MSM in Lithuania is actually 
related to the EUROMOD project – an EU-wide research activity.  
Actually, relatively few studies have explored the question of disproportionate 
lack of use of microsimulation techniques in transition economies, especially taking 
into consideration the huge need for this type of analysis in the light of the regions’ 
experiences with acute and sudden distributional changes. This dissertation shows 
that a number of multiplicative factors are responsible for the underdevelopment 
and lag of microsimulation exercises in transition countries: low political interest in 
distributional policy analysis, rapid policy changes, low research funding and 
empirical research capacity, poor quality or limited access to micro-data. Many of 
these factors are changing, explaining the higher intensity of MSM applications in 
the recent years.  
Third, it is the first time in Lithuania that public policy effects are studied in an 
integrated and coherent approach allowing evaluating the entire package of 
related government policies. The developed family benefit microsimulation model 
LitFAMOD is the first MSM application for the in-depth distributional evaluation 
purposes of the Lithuanian family cash support and social assistance systems. The 
model is actually a forerunner of a higher number of tax-benefit policies 
encompassing model, the EUROMOD. The use of the latter model is actually the 
first application of a tax-benefit microsimulation model being utilised in testing 
family transfers’ effectiveness within a comparative setting of five new EU member 
states, and particularly given a focus on the Lithuanian settings.   
7.4. Conclusions on the data needs for distributional public 
policy studies 
This dissertation relies on diverse micro and macro, survey and administrative 
data sources. Some common patterns in the use of such data types for policy 
analysis can be observed: 
Chapter 7: Conclusions P a g e  | 201 
 
1. Household surveys offer a valuable source of information and provide an 
opportunity to construct tax-benefit microsimulation models or to analyse 
healthcare use patterns. Nevertheless, they also pose a number of challenges 
for empirical studies. For example, previous studies on healthcare use are 
restricted to a very small range of reported frequencies, which limits a more 
precise analysis of healthcare utilisation patterns. This study utilised 
administrative social security records escape this limitation. We do rely on the 
EU-SILC, a household income survey, for the analysis of family cash support 
measures though. An alternative and more suitable information source has not 
yet been available given the policy question and the selection of countries. The 
latter survey has a number of its own limitations, ranging from differences in 
time reference points for income and demographics information to highly 
aggregated information on family allowance or social exclusion variables. This 
implies that other information must be utilised additionally in order to ensure 
a policy question suitable information pool.  
2. Micro level administrative records, such as social security data, offer a rich, but 
still under-developed source of information for distributional policy studies:  
a. To study healthcare utilisation in Luxembourg, we use an extremely 
rich set of cross-sectional social security data of the Luxemburg-
resident population. The data were specifically assembled for this 
project from various public institutions by the Inspection Générale de 
la Sécurité Sociale. It is the first application of a kind. The dataset could 
be further developed – a major task on its own - to analyse the 
presented healthcare use questions in more detail or for exploring 
other healthcare and public policy questions.  
b. In Lithuania, social security records are not yet utilised for the purpose 
of distributional public policy studies. Nevertheless, we find some 
evidence on the efforts of policy making institutions in collecting and 
constructing such a social security micro-database. This could be used 
in future policy studies: construction of a full tax-benefit 
microsimulation model, healthcare use studies, etc.  
3. Macro information could and is utilised as a source of complementary but 
highly valuable information in studies primarily relying on (survey or 
administrative) micro-data. For example:   
a. We validate the microsimulation results using annual external 
administrative social security information on the number of state 
transfers’ beneficiaries or total state expenses.  
b. Aggregate administrative records or other macro level information is 
also used to test how well survey included (observed) information 
aligns with external estimates, especially if information of interest 
pertains to smaller population sub-groups.  
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c. We use macro level information (i.e. municipal level) is in order to 
capture healthcare supply and other area socio-economic descriptive 
factors within our empirical study of healthcare utilisation.  
4. The pooled information from survey and administrative social security records 
would highly enhance the scope of policy analysis and the understanding on 
the causality of observed behaviours. Such pooled data sources are still rarely 
obtainable, often due to privacy concerns.  
5. Availability of panel data, either survey or administrative records, would 
permit a better description of policy functioning, i.e. healthcare utilization, 
over time. It would also allow highlighting the influence of career information 
on health status and healthcare use. Such data sources become more readily 
available, at least in some (EU) countries. Their availability is also often related 
to corresponding public institutions’ interest and capacity in supporting 
evidence based public policy analysis.   
7.5. Lessons for Public Policy Design  
The evidence on the impact of policy interventions presented in this study can be 
used to evaluate new policy initiatives, ex ante or ex post. 
The obtained evidence on how employment characteristic relate to healthcare use 
point both to potential policy responses and to the supreme benefits of analysing 
rich social security administration datasets. Actually, such empirical micro data 
could also be used for the analysis of other public policies, ranging from the family 
benefit system in Luxembourg to social insurance or income taxation system. Three 
direct policy lessons also emerge from this dissertation conducted empirical study 
on Luxembourg:  
1. Given that our study points to business and construction sectors’ workers as 
the less frequent users of the healthcare services, one should expect people 
with the occupational history from these particular sectors to accumulate 
health problems in a longer run. These occupational profiles therefore should 
be a target of further studies on potential causes of low(-er) utilisation of 
healthcare services.  
2. The policy makers aiming at improving population health in Luxembourg 
should pay a closer attention at healthcare utilisation patter of certain socio-
occupational population sub-groups. For example, special attention should be 
paid to non-Luxembourg origin, poorer and part-time working employees – all 
three attributes are associated with a below average use of healthcare services.  
Chapter 7: Conclusions P a g e  | 203 
 
3. Though the analysed Luxembourg socio-economic settings are rather unique, 
ethnically diverse labour markets are more and more present in many other 
countries. The results from this study therefore are applicable in a wider 
international context, and particularly call for a more accurate capturing of the 
roles of nationality and employment characteristics.  
The results of the dissertation can also be used to understand the effects of various 
family policy reforms, both in Lithuania and abroad. For example, as recently as 
2009, as part of the massive budgetary cuts, family benefits’ eligibility in Lithuania 
has once again been reformed and restricted to lower incomes families. The policy 
is considered as a temporary austerity measure, and no evaluation of its 
distributional impacts yet exists. Certain wider and this particular reform related 
policy lessons could be drawn:  
1. The full distributional effects of the new means-testing would go beyond the 
single policy boundaries, and should be evaluated in relation to the social 
assistance rules, as well as the general tax-benefit environment and other socio-
demographic changes in the country.  
2. Depending on the specific parameters of the implemented means-testing, large 
families could become relative “winners” in comparison to other vulnerable 
household types, such as single parents.  
3. The Lithuanian EUROMOD tax-benefit module with the underlying EU-SILC 
micro data for Lithuania is readily available to analyse the first-order effects of 
both family cash support and other policy measures.  
4. This dissertation performed family policy evaluation could be extended by 
evaluating the poverty effectiveness of the other countries policies too – the 
exercise highly in demand by many national and transnational (i.e. EU 
Commission) policy making institutions. Given numerous budgetary 
restrictions, the budget neutral simulations are of particular value when 
striving to find the most efficient and effective policy designs.  
5. The dissertation also suggests that a wider and more effective use of 
comprehensive policy analysis could be achieved by a more active exchange of 
knowledge across the national borders. As in the case of Lithuania, a number 
of microsimulation models have already been developed or are on the way of 
construction. However, unless a more active engagement in the utilisation of 
the current models by both national researchers and policy makers is obtained, 
their potential value is going to be limited.  
Overall, the thesis suggests that a comprehensive analysis of empirical micro data 
is particularly needed and useful in order not to make over-simplistic or biasing 
conclusions with respect to the distributional impacts of a single public policy. As 
we show in this dissertation, the design and evaluation of public policies is 
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dependent on many inter-linked factors, of which our knowledge is still limited. 
And even though construction of complex models, which could answer all policy 
questions, is not possible, the only way to better understand policy effects is by 
using comprehensive approaches and quality datasets in order to better grasp 
complexities of reality.  
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Samenvatting  
 
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit essays over de ex-ante en ex-post evaluatie van de 
herverdelende impact van overheidsbeleid. In een context van steeds toenemende 
druk op nationale begrotingen, van betere data en groter rekenvermogen, groeit de 
interesse voor analyse van overheidsbeleid. Hierbij gaat de aandacht in het 
bijzonder naar de doeltreffendheid, de efficiëntie en de herverdelende impact van 
het beleid. Een dergelijke beleidsanalyse stelt echter een aantal uitdagingen. Zo 
kan relevante informatie vaak enkel worden afgeleid uit de analyse van diverse, 
complexe, gegevensbronnen. De beschikbaarheid van recente data en van 
gebruiksklare analyse-instrumenten is hierbij van groot belang - zeker wanneer een 
dringende beleidsvraag voorligt. Het beleid is in de meeste gevallen ook specifiek 
voor een bepaald land, waarbij nationale instituties en de socio-demografische 
context een belangrijke invloed hebben op de uiteindelijke impact van een 
beleidsinstrument. Daarom zijn analyses op nationaal niveau zeer belangrijk. Deze 
en andere uitdagingen komen aan bod in dit proefschrift. 
In ruime zin is het doel van dit proefschrift het beleidsadvies te ondersteunen, 
opdat beleidsdoelen doeltreffend en efficiënt vervuld kunnen worden. Meer 
specifiek zal het nieuwe empirisch onderbouwde inzichten leveren over de 
herverdelende impact van beleid. Het gaat hierbij om één beleidsinstrument 
gebaseerd op monetaire transfers (namelijk inkomenssteun aan gezinnen door de 
overheid) en één beleidsinstrument dat voordelen in natura biedt (namelijk het 
gebruik van publieke gezondheidszorg). De analyse van het gebruik van 
gezondheidszorg wordt toegepast op de Luxemburgse casus. Het gezinsbeleid 
wordt onderzocht voor de nieuwe lidstaten van de Europese Unie, met bijzondere 
aandacht voor Litouwen. Deze landen en regio’s werden geselecteerd omdat ze 
ieder een bijzonder interessant sociaal-economisch en beleidskader bieden, dat tot 
op heden onvoldoende in kaart werd gebracht. 
De analyse van de geselecteerde beleidsinstrumenten houdt rekening met de 
nationale en internationale context en betreft ex-ante, ex-post en hypothetische 
beleidsanalyse. Dit proefschrift beperkt zich niet tot empirische analyse, maar 
verkent ook relevante methoden voor het intensief benutten van empirische micro-
data voor beleidsondersteuning.  
Twee hoofdstukken zijn gewijd aan gezondheidszorgbeleid. In hoofdstuk 2 
verkennen we multidisciplinaire inzichten, met name de ‘social risk management 
theory’ en de bestaande conceptuele kaders met betrekking tot het gebruik van 
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gezondheidszorg. Op basis hiervan stellen we een kader voor dat de 
determinanten van het gebruik van gezondheidszorg op een meer omvattende 
wijze in kaart brengt.In hoofdstuk 3 presenteren we empirische resultaten die 
aantonen hoe verschillende arbeidsgerelateerde factoren het individuele gebruik 
van gezondheidszorg beïnvloeden. Deze studie steunt op een ex-post analyse (voor 
het jaar 2006) van administratieve gegevens van de Luxemburgse sociale 
zekerheid. De data werden specifiek gestructureerd voor deze bepaalde analyse. 
Dit proefschrift bevat drie hoofstukken met betrekking tot microsimulatie van de 
herverdelende (armoedebestrijdende) effecten van monetaire inkomenssteun aan 
gezinnen. Hierbij komen zowel uitkeringen als belastingvoordelen aan bod. In 
hoofdstuk 4 gaan we na in welke mate microsimulatiemodellen voor uitkeringen 
en belastingen verspreid zijn in de Europese transitielanden (dit zijn de 10 nieuwe 
EU-lidstaten, plus 13 landen uit Zuidoost-Europa en het Gemenebest van 
Onafhankelijke Staten). Microsimulatiemodellen zijn voor het beleid bijzonder 
nuttige analyse-instrumenten. Ze maken het immers mogelijk om complexe en 
vaak onderling gerelateerde uitkeringen en belastingvoordelen te bestuderen. 
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt in welke mate de recente hervorming (in 2004) van de 
Litouwse gezinsuitkeringen de armoede bij gezinnen met kinderen vermindert. Dit 
is immers één van de belangrijkste doelstellingen van het systeem (de graad van 
armoederisico is bijzonder hoog in bepaalde gezinstypes, zoals bijvoorbeeld 
gezinnen met alleenstaande ouders of grote gezinnen). Voor deze analyse 
ontwikkelen we een eigen ‘partial static’ microsimulatiemodel, aangezien 
bestaande modellen niet geschikt zijn voor deze vraag. Uit de analyse blijkt dat de 
beleidshervorming die werd doorgevoerd in Litouwen weinig doeltreffend was op 
het vlak van  armoedebestrijding, zeker in vergelijking met de prestaties van 
andere nieuwe lidstaten van de EU, zoals Estland, Hongarije, Tsjechië en Slovenië. 
Deze internationale vergelijking vormt het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 6. Hier 
evalueren we de armoede-uitkomsten van het Litouws stelsel voor 
gezinsuitkeringen na een  hypothetische hervorming naar het voorbeeld van de 
voornoemde nieuwe EU-lidstaten. 
Dit proefschrift levert een aantal belangrijke bijdragen aan verschillende aspecten 
van publieke beleidsanalyse. In ruime zin ontwikkelen en bespreken we 
methodologische concepten en benaderingen die waardevol zijn voor de empirisch 
onderbouwde analyse van het herverdelend beleid. Verder presenteren we ook 
nieuwe empirische resultaten met betrekking tot de uitkomsten van de gekozen 
beleidsinstrumenten. 
Een aantal bijdragen willen we hier in het bijzonder noemen. Eén van de bijdragen 
op conceptueel vlak is dat we de ‘social risk management theory’ toepassen om de 
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verschillende institutionele determinanten voor het gebruik van gezondheidszorg 
beter in kaart te brengen. Op methodologisch vlak stellen we vast dat er nog steeds 
een kloof bestaat in de ontwikkeling van microsimulatiemodellen voor uitkeringen 
en belastingen, met name tussen EU-lidstaten met een hoger inkomen enerzijds, en 
anderzijds landen met een lager inkomen, die meestal geen deel uitmaken van de 
EU. Het inkomensniveau is echter niet het enige criterium dat verbonden is met de 
ontwikkeling van microsimulaties. De empirische bijdragen bestaan uit resultaten 
voor Luxemburg enerzijds en anderzijds voor Litouwen in een vergelijkend 
perspectief. Bij het gebruik van gezondheidszorg in Luxemburg stellen we vast dat 
het effect van de arbeidssituatie van een individu, in al haar diversiteit, sterk 
verweven is met andere socio-economische factoren, zoals etnische achtergond. 
Bovendien toont het onderzoek aan dat de arbeidskenmerken vooral een goede 
verklaring bieden voor de toegang tot  diensten van gezondheidszorg, eerder dan 
voor de frequentie van het gebruik. De analyse van het  Litouwse systeem van 
inkomensondersteuning voor gezinnen onderzoekt het effect van de hervorming 
van een systeem met middelentoets naar een universeel systeem. Het onderzoek 
wijst uit dat deze hervorming een gunstig maar beperkt effect heeft op armoede en 
ongelijkheid in Litouwen. Bovendien tonen we aan dat het ontwerp van de 
gezinsuitkeringen (in het jaar 2008) een sterker armoedereducerend effect zou 
kunnen hebben dan nu het geval is, in het bijzonder voor grotere gezinnen. 
Anderzijds tonen we aan dat bij elk van de onderzochte hypothetische 
hervormingen, het effect voor gezinnen met alleenstaande ouders veel minder 
gunstig is dan voor  grotere gezinnen. Dit geldt bij uitstek wanneer het volume van 
de uitkeringen, en dus de overheidsuitgaven, niet wordt verhoogd. Deze conclusie 
moet worden beschouwd binnen een Litouws kader, met zijn specifieke 
economische en socio-demografische kenmerken. We vinden immers sterkere 
armoedereducerende effecten wanneer we deze beleidsontwerpen toepassen 
binnen hun eigen context (namelijk Estland, Hongarije, Slovenië en Tsjechië). 
Samenvattend stelt dit proefschrift dat er een een omvattende analyse van 
empirische microdata nodig is om te eenzijdige of onevenwichtige conclusies met 
betrekking tot de herverdelende werking van één enkel beleidsinstrument te 
vermijden. Zoals we hier aantonen, is het ontwerp en de evaluatie van 
overheidsbeleid afhankelijk van vele onderling gerelateerde factoren, waarover 
onze kennis nog altijd beperkt is. Een complex model ontwerpen dat in staat is alle 
beleidsvragen te beantwoorden, is echter onmogelijk. Desalniettemin is het gebruik 
van veelzijdige benaderingen en hoogwaardige datasetsde enige manier om de 
complexe realiteit beter te vatten en beleidseffecten te verhelderen. 
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